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ABSTRACT
When, and how far, should individuals assume responsibility for their own disadvantages 
themselves, and when, in contrast to this, is it right for society as a collective body to try to 
remedy or mitigate disadvantage? Some theorists argue that in so far as disadvantages result 
from voluntary choices, they should be borne by the agents themselves and do not raise a case of 
justice for public assistance. This criterion is plausible in some cases but far from self-evident in 
others. In reality, people often fail to make the kinds of choices about what to do that we might 
hope for yet this does not necessarily make it right for them to abrogate responsibility entirely. 
And even where a voluntary choice has been made by the individual, it is not obviously right in 
every case for the individual to bear all the consequences. It is argued that in order to fully 
account for common intuitions in this area we must appeal to a more inclusive theory of 
responsibility that takes in a number of criteria of justice including, but not exhausted by, the 
presence or absence of voluntary choice. In addition to this, however, it is argued that, though 
important, justice is not the only reason why responsibility matters. We also care about 
individual responsibility because of its associations with human flourishing and because of the 
alleged moral value of autonomous choice. Whilst this pluralistic view of the value of individual 
responsibility can make it harder to arrive at definitive prescriptions about which social policies 
best advance our concerns, it is nevertheless possible to draw at least some policy conclusions. 
One important conclusion is that sometimes it is better not to hold individuals responsible for 
their past choices by denying them aid now, so that they might be better able to assume 
individual responsibility at a later date.
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AESOP’S FABLES
Hercules and the Wagoner
A farmer was carelessly driving his wagon along a muddy road when his wheels became stuck so 
deep in the clay that the horses came to a standstill. Consequently, the man dropped to his knees 
and began to pray for Hercules to come and help him without making the least effort to move the 
wagon himself. However, Hercules responded by telling him to lay his shoulder to the wheel and 
reminding him that heaven only aided those who tried to help themselves.
Pray as we may, if we do not learn to help ourselves, all our prayers will go unheeded.
(Aesop 1996: 62)
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The Ants and the Grasshopper
On a cold, frosty day the ants began dragging out some of the grain they had stored during the 
summer and began drying it. A grasshopper, half-dead with hunger, came by and asked the ants 
for a morsel to save his life.
“What did you do this past summer?” responded the ants.
“Oh,” said the grasshopper, “I kept myself busy by singing all day long and all night, too.” 
“Well then,” remarked the ants, as they laughed and shut their storehouse, “since you kept 
yourself busy by singing all summer, you can do the same by dancing all winter.”
Idleness brings want. (Aesop 1996: 11)
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1 INTRODUCTION
Individual responsibility is now very much on the political agenda. Even those who 
believe that its importance has been exaggerated in recent years -  either because the right 
conditions for assigning responsibility to individuals are rarely satisfied or because not 
enough is done to protect individuals from the more severe consequences of their choices 
and gambles -  accept that individual responsibility is at least one of the values against 
which a society and its institutions ought to be evaluated. Yet we still know surprisingly 
little about this supposed value. What, more exactly, does it mean to hold individuals 
responsible for the success or failure of their own lives? When, if ever, is this policy 
justified and on what grounds? Finally, if we value individual responsibility, which 
social policies should we favour?
What follows is an applied philosophical investigation of the above questions. Its 
approach combines conceptual analysis of individual responsibility with a much-needed 
exploration of its various normative bases and practical applications. In addition to these 
normative issues, the thesis also examines some of the many economic and political 
difficulties associated with responsibility-catering policies, and explores some rules and 
policies which could best meet our concerns.
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1.1 BACKGROUND
Much present philosophical interest in individual responsibility started with a broader 
question: what is it to live in a society of equals? In his, A Theory o f Justice, Rawls 
argued that significant progress can be made in answering this question by appealing to 
Kantian moral philosophy and, in particular, Kant’s Formula of the End in Itself:
On the contract interpretation treating men as ends in themselves implies at the 
very least treating them in accordance with principles to which they would 
consent in an original position of equality. (Rawls 1971: 180)
For Rawls, Kantian moral philosophy places particular emphasis on respect for persons, 
which in turn requires that principles be such that they can be justified to each person. 
Rawls tried to flesh out this idea by asking the following question: what principles of 
justice can be justified to each person in an original position of freedom and equality?
Rawls argued that parties to an original position of freedom and equality would agree 
upon ‘the difference principle’ for the arrangement of social and economic inequalities. 
This principle states that social and economic inequalities should be arranged so that they 
are to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged (see Rawls 1971: 302). By adopting the 
difference principle, however, Rawls left himself open to the bipartite objection that his 
conception of distributive justice violates individual liberty and, crucially for my 
investigation, is insensitive to individual responsibility.
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I think that it is worth briefly looking at the first objection because it offers some 
important insights into the second. In his stirring book, Anarchy, State and, Utopia, 
Robert Nozick argued that arranging inequalities to the greatest benefit of the least 
advantaged inevitably involves government interference in voluntary exchanges (see 
Nozick 1974: 194). This, according to Nozick, is not permitted by Kant’s Formula: on 
Nozick’s reading, treating individuals as ends in themselves has to do with respecting 
their inviolable rights to life, liberty, and property and this in turns means the State does 
not have the right to ‘arrange’ inequalities (see Nozick 1974: 30-31). Specifically, 
Nozick believed that the project in which Rawls was engaged was based on the false 
assumption that the State has at its disposal at any given time a pool of unattached 
resources to distribute as it sees fit:
However, we are not in the position of children who have been given portions of 
pie by someone who now makes last minute adjustments to rectify careless 
cutting. There is no central distribution, no person or group entitled to control all 
resources, jointly deciding how they are to be doled out. What each person gets, 
he gets from others who give to him in exchange for something, or as a gift. 
(Nozick 1974: 149)
Even without the Formula of the End in Itself, there is evidence in Kant’s political 
philosophy to suggest that he himself supported, if not an ultraminimal State, then at least 
a minimal State. For one thing, Kant thought that rightful law giving (that is, the
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legitimate use of coercive force by the State) has to do with what is necessary to prevent 
individuals interfering unjustly in other people’s lives (see, for example, Kant 1996: 24). 
Thus, Kant distinguished between ‘duties of right’ (which have to do with external 
actions) and ‘duties of virtue’ (which have to do with goals we set ourselves and freely 
choose). Although duties of benevolence are obligations to external action (to help 
others), they are also duties of virtue because they are goals that individuals set 
themselves. And it appears to follow from the above distinction that the State does not 
have the right to interfere to force individuals to benefit the less fortunate even though 
this is what the difference principle seems to imply.
On the surface, then, it looks like Rawls was at best hopeful and at worse misguided 
in appealing to Kantian philosophy to try to justify his belief that inequalities should be 
arranged so that they are to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged. However, there is 
also evidence in Kant’s work to suggest he did think that the State has the right to take 
over the benevolent activities of private groups and individuals. Kant thought that each 
citizen wills his preservation as a condition of living in a political society and that citizens 
therefore consent to the right of the sovereign to act to preserve life. For these reasons, 
Kant argued that it is in keeping with the right of the State to impose taxes on wealthy 
citizens in order to support the destitute (see Kant 1996: 101).
Nevertheless, there is a further wrinkle. Kant’s comments on institutional 
beneficence reveal that he was selective over who has a claim to help. When Kant 
considers the right of the State in respect of benevolence he claims only that the State has
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a right to help ‘those members of society who cannot help themselves’ (Kant 1996: 101) 
and ‘the helpless poor’ (cited in Williams 1983: 197). Kant expressly rejects 
arrangements for benevolence that ‘make poverty a means of acquisition for the lazy.’ He 
describes these arrangements as ‘an unjust burdening of the people by government’ (Kant 
1996: 101). We must assume, therefore, that Kant was not opposed to the State playing 
an instrumental role in benefiting the poor but with the additional proviso that it is only 
just to intervene to help individuals who cannot help themselves (as opposed to those 
who can).
This last mentioned point leads directly to the second objection against Rawls. 
Rawls’ difference principle specifies that inequalities should be arranged so that they are 
to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged. However, as Will Kymlicka pointed out in 
his Contemporary Political Philosophy, this potentially ignores the fact that some 
individuals have fewer resources than others due to their own choices (see Kymlicka 
1990: 73-76). According to Kymlicka, one example that illustrates this point very well is 
Ronald Dworkin’s retelling of Aesop’s fable of the Ants and the Grasshopper. Suppose 
there are two equally talented individuals who share the same social background and have 
an opportunity to privately own and use equally valuable sets of land and material 
resources. One wants to be a market gardener and selects land and raw materials that will 
allow him to produce as much of what others want as possible. The other person wants a 
similar amount of land and raw materials but for use as a tennis court. Assuming the 
market gardener is more successful at trading with other members of the community, he 
will soon have a greater share of resources than the tennis player. What should we do?
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To insist on the status quo, we would have to redistribute some of the market gardener’s 
resources in favour of the tennis player. Yet we hardly think this outcome fair. Justice 
appears to require that people who choose less productive occupations, as measured by 
what other people want, have fewer resources in consequence (see Dworkin 1981 b: 304- 
305).
It seems, therefore, that Dworkin’s work on equality contains an important criticism 
of Rawls’ difference principle. Whilst Dworkin’s aim has been to explore which 
conception of equality (equality of welfare or equality of resources) states the more 
attractive political ideal, he also appeared to uncover an important truth about equality, 
namely, that an equal society is one in which the distribution of resources is sensitive to 
individual responsibility. Whereas Nozick rejected the ideal of social justice, and 
appealed to fundamental rights of life, liberty, and property to build a case against 
government intervention in market outcomes, Dworkin had revealed how subtler 
conclusions about when it is right for the State to intervene could be reached by 
incorporating greater sensitivity to individual responsibility into egalitarian arguments 
about social justice.
A sophisticated egalitarian, then, believes in equality but does not necessarily believe 
that all disadvantages are unfair. Some disadvantages are rightly borne by the agents 
themselves. And this is the crux of the second objection against Rawls’ difference 
principle. Kymlicka argued that in aiming to maximise the position of the least well off, 
the difference principle ignores the morally relevant fact that some people are worse off
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as a result of their own choices, and so do not have a right to assistance (see Kymlicka 
1990: 73-76). Rawls was aware of this objection and attempted to respond to it in his 
later work. Rawls’ various strategies to incorporate sensitivity to individual 
responsibility within his contract approach raise important issues that I shall explore later. 
But for the moment I want to stress that even though virtually all egalitarians now accept 
the basic premise that equality should be responsibility-sensitivity, at least to some 
degree, there are different versions of responsibility-sensitivity.
Some egalitarians defend a form of egalitarianism that incorporates within it a generic 
distinction between choice and luck. The basic thought behind this iuck egalitarianism’ 
(Anderson 1999: 289) is that individuals should be compensated for those inequalities 
that reflect bad luck but not for those that flow from their own voluntary choices. 
Nevertheless, there is as yet no settled view about the exact meaning of this distinction.
G. A. Cohen, for example, recognises the contribution of Dworkin in highlighting the 
importance of responsibility-sensitivity but argues that Dworkin has not always remained 
true to the basic ideal (see Cohen 1989: 933). Hence, whereas Dworkin believes that it is 
right to hold people personally responsible for their individual tastes and preferences, 
except where they suffer from a craving or obsession that is aptly viewed as a handicap, 
Cohen thinks that the distinction between choice and luck cuts through all dimensions of 
human disadvantage, judging certain disadvantages to be fair and others to be unfair 
depending on the degree of choice (see Cohen 1989: 921). For Cohen, this means that 
personal tastes and preferences do raise a case for compensation or subsidy if they are 
unchosen (see Cohen 1989: 932).
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For his part, Dworkin claims that it is Cohen who misunderstands the true 
significance of the distinction between choice and luck. He points out that people’s 
personal tastes, preferences, ambitions, desires, and so on, are educated by underlying 
beliefs, convictions, and judgements of different sorts. As such, it would strike us as 
‘bizarre’ for someone to claim compensation for his unchosen preferences (Dworkin 
2000: 290). For Dworkin, the morally relevant distinction is between ‘personality’ 
(which ordinarily do not raise a case for compensation) and ‘circumstances’ (which he 
argues might in some cases) (see Dworkin 2000: 323).
However, the intricacies do not end here. Dworkin suggests that in reality there is a 
close interplay between personality and circumstances. But the problem is that 
circumstances are not equal from the start -  some people are more talented than others; 
people face unequal chances of being made redundant; some people have physical 
handicaps that others do not; some people are predisposed to certain diseases; people 
have access to different levels of information about risk; some people can pay more than 
others for health care because they have more income; and so on. These interactions pose 
a ‘strategic problem’ for the egalitarian planner. How do we identify, at any particular 
time, that component of personal disadvantage that is traceable to differential 
circumstances as distinguished from differential ambitions? (See, for example, Dworkin 
1981^: 313-4; 2000: 322-5).
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Dworkin’s proposed solution to the strategic problem is to entertain the following 
thought experiment. We are asked to imagine a hypothetical situation in which everyone 
faces the same antecedent chance of suffering a range of misfortunes and the same means 
with which to purchase insurance against different outcomes. Faced with the difficult 
question of deciding which situations are rightly a matter of individual responsibility and 
which should be remedied by society at large, the egalitarian planner should look at the 
kinds of decisions that would be made by people within the hypothetical insurance 
market. Dworkin applies this thought experiment to a variety of different disadvantages, 
ranging from physical disability and lack of talent through to disease and injury, and on to 
redundancy and being bom to poor parents (see his 2000: chs. 2, 8 and 9).
Dworkin was certainly not the first egalitarian philosopher to employ a thought 
experiment to flesh out principles of justice. Rawls, in A Theory o f Justice, placed 
individuals behind a metaphorical veil of ignorance. But Dworkin was arguably the first 
to underscore the importance of the distinction between choice and luck for debates about 
distributive justice. It has been suggested (at least in the verbal tradition) that Rawls’ 
own formulation also depends on the distinction between choice and luck. By way of 
evidence for this claim, it is pointed out that among the essential features of the original 
position is the fact that no one knows his own fortune in the distribution of natural assets 
and abilities (see Rawls 1971: 12). This is certainly consistent with the claim that society 
should try to eliminate the influence of brute luck on distribution. However, even though 
Rawls argues that ‘no one deserves his place in the distribution of native endowments, 
any more than one deserves one’s initial starting place in society’ (Rawls 1971: 104), he
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also distances his principles of justice (including the difference principle) from the idea 
that we should redress the bias of natural contingencies in the direction of strict equality 
(see Rawls 1971: 101).
Perhaps the main reason for Rawls’ ambivalence towards the principle of redress is 
his belief in the impossibility of redressing the bias of social contingencies and natural 
fortune on distributive shares as long as the institution of the family exists -  the family 
being one of the basic institutions of a political society, responsible for ensuring the 
normal development of future generations (see, for example, Rawls 1971: 74). But 
whatever the reason, I agree with Samuel Scheffler that it makes questionable sense to 
interpret Rawls as engaged in the same work as Dworkin and Cohen, namely, to defend 
and render more explicit the distinction between choice and luck (see Scheffler 2003: 8- 
12). Rather, we should say that, for Rawls, the central business of egalitarian theory is to 
identify principles of justice -  which principles incorporate a social division of 
responsibility -  acceptable to everyone under conditions of freedom and equality.
There are, then, different ways to reconstruct the basic egalitarian impulse. But what, 
if any, are the implications of this? One implication is that there is more than one 
rationale of justice for denying aid to the lazy or for refusing to give extra resources to 
people with expensive tastes. However, a further implication is that there are egalitarians 
who do not believe that it would be unjust to (1) offer income to the idle and (2) give 
additional resources to people with expensive tastes. On the first point, some egalitarians 
contend that everybody has a right to at least some unconditional income, even people
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who want to surf all day. Philippe Van Parijs, for example, defends unconditional 
income on the grounds of ‘real freedom for all* (see Van Parijs 1991; 1995). On the 
second point, whereas Rawls and Dworkin think that it is right to assign responsibility to 
individuals for the satisfaction of their tastes and preferences (see Rawls 1996: 186; 
Dworkin 1981 b), Cohen and Ameson affirm that unchosen tastes and preferences do raise 
a case for compensation (see Cohen 1989; and Ameson 1989).
Further discrepancies in egalitarian thinking about justice are brought out in Elizabeth 
Anderson polemical article, “What is the Point of Equality?” Anderson regards recent 
work on the idea of equality as being dominated by the claim that individuals should be 
held responsible for the consequences of their choices but not for bad luck. According to 
Anderson, however, the more fundamental task is to identify a division between 
individual and collective responsibility that shelters people from oppressive relationships 
and enables them to live as human beings, pursue their own conceptions of the good, and 
participate in the economic and political life of the community (see Anderson 1999: 312). 
Anderson argues that adhering to the idea of choice and responsibility entails treating 
individuals in ways that we have other egalitarian reasons not to want to treat them. It 
entails, for example, that society should deny emergency medical treatment to individuals 
injured as a result of their own negligent actions; that it is acceptable to exclude certain 
sections of the disabled community from public places if they are responsible for their 
own disabilities; that government agencies should withhold disaster relief from farmers 
who knowingly set up production in hazardous geographical areas; that society has a right 
not to compensate public service workers (such as fire-fighters) for any injuries they
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might suffer as a result of carrying out their dangerous duties; and that individuals should 
accept the present system of market-based rewards as the unintended result of people’s 
free choices, even though the present system fails to recognise the work undertaken by 
female carers in the home, leaving such women vulnerable to exploitation, violence, and 
domination at the hands of men (see Anderson 1999: 295-298).
Divergence between theories of justice is replicated in differences between the 
welfare ethos’s of different countries. In some countries, for example, moral and political 
discourse about social welfare policy starts from the assumption that individuals should 
fend for themselves wherever possible and, therefore, that government should aim to help 
only a relatively small number of severely disadvantaged people. However, not every 
country is like Britain and the United States in its attitudes towards social welfare. In 
Sweden, for instance, it is the move away from collective responsibility that stands in 
need of justification:
The welfare state in Sweden is universalist and egalitarian in that it seeks to 
provide for the whole population rather than to target resources on groups with 
special needs. Welfare is intended to integrate rather than to divide the members 
of society. Social citizenship confers upon Swedes a wide range of welfare 
entitlements which are designed to provide the decent (rather than the minimum) 
standard of living that is considered appropriate to an advanced democracy. 
(Digby 1989: 12)
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History can help to explain these variations in ethos between countries. In the United 
States, for example, the presumption has been against government intervention in matters 
of personal welfare, and some historians trace this rugged individualism back to the 
pioneering spirit of the early American experience, where an ethos of individual initiative 
and self-help was bom of necessity rather than choice (see Digby 1989: 15). In addition 
to this, some view differences in social welfare provision between different countries as 
reflecting the degree of social integration and homogeneity that exists within each 
country. As David Willetts has recently suggested:
The basis on which you can extract large sums of money in tax and pay it out in 
benefits is that most people think the recipients are people like themselves facing 
difficulties that they themselves could face. If values become more diverse, if 
lifestyles become more differentiated, then it becomes more difficult to sustain 
the legitimacy of a universal risk pooling welfare state. People ask; why should I 
pay for them when they are doing things that I wouldn't do? This is America 
versus Sweden. You can have a Swedish welfare state provided that you are a 
homogeneous society with intensely shared values. In the United States you have 
a very diverse, individualistic society where people feel fewer obligations to 
fellow citizens. Progressives want diversity, but they thereby undermine part of 
the moral consensus on which a large welfare state rests. (Quoted in Goodhart 
2004: 24)
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However, the differences between countries also raise the following normative questions. 
What is the right ethos of responsibility? To what extent are dissimilarities in the way 
different countries deal with issues of personal responsibility morally justified? Is there a 
definitive set of rules to which every country must conform or are there simply a number 
of just policies and just outcomes?
Bringing all of the foregoing points together, since there is more than one theory 
about the link between justice and responsibility-sensitivity and more than one theory 
about the right criteria for assigning consequential responsibility to individuals, more 
needs to be said to make good the claim that the choice/luck distinction should be 
operative in deciding what is a just division of consequential responsibility. One of the 
main aims of my investigation is to try to bring out the limitations of a purely choice- 
based approach to individual responsibility.
It should also not be forgotten that individual responsibility is widely discussed in 
many contexts and not only in terms of specifying whether or not people’s disadvantages 
are in some sense chosen. In fact support for individual responsibility can take many 
forms. One obvious place to start is with the beneficial consequences of individual 
responsibility for society. In his classic text on the merits of individual initiative, for 
example, the Victorian thinker Samuel Smiles focused on the endeavours of great 
historical figures to point out the merits of self-help for the general good, including in the 
fields of industry, science, and the arts (see Smiles 1859). More recently, individual 
responsibility has been offered as the right solution to some of the most difficult and
22
pressing social welfare problems of our age. How can the next generation support an 
ageing population in retirement? How do we cover the cost to health services of treating 
smoking-related diseases? How can we fund more students going to university? Can 
society afford to support the idle? How can the State be expected to make people happy?
The possible advantages of individual responsibility are not confined to society. It is 
an open question whether government should support the idle. But even in those 
societies where the idle do receive an income, one reason often given as to why 
individuals should try to support themselves through work, wherever possible, is that it is 
in their best interests to do so. In his investigation of these issues, for example, David 
Schmidtz points to studies in the United States which reveal how individuals who rely on 
welfare benefits are more likely to remain in poverty than those who make an effort to 
find work and provide for themselves. This sort of argument provides a ready answer to 
people who ask: ‘Why, if nobody else is trying to work for a living, should I?’ If there is 
an argument from self-interest for people to work for a living, then this argument is 
unaffected by non-compliance on the part of other similarly-situated people. In fact, non- 
compliance by others may even improve a person’s chances of gaining a good job in the 
sense of removing at least some of the competition. Part of the attraction of individual 
responsibility is also that it adds to the self-respect of those who exercise it. It has been 
argued, for example, that by earning a wage and being financially self-reliant individuals 
gain a level of self-respect that they might not otherwise achieve.
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There is, then, potentially much more to debates about the just division of 
consequential responsibility than talk of choice-sensitivity and there is no reason why 
theories of justice should exclude reasons to do with the consequences of different 
assignments of responsibility; at any rate, no reason I can think of. However, an 
additional complication that I intend to explore in this investigation is that justice is not 
the only thing that matters. Some people argue that assigning responsibility is not only 
about justice but also about promoting the good life.
What do I mean by ‘the good life’ and how is it linked to individual responsibility? 
One straightforward answer is that individual responsibility is sometimes depicted as a 
virtue, as a character trait it is desirable for people to have. (I do not deny that virtues are 
sometimes explained and defended in terms of beneficial consequences but that is not 
necessarily the case. We sometimes define virtue independently of any benefits it might 
bring to individuals and society at large.) Some historical perspective should help to 
make this plain. The Poor Laws of England were an early attempt to improve the quality 
of life of the poor. However, its critics argued that its overall affect was to remove a key 
incentive to the virtues of hard work and self-reliance:
The labouring poor, to use a vulgar expression seem always to live from hand to 
mouth. Their present wants employ their whole attention, and they seldom think 
of the future. Even when they have an opportunity of saving, they seldom 
exercise it; but all that they earn beyond their present necessities goes, generally 
speaking, to the alehouse. The poor law may, therefore, be said to diminish both
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the power and the will to save among the common people, and thus to weaken 
one of the strongest incentives to sobriety and industry, and consequently to 
happiness. (Malthus 1992: 101)
The Victorians, then, associated the Poor Laws with a variety of undesirable character 
traits ranging from indolence and dependency to imprudence, drunkenness, and sexual 
impropriety. Indeed, in 1888 the Select Committee on Poor Relief declared that:
The out-door relief has a great tendency to make the poor more improvident than 
they are already; it indisposes them to take advantage of savings banks and 
provident clubs . . .  it is very detrimental to the moral character of the recipients, 
it not only takes away their independence, but also has a very bad effect upon 
their relations; it prevents them from accepting their natural responsibilities. The 
children, for instance, learn to think that they have no responsibilities towards 
their parents, and that they need not take care of them in old age. And then, again 
another important evil is that it certainly acts . . .  as a stimulus to population; 
persons are disposed to marry even with more improvidence than they do now, 
when they think at any rate they will have out-door relief for their children if they 
are in distress. (Quoted in Johnson 1986: 444-5)
It is perhaps a gloomy picture of human nature that says when work is not necessary 
to live people tend not to work, when having more children than people can afford to look 
after triggers support from others people tend not to exercise birth control, and when there
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is charity from government there is no incentive to save for the future and no reason not 
to spend all day in the alehouse. Even so, it is a picture that endures in the work of the 
New Right. In one of the defining studies of the period, Losing Ground: American Social 
Policy 1950-1980, Charles Murray argued that reforms in American social policy -  such 
as the introduction of AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent Children) and a change of 
rules allowing families with unemployed husbands to claim AFDC -  did not stop women 
having more children than they could afford to support and only succeeded in eroding 
among the poorest sections of American society the principles of hard work, individual 
initiative, and self-reliance.
Once it was assumed that the system is to blame when a person is chronically out 
of work and that the system is even to blame when a person neglects spouse and 
family, then the moral distinctions were eroded. The first casualty inevitably was 
the moral approbation associated with self-sufficiency. In the 1950s, the reason 
for “getting people off welfare” was to keep them from being drag on the good 
people -  meaning the self-sufficient people -  and to rescue them from a 
degrading status. It was not necessary to explain why it was better to be self- 
sufficient; it was a precondition for being a member of society in good standing.
In the late 1960s, with the attack on middle-class norms and the rise of the 
welfare rights movement, this was no longer good enough. Self-sufficiency was 
no longer taken to be an intrinsic obligation of healthy adults. (Murray 1984:
180)
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Much the same argument was later put by then President Ronald Reagan in his State of 
the Union message to Congress in 1986:
After hundreds of billions of dollars in poverty programs, the plight of the poor 
grows more painful. But the waste in dollars and cents pales before the most 
tragic loss -  the sinful waste of human spirit and potential. We can ignore this 
terrible truth no longer. As Franklin Roosevelt warned 57 years ago standing 
before this chamber . . . welfare is “a narcotic, a subtle destroyer of the human 
spirit.” And we must now escape the spider’s web of dependency . . .  I am 
talking about real and lasting emancipation, because the success of welfare 
should be judged by how many of its recipients become independent of welfare 
(quoted in Goodin 1998: 335).
If Murray and Reagan were right to claim there had been some erosion of American 
values during the 1950s and 1960s, the commitment of American politicians to these 
values has remained intact. Successive administrations in the United States have 
appealed to ‘the traditional American values’ in defending welfare reforms. In 1996, for 
example, the House of Representatives endorsed the Individual Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of that year in the following terms:
The welfare system contradicts fundamental American values that ought to be 
encouraged and rewarded: work, family, individual responsibility and self- 
sufficiency. (quoted in Goodin 1998: 103n.l0)
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Perhaps it was a reflection of the electoral success of Reagan during the 1980s or a 
testament to the ‘special relationship’ between Britain and the United States during this 
period that Margaret Thatcher espoused a similar set of values for the British people. But 
if Thatcherism was characterised, at least in part, by an attack on ‘dependency culture’, 
the political trend in upholding individual responsibility as an important virtue has not 
significantly been reversed by New Labour in Britain. Tony Blair has likewise exploited 
the language of individual responsibility (taking the clothes of the Right) to place himself 
in a tradition of thought that extols hard work, delayed gratification, thrift and self- 
reliance. As he puts it:
Our vision is of . . . [a] society where more opportunities, and more choices, are
matched by a greater responsibility on the part of individuals to help themselves.
(Blunkett 2001: vi)
The ideal of individual responsibility, then, has historically played a key role in 
political debates about the proper aims, scope, and workings of the ‘the Welfare State’. 
On the surface that debate is about the best use of taxpayers’ money and the most 
efficient ways to promote individual responsibility but the underlying normative issues 
are about the kind of society we want to live in and the values we hold dear. 
Understanding the importance of individual responsibility, therefore, involves 
understanding a range of complex issues including but not exhausted by justice. The
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questions are these. What do we owe to each other? Which policies are in our best 
interests? How should we live? What kind of society is best?
I do not deny that luck egalitarians in arguing against flat equality have discovered an 
important truth about individual responsibility. But what I want to emphasise here is the 
rich intellectual history associated with this ideal. The point is not that justice provides 
an insufficient reason for extending the scope of individual responsibility and reducing 
the welfare state. Rather, the more subtle point is that we can offer a whole series of 
moral justifications for greater individual responsibility.
1.2 THE THESIS
Notwithstanding this last revealed intricacy, the thesis takes as its starting point a 
question about distributive justice. When and how far should individuals take 
responsibility for the disadvantages or misfortunes of their own situations themselves, 
and when, in contrast to this, is it right that society as whole, through the institutions of 
the State, take responsibility for remedying or mitigating these outcomes? I shall argue 
that in certain cases voluntary choice can provide a sufficient reason for assigning 
responsibility to individuals for the situations in which they find themselves. Few people 
seriously think, for example, that a person who chooses to quit a well paid job in order to 
relax on a beach somewhere for a few months should not be held personally responsible 
for at least some of his diminished income. Nor does it seem unfair that a person who
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chooses to live near the San Andreas fault because property is cheap and he likes the wide 
open spaces should have to pay more for his home insurance to take account of the higher 
probability of earthquakes.
However, I shall also try to show that choice is not a sufficient condition in every 
case. From the fact that a person has chosen a certain course of action it does not 
necessarily follow that he or she should be held personally responsible for the 
consequences. For example, people give up work for a variety of different reasons. One 
person might take a less well-paid job to fulfil a lifelong ambition, or give up work to go 
to university. Another person might be looking after an elderly parent. Someone else 
might be waiting for a job suitable to his skills and experience. It is at least debatable in 
these cases whether a person should be held personally responsible for his or her 
diminished income. Similarly, consider the injuries suffered by police officers, fire­
fighters, members of the armed forces, and so on, as they try to save lives and defend 
national security. Surely we do not think these people have no right to public assistance 
merely because they have voluntarily chosen to do this work.
Nor is it obvious that voluntary choice is a necessary condition of assigning 
consequential responsibility to individuals. From the fact that a disadvantage or 
misfortune is unchosen it does not follow that we should collectivise responsibility for the 
cost of relieving that disadvantage or misfortune. People often react from instinct to the 
situations they are presented with, or they fall into habitual patterns of behaviour. Yet we 
do not always say that individual responsibility is thereby abrogated. So even though the
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criterion of voluntary choice offers a plausible starting point from which to begin 
explaining our intuitions about consequential responsibility, in many cases we need a 
more sophisticated account.
Some look to second-order preferences and attitudes for this additional bit of 
complexity. Dworkin, for example, alleges that we commonly draw an ethical distinction 
between circumstances and personality. We tend to think of our personal tastes, 
preferences, desires, ambitions, and so on, as defining our ends, whereas we see our 
income, talent, opportunity and so on, as defining the means we have at our disposal for 
achieving our ends. Because of this, it would, according to Dworkin, strike us as bizarre 
for government to offer compensation for unsatisfied ends. Now, in some cases it 
appears that Dworkin is quite right. Consider someone who sets out to develop 
champagne tastes precisely because he wants to ape the lifestyles of the rich and famous; 
he wants tastes the vast majority of people cannot afford to satisfy. It would surely 
destroy the point of these tastes for government to offer subsidy or compensation. 
However, not every expensive taste or preference can be described in these terms. At 
least in some cases it is not unreasonable that taxpayers should subsidise expensive tastes 
because of the arbitrary expense of the taste. This compensation is owed not in spite of 
the fact that individuals identify with these things but because it is unreasonable that they 
should have to pay more to get what they want through no fault of their own. Dworkin, 
then, fails to apply criteria of choice, luck, and personality consistently; this, at any rate, is 
what I shall try to argue.
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That being the case, I should make it clear that I do not intend to dispute the 
relevance of facts about the genesis of people’s disadvantages and facts about second- 
order identification. As I have already said, I believe voluntary choice can provide a 
sufficient reason for assigning some consequential responsibility to individuals in some 
cases. I also think second-order attitudes can help to ground individual responsibility in 
cases where choice is missing. Nevertheless, I do not think divisions of consequential 
responsibility can be determined exclusively by these reasons; not, that is, if we want 
them to be just.
What I propose, therefore, is an inclusive theory of consequential responsibility that 
supplements existing theories with an account of reasonableness, where reasonableness is 
understood in terms of striking a balance between many types of reason including but not 
exhausted by the choice/luck distinction and personality. The following types of reason 
are explained and defended in chapter 5.
I. The distinction between choice and luck.
n. Whether or not an agent identifies with his tastes and preferences.
HI. Special responsibilities.
IV. Desert.
V. Concerns about free-riding.
VI. Sufficiency.
VII. Maximin.
VIII. Simple equality.
32
IX. Utilitarian reasons.
X. Prioritarian reasons.
However, there is a further issue I intend to explore. Concentrating solely on recent 
egalitarian literature can give the impression -  false in my view -  that reasons of justice 
are the sole reasons why it makes a difference that we make the right divisions of 
responsibility. Or if not the sole reasons, then self-evidently the most important reasons. 
Nevertheless, a second aim of my thesis is to try to motivate the claim that justice is not 
the only value which supports making the right divisions of responsibility and perhaps not 
even the decisive value. For example, even a brief survey of the literature on social 
welfare policy over the past two hundred years or so reveals a number of grounds for 
promoting individual responsibility not least human flourishing (the idea that doing 
everything in one’s power to be self-reliant is part of what it means to lead a flourishing 
human life) and autonomy (that taking control of one’s personal ends by adjusting them 
over time to fit one’s changing circumstances is a valuable exercise of autonomous 
choice).
Once we accept a pluralistic view of the value of individual responsibility, however, 
we open up the possibility of value conflict. The result is that we require either a way of 
balancing competing reasons of justice and values that appear to support a different 
approach to responsibility or else rules that tell us the order of priority between these 
reasons and values. The position I shall try to defend is that it is difficult to develop non- 
arbitrary priority rules at the level of first principle and so it should be regarded as rightly
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a matter for each society to decide (through democratic decision-making) exactly how 
much weight is given to different reasons and values at any given time. This, however, 
must take place within a framework in which some weight is given to all relevant reasons 
and values. My hope is that understanding more about the diverse rationales for 
individual responsibility will lead to a more sophisticated theory of the subject matter 
against which to assess current welfare systems around the world. In summary, my 
overall aim is not to undo the work that other writers have done in defending 
responsibility-catering egalitarianism, but to show the ideal of individual responsibility in 
its true light and to explore its normative bases and implications for public policy in more 
depth than has previously been done.
So much, then, by way of general introduction to the key arguments of the thesis. I 
now want to briefly explain how it is structured. In chapter 2 I clarify the concept of 
individual responsibility. Here I survey contemporary uses of the language of individual 
responsibility in philosophy, politics, law, social policy, applied ethics and ordinary 
discourse, to find shared senses. I start by looking at how the words ‘personal’ and 
‘individual’ qualify ‘responsibility’, and then consider some of the various disadvantages 
for which individuals might conceivably be held responsible. Finally, I shall distinguish 
different senses of responsibility, and try to highlight two senses most relevant to issues 
of social justice and welfare: consequential and preventive responsibility.
In chapters 3 ,4 , and 5 I critically assess three theories of consequential responsibility. 
Chapter 3 focuses on the principle that inequalities arising out of voluntary choices
34
should be bome by the agents themselves and so do not raise a case for redistribution. To 
test this principle I start by looking more closely at so-called cases of ‘voluntary 
unemployment’. I consider various kinds of people who do not work for a living even 
though they are of working age and generally thought to be capable of holding down a job 
in a time of no particular shortage of opportunity. I argue that in many such cases it is 
misleading to say that a person made a conscious decision to remain unemployed, but 
nevertheless it may be right to hold him or her personally responsible and deny welfare 
benefits. In this chapter I also take up cases of people who even though they do make a 
‘deliberate choice’ to operate outside of the traditional labour market (such as non-wage- 
eaming carers). I shall argue that they still might have a reasonable claim to taxpayers’ 
money on the strength of the contribution they make to society. Chapter 3 also 
investigates cases where individuals put themselves at risk of disease or personal injury -  
people who, for example, increase their chances of contracting certain diseases by 
smoking, and people who risk serious injury because they engage in dangerous 
professions and pastimes. Again, I shall try to motivate the claim that a just result cannot 
be determined solely by looking at the choices people make in accepting risks they could 
avoid, but should also consider the usefulness to society of the behaviour in question.
Chapter 4 enquires into the role of second-order attitudes in theories of consequential 
responsibility. This chapter focuses mainly on Dworkin’s argument that people are 
rightly held consequentially responsible for their happiness and preference satisfaction by 
virtue of the fact that most people ordinarily identify with their personal ends. Following 
Dworkin’s article, “Equality of Welfare”, I am going to focus the discussion around the
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example of Louis who develops expensive tastes he cannot afford to satisfy. I will argue 
that although Dworkin is correct in saying that it is bizarre to compensate people for 
having expensive tastes if they develop those tastes because they are expensive, it is 
important not to read too much into this insight. Some individuals should have access to 
subsidy because through no fault of their own the things they dislike are cheap and the 
things they like expensive -  tastes and preferences with which they identify but should 
not be penalised for doing so.
In chapter 5 I shall argue that reasonableness has a crucial role to play in the way 
consequential responsibility is assigned. Though a number of writers seem committed to 
some version of reasonableness, I shall argue that the most appealing conception focuses 
on what can be justified to people on the basis of a balance of reasons, formal and 
normative. I shall distinguish between ‘formal’ and ‘inclusive’ theories of consequential 
responsibility. Following on from this, I try to cash out some the criteria of responsibility 
that I believe are wrongly ignored by formal theories. I then explore how these reasons 
are to be balanced and attempt to motivate the idea that policies of shared responsibility 
are often the right way of balancing the reasons at any given time. Then, returning to the 
examples considered in chapters 3 and 4, I try to motivate the case for the inclusive 
approach to consequential responsibility. Here I draw some conclusions about what 
justice requires under this approach and try to explain why inclusive theories offer a 
better fit with common intuitions about consequential responsibility than formal theories. 
Finally, I consider some possible replies on the part of the choice theorist.
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In chapter 6 1 move beyond narrow issues of justice and look into some other possible 
reasons why we care about, or should care about, individual responsibility. I examine the 
claim that we should promote individual responsibility because it is part of a good human 
life. I also explore possible conflicts between the strict demands of justice and the good 
life. I will not attempt to discuss every possible source of tension, but I do want to give 
some examples of value conflict that are striking. These are, firstly, that it could be 
desirable to encourage people to be more self-reliant, to delay gratification, and to adjust 
their personal ends in the light of change even though strictly speaking it is not unjust for 
them to claim extra resources, and secondly, that sometimes it is desirable not to force 
people to bear the adverse consequences of their past choices so that they might be better 
able to assume responsibility or lead a more responsible life later on. In this chapter I 
also say something in general terms about how we balance these different responsibility- 
catering values.
Finally, chapter 7 considers further difficulties which inevitably arise when trying to 
implement the various reasons and values discussed. At the level of public policy we can 
no longer be concerned exclusively with the right and the good but must also take into 
account what is feasible as defined by such as issues as cost, efficiency, and political will. 
Clearly it is a matter of tremendous complexity which policies will be feasible for a 
country, given its particular economic, social and political circumstances. But I think 
political philosophy can fulfil an important function even here in terms of making clear 
the different policy options, clarifying both the moral and practical considerations in play, 
and seeing how these considerations bear on specific policy issues. The issues I am going
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to consider range from general questions about the proper limits of state intervention and 
the basic functions of government to particular problems with specific policy proposals 
such as whether there should be eligibility tests for unemployment benefits given that 
these can have harmful unintended consequences for those incapable of work, and the 
principle that sometimes it is more efficient to prevent disadvantage than impose 
consequential responsibility for it.
1.3 METHOD
So far I have outlined the main arguments of the thesis and briefly described how the 
chapters are structured. I now want to take up one important question of method. We 
have seen that there are different theories about when it is right to assign consequential 
responsibility to individuals for the situations in which they find themselves, and when, 
on the other hand, it is right to assign responsibility to citizens as a collective body. This 
calls forth a question about how principles of consequential responsibility are to be 
justified: what rational arguments can be put forward in support of principles of 
consequential responsibility?
It is worth pointing out that philosophers do not always disagree about how principles 
may be justified. In fact, most of the writers discussed in my thesis share the view that 
people are moral equals and so have a right to equal concern from the State in matters of 
distribution. And most of these writers, if not all, think it a proper aim of political
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philosophy to try to elucidate a set of principles that best capture this ideal. Other things 
remaining equal, egalitarians endorse whichever principles lay strongest claim to treating 
citizens as equals (see, for example, Dworkin 1981a: 185; 1985: 205; 2000: 2; Cohen 
1989: 908; Rakowski 1991: 19; and Anderson 1999: 289).
However, even if there is broad agreement over how principles may be justified, the 
difficulty remains that each of these writers defends a different egalitarian conception. 
Whereas Cohen believes that eliminating involuntary disadvantage is most in keeping 
with a society of equals, Dworkin and Rakowski have argued that this approach ignores 
relevant facts about people’s second-order preference and attitudes, which facts support a 
case for greater individual responsibility. Anderson, on the other hand, claims that 
leaving individuals to bear the misfortunes of their own situations themselves (in the 
ways proposed by Rakowski) can be objectionable from an egalitarian point of view. In 
addition to this, both Rawls and Dworkin believe that a just society is regulated by 
principles that are acceptable to free, self-interested agents placed under hypothetical 
conditions of equality. For my part, I hope to motivate the claim that a just division of 
consequential responsibility is one that can be justified to all citizens on the basis of a 
balance of reasons. Each of these developments begins with a claim that people should 
(or should not) be made more equal in certain respects and proceeds, by counter example, 
to the opposite claim that in a society of equals people would not (or would) be more 
equal in those respects.
39
It is not news that people disagree about equality. Perhaps nobody seriously denies 
that governments should endeavour to treat all citizens as equals, but when it comes to 
substantive issues, such as economic equality (say), there are as many interpretations of 
what it means to treat citizens as equals as there are moral theories. Utilitarians believe 
that the State ought to serve ‘the greatest good of the greatest number’, with the proviso 
that ‘each person is to count for one, none more than one’. Some Utilitarians make the 
further claim that the best way to produce the greatest good of the greatest number is to 
distribute income and wealth more equally. This has to do with the diminishing marginal 
utility of income and wealth (see, for example, Arrow 1971). Rawlsians, on the other 
hand, do not think that all inequalities are bad. Rather, inequalities should be arranged so 
that they are both to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged and attached to offices 
and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity. Luck 
egalitarians also do not believe that all inequalities are bad. Nevertheless, they view the 
primary egalitarian goal as making the distribution of benefits and burdens sensitive to 
individual choice but insensitive to brute luck. In contrast to this, libertarians believe that 
everyone has rights and there are things that no person or group of persons may do to 
them, such as interfering in the distribution of income, without violating their rights.
Hence, it might be a little over-optimistic to think that we can identify a correct 
theory of consequential responsibility just by appealing to the idea of a society of equals. 
But if writers do disagree over which particular interpretation of the cut between 
individual and collective responsibility best satisfies the ideal of a society of equals, what 
else can be said to support one theory over another?
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An additional criterion for judging the best theory is simplicity. Other things 
remaining equal, it is better to have a theory whose terms can be fully specified from the 
start than one whose terms are fleshed out differently in each application. This has to do 
with the inherent methodological elegance of a simple theory. Simplicity alone, however, 
is not enough for rational justification. Suppose we have two theories, one simpler than 
the other, but only one theory that fits our intuitions about right and wrong. Should we 
accept as the best theory the one which is simpler or the one that is more accurate? 
Surely the more important basis on which to judge the best theory is truth. So how do we 
know if a theory is true?
A theory, if true, should confirm certain things we already know about consequential 
responsibility. One thing we think we know about consequential responsibility is that 
sometimes it is right to hold individuals responsible for the situations in which they find 
themselves and sometimes it is right for society as a collective body to remedy or mitigate 
these situations. So, if it turned out that no person should ever be held personally 
responsible for any situation because the reasons that warrant such assignments never 
obtain under the proposed theory, then we would have grounds for questioning the truth 
of that theory.
A second thing we know about consequential responsibility is that there is often 
disagreement among citizens and politicians about who should be held personally 
responsible and to what degree. A theory, if true, therefore should also be able to explain
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why there is disagreement and whether there is hope for agreement once all of the 
arguments have been brought out into the open and each side has had a chance to clear up 
any misunderstandings that might be present. Of course, some of the facts might be 
subject to fundamental, irresolvable dispute and so there is no prospect of agreement. But 
then a true theory should be able to accommodate this too.
Finally, perhaps the most important requirement of a true theory is that it should be 
supported by both general beliefs and specific intuitions about the right way to divide 
consequential responsibility. Finding out when, and to what extent, a theory is true, in 
this sense, is a matter of discerning what the theory claims (or implies) about 
consequential responsibility across a broad range of different cases, and reflecting upon 
how well it satisfies our moral convictions. A true theory says of a person that he should 
be held personally responsible for the situation in which he finds himself and it is 
evidently right that responsibility is assigned in this way under these conditions.
Consulting moral intuitions is, of course, not an exact science. Nor is it intended to 
be so. Indeed, sometimes the point of moral theory is to be revisionary. Nevertheless, 
consulting moral intuitions does have some subtleties that might be worth pointing out. 
Unreflective beliefs about how consequential responsibility should be assigned provide a 
good starting point for philosophical theory. Perhaps most people would initially agree 
with the claim: ‘Individuals should pay for the choices they make.’ The merit of looking 
at moral intuitions, however, is that we can test unreflective beliefs against specific cases. 
And so, to test the principle that individuals should pay for the choices they make, I will
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consider a number of people (both real and fictional) whose circumstances might raise a 
case for remedy or mitigation. In addition to this, I will consider welfare systems around 
the world (which systems incorporate various practices of, and attitudes towards, 
consequential responsibility) and see whether they honour the principle. Finally, I look at 
the concept of responsibility as it is viewed in other spheres of justice, including criminal 
and tort law, and ask whether there is an analogy with the principle that choice should be 
the operative factor in deciding responsibility. Taken together these intuitions should 
help either to justify the principle or show how it is defective in certain respects.
In reply, some might argue that it is worthless to try to appeal to considered intuitions 
in this way. One reason is that considered intuitions are not impartial. Surely our 
intuitions are influenced by the particular theory we already think is right. And even if 
we begin the process with no firm beliefs, we are bound to form prejudices on the basis of 
the first few cases we consider, which prejudices affect our reflections on other cases. A 
second and related concern is that other people may not share my intuitions. Who is to 
say that my set of intuitions is correct and another set mistaken? A final worry is that in 
some instances we are being asked to pass judgement on fictional cases. But how can we 
have any firm intuitions about what is not real?
I do not deny the foregoing difficulties. It is something of an occupational hazard for 
moral and political philosophers that moral intuitions are not indubitable. Nevertheless, I 
hope I have at least two reassuring things to say in response to this scepticism. The first 
point is that I will try to focus only on those examples where I think judgements about
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right and wrong are most durable and manifest. In short, I plan to present the strongest 
possible evidence for my interpretation of right and wrong, good and bad. The second 
point is that even in those cases where there is no obvious or shared set of intuitions ab 
initio, I aim to delve into the truth of the matter in such a way that those who may have 
been disposed to form a different judgement, because they hold a different theory form 
the start, will be persuaded by my arguments and be converted to my way of thinking.
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2 WHAT IS INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY?
To say that individuals bear responsibility for the success or failure of their own lives can, 
at first sight, appear so plain as to require no further analysis. The truth is otherwise. The 
language of individual responsibility can be, and often is, used in a variety of different 
contexts, to make subtly different points about why people find themselves in difficult 
situations, what society owes to such people and how they should behave. And even if 
the logical differences between individual and collective responsibility are relatively 
clear, the word ‘responsibility’ itself presents numerous well-known conceptual 
ambiguities. The task of the present chapter, then, is to engage in some much-needed 
clarification of the idea of individual responsibility: to explore its underlying nature and 
various uses; and to try to distinguish it from other kinds of responsibility.
2.1 ‘INDIVIDUAL’, ‘PERSONAL’
‘It is the responsibility of the individual’, ‘the individual should be held responsible’, 
‘there should be more personal responsibility’ -  these and similar expressions play an 
important role in politics, social policy, political philosophy, and ordinary moral 
discourse. But what do they mean? Let us begin with the words ‘individual’ and 
‘personal’. What additional connotation do these words convey when combined with the 
word ‘responsibility’?
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Two things are worth making clear. Firstly, if we believe that individuals bear a 
special responsibility for the success or failure of their own lives, we need a form of 
words that will highlight this fact. This appears to be one function of the word 
‘individual’ or ‘personal’. These words link the person with his or her own situation. 
They place emphasis on the fact that someone is responsible for the success or failure of 
his or her own life, or some feature of his or her life, such as health, welfare, or 
prosperity, as distinguished from the life of some other person or group of persons.
Secondly, the words ‘individual’ and ‘personal’ point to the fact that responsibility is 
not shared with other people. So, when I am individually responsible for certain features 
of my life, this generally means that no other person or group of persons is responsible fo r  
me in quite the same way or to the same degree. Individual responsibility differs in this 
respect from a responsibility that is shared with others. When a parent is responsible for 
the care or welfare of a child, for example, it is generally assumed that this responsibility 
is shared with the other biological parent; provided, that is, he or she is fit to assume this 
role. In contrast to this, a collective responsibility is shared by a number of individuals, 
sometimes within a close integrated community but also within large disparate societies.
The distinction between individual and collective responsibility is useful because it 
offers a way of framing questions about when and how far it is right that individuals take 
responsibility for the disadvantages of their own situations themselves and when, in 
contrast to this, it is right that society should try to remedy these disadvantages. Take the 
example of the eruption of a volcano believed to be extinct. The event is so unlikely,
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catastrophic and indiscriminate in its consequences as not to be covered by any insurance 
policy. As such, it might be fitting for society at large to assume collective responsibility 
for helping the victims (see Rakowski 1991: 80n.9). On the other hand, some dangers are 
associated with a particular habit or lifestyle and are neither rare nor unforeseeable. This 
is perhaps true of the risks associated with smoking. In these cases it might be more 
appropriate to speak of individual responsibility.
Having made this distinction, however, the first thing I should emphasise is that there 
are degrees between individual and collective responsibility. Consider the policy of 
subsidising the efforts of single unemployed mothers to work for a living by offering free 
child-care. Some might argue that because these women are not financially independent 
from government, then strictly speaking they are not taking full responsibility for their 
own livelihoods. But if somebody increases her skills and re-enters the job market, and 
as a consequence of this is able to earn enough money to pay her own living expenses, it 
seems perfectly reasonable to claim that she has achieved a degree of individual 
responsibility that someone who fails to do these things, but instead lives off handouts 
from government, has not achieved.
A further intricacy is that individual responsibility can be linked instrumentally with 
collective responsibility. It is possible, for instance, for a society to accept collective 
responsibility for the welfare of all of its members, but to do so on the basis that each 
individual is in the best position to judge what makes him or her happy and to strive to 
achieve that end. In this scenario, holding individuals responsible for the success or
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failure of their own lives, measured in these terms, is justified as the best way of meeting 
a collective responsibility for welfare (see, for example, Goodin 1998: 147).
Instrumental justifications for individual responsibility, however, are contingent on 
circumstances: the justification becomes void if individuals are actually made worse off. 
So, for example, if a society tried to encourage individuals to take responsibility for 
earning their own means of subsistence, as a way of meeting a collective responsibility 
for care, but found that many did not take this responsibility, then the collective 
responsibility would require a safety-net which guaranteed a minimum standard of living 
for all individuals. In this case we might say that the society in question accepted an 
‘ultimate’ or ‘final’ responsibility for the success or failure of people’s lives.
What else can we say about individual responsibility besides that it is contrasted with 
collective responsibility? Individual responsibility is often identified with the ideal of 
self-reliance. To take responsibility for the success or failure of one’s own life, in this 
sense, is to use one’s own talents and resources to meet one’s needs; to take steps to look 
after one’s own interest without relying on others for help. Self-reliance may seem like 
an attractive ideal but much depends on how strictly it is defined.
A State-organised social insurance scheme, for example, offers people the chance to 
look after themselves. It enables everyone, even the poor, to indemnify themselves 
against certain misfortunes by paying into a central fund, from which they can benefit if 
they need to. On the surface, this appears to be something that we should value.
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However, some argue that in reality what these types of schemes do is encourage people 
to think of their own welfare as the responsibility of someone else. The reliance on other 
people may be mutual, but it is nevertheless a form of dependency, mediated by 
government. On the other hand, there is a way of interpreting the ideal of individual 
responsibility that says people should take care of themselves independently of others and 
government. In the United States, for example, there is a strong tradition of robust self- 
sufficiency and rugged independence from government (Digby 1989: 15-16).
The American interpretation may well take the ideal of individual responsibility too 
far. But there is also a danger of not taking that ideal far enough. For example, there is a 
way of viewing individual responsibility that says if someone refuses to work because she 
can access more income from government by not working, then she is taking 
responsibility for her own success or failure: she is doing what she needs to do to make 
herself as well off as possible. Yet I think that this interpretation falls far short of most 
people’s ordinary understanding of individual responsibility.
The modem connotation of self-reliance, then, is for individuals to be self-sufficient 
wherever possible, and not to depend on others for help, especially not government. 
However, it is perhaps worth at least mentioning that in the past the virtue of self-reliance 
was equally associated with not relying on divine intervention. Aesop’s fable of Hercules 
and the Wagoner, quoted at the beginning of this investigation, illustrates this very well. 
When a farmer’s wagon becomes stuck in the clay, he drops to his knees and begins to 
pray for Hercules to come and help him without making the least effort to move the
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wagon himself. Hercules responds by telling him to lay his shoulder to the wheel and 
reminds him that heaven only helps those who help themselves.
A further interesting feature of policies that cater to individual responsibility is the 
possibilities that it might in some cases be preferable to waive personal responsibility at 
T l, so as to make a person abler and more likely, to take responsibility at T2. For 
example, in 1996 then President Clinton signed an executive order mandating that young 
mothers receiving AFDC should sign a ‘personal responsibility agreement’ promising to 
remain living with parents and to stay in school (cited in Goodin 1998: 136). On the 
surface it would seem that staying at home and not going to work is a way of abdicating 
responsibility. As Goodin puts it:
A young adult’s remaining in the parental home is ordinarily seen (and rightly so) 
as prolonging dependency on parents, as shunning the responsibility that comes 
with moving out and setting up house on one’s own. (Goodin 1998: 137)
Even so, there is an alternative way of seeing this agreement, as something that puts these 
young women in a better position to take personal responsibility for their own lives in the 
long term.
I trust we now have at least a basic grasp of the language of individual responsibility. 
I now want to explore some of the different ways this language is used in political 
discourse, and try to distinguish some different concepts of responsibility.
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2.2 DIFFERENT KINDS OF RESPONSIBILITY
We begin with a familiar distinction in political philosophy between descriptive and 
prescriptive statements. The notion of individual responsibility can be, and often is, used 
to make, on the one hand, statements of fact, or what purport to be statements of fact, 
about why people find themselves in certain situations, and, on the other hand, normative 
statements about what people may be owed if they find themselves in difficulty, and what 
they ought to do to get themselves out of trouble. The basic difference is between saying 
that a person is responsible for a situation in which he finds himself and saying that he 
should be held responsible for that situation. However, even within these two broad 
groups there are different kinds of responsibility, and this is what I shall examine now.
I. Consequential responsibility
Sometimes people do things (or fail to do things) that lead them to face dangers and 
disadvantages that other people do not face. Smokers face an increased risk of certain 
diseases, and there is a material cost if they want to remedy or mitigate the burden in bad 
health and low life expectancy; people who develop a taste for the finer things in life can 
face an existence with less preference satisfaction than people with more modest tastes;
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beach bums tend to have less income than accountants. These examples signal the 
following question, of distributive justice:
When and how far is it right that individuals bear the disadvantages or 
misfortunes of their own situations themselves, and when is it right, on the 
contrary, that others -  other members of the community in which they live, for 
example -  relieve them from or mitigate the consequences of these 
disadvantages? (Dworkin 2000: 287)
At first glance consequential responsibility appears to be quite straightforward. 
Consequential responsibility is placed with individuals when they are expected to get 
themselves out of trouble or else bear the disadvantages of their own situations 
themselves. On the other hand, consequential responsibility is placed with society as a 
collective body when other members of the community are expected to deal with these 
disadvantages. Yet consequential responsibility can mean different things in different 
situations, and so we need to draw some further distinctions.
When individuals are held responsible for the success or failure of their own lives this 
can mean that they are responsible for remedying the situations in which they find 
themselves, for getting themselves out of trouble. Remedial responsibility, therefore, is 
about putting a bad situation right. What does this mean? In some cases it might be 
possible for individuals to return things to the status quo. If a person is made redundant, 
for example, then, at least in theory, he can remedy the situation by getting another job.
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However, it is not always possible to return things to how they were before. Some ills are 
such that individuals cannot help themselves directly. And some ills are such that at best 
all we can hope to do is mitigate the consequences.
Mitigative responsibility, therefore, is a responsibility to assuage a bad situation, 
which can be done either by making the relevant disadvantage slightly better or by doing 
something else that in some sense makes up for the disadvantage. Consider one 
illustration. Even if responsibility for primary care falls on hospitals and clinics, one way 
of holding smokers responsible for the consequences of their actions is by requiring them 
to pay for their own medical treatment. If doctors do not catch smoking-related diseases 
at an early stage, however, they may well be unable to cure the individual, to return things 
to how they were before. So the best they can do is treat the symptoms and slow down 
the onset of the disease. In this case, then, the individual takes responsibility for the costs 
of others trying to mitigate his or her disadvantage. Individuals might also be able to 
mitigate the effects of the disease by following medical advice. So again, in that sense, 
mitigative responsibility falls on the individual.
It is important to recognise, however, that even if society does bear remedial or 
mitigative responsibility towards a certain type of disadvantage, this does not imply that 
there has been some kind of failure or wrong doing for which reparation is owed. 
Suppose, for example, we think that society has remedial and mitigative responsibilities 
towards the disabled. We do not have to focus on people that have been harmed by
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human malpractice, such as victims of thalidomide, to defend this case. It might be that 
society has a general responsibility to remedy or mitigate the consequences of bad luck.
It is a further question at what point individuals might be expected to pay for remedy 
or mitigation. There are different examples, but certainly smokers can be asked to pay for 
the risks they take either before things turn out badly (ex ante) or after things turn out 
badly (ex post). Most writers seem to agree that smokers should be compelled to pay ex 
ante. Hence, it has been suggested that smokers ought to pay an additional sum for each 
packet of cigarettes to cover the extra medical costs of treating smoking-related diseases 
(see, for example, Anderson 1999: 328). The basic idea is that people who take risks 
should have to pay the expected costs of their risk-taking rather than the actual costs (Le 
Grand 1991: 97-100).
This general strategy appears to have two main benefits. The first is that it abstracts 
from brute luck. Suppose two people take similar risks with their health, but only one 
suffers any bad consequences as a result. It seems much fairer in this type of case to 
require both individuals to pay up front, before any bad situations actually arise. In this 
way the individual has to pay for his or her behaviour irrespective of luck (see Ameson 
2001: 85-86).
A second argument in favour of an ex ante strategy is that fewer people will end up in 
a situation where they urgently require assistance but are unable to pay for it. If we 
cannot rely on people to pay for their follies after the event, because some will not have
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enough money to do so, a system of compulsory insurance (say) means that we can 
uphold the ideal of individual responsibility, but at the same time ensure that people who 
get themselves in difficulty receive the help they need.
This last point raises a further question about the limits of legitimate government 
interference. It might be better for individuals to pay for the consequences of their 
actions before things turn out badly, but this kind of interference stands in need of 
justification, and may be illegitimate. Consequently, government may not have the right 
to force individuals to pay before they require and ask for medical treatment. This is an 
important issue, which I shall continue to investigate in chapter 7.
On the other hand, the logical consequence of government not interfering ex ante is 
that some individuals may be unable to pay for their treatment, neither at the time nor at a 
later date. Hence, a further way of placing responsibility with individuals, in a 
consequential sense, is simply for government to do nothing. When government holds 
individuals responsible in this way it merely insists that they have no right to help, no 
official effort is made to remedy or mitigate the ill. These are cases in which folly 
punishes itself, where individuals bear the consequences of their actions by virtue of the 
fact that governments sits back and allows the natural turn of events to run its course, and 
does not intervene to ameliorate bad.
Refusing to treat individuals with smoking-related diseases is perhaps an extreme 
example of this but there are other, perhaps more familiar, cases. Individuals who are
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unemployed, for example, low-paid or non-wage-eaming, are often held responsible for 
the consequences of their actions simply by government not offering them additional 
income. Individuals in this situation may have to take out personal loans or depend on 
friends and family or learn to cope without a regular source of income. But the bottom 
line is that taxpayers do not bear the burden.
II. Liability responsibility
Consequential responsibility has been an organising motif of a great deal of work on 
distributive justice over the last twenty-five years or so. But without proper clarification, 
it is easy to confuse it with other kinds of responsibility. One distinction that I believe 
Anderson fails to draw is between consequential responsibility and liability responsibility. 
To illustrate, in her article, “What is the Point of Equality?”, Anderson discusses the case 
of ‘an uninsured driver who negligently makes an illegal turn that causes an accident with 
another car’ (Anderson 1999: 295). According to Anderson, luck egalitarians believe that 
it would be just for an ambulance teams to leave him to die at the side of the road for they 
have no obligation to save him. She claims that is an undesirable implication of the luck 
egalitarian interpretation of consequential responsibility. But Anderson’s description of 
the case does not end there:
If the faulty driver survives, but is disabled as a result, society has no obligation
to accommodate his disability . . .  It follows that the post office must let the
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guide dogs of the congenitally blind guide their owners through the buildings, but 
it can with justice turn away the guide dogs of faulty drivers who lost their sight 
in a car accident. (Anderson 1999: 296)
Yet I do not see how Anderson can sustain this further implication of the luck egalitarian 
position. This becomes plain if we reflect on the basic difference between consequential 
responsibility and liability responsibility.
Whilst both consequential and liability responsibility are concerned with the just 
distribution of benefits and burdens in society, there is an important difference between 
the two. Consequential responsibility is essentially about holding individuals responsible 
for the success or failure of their own lives. In contrast to this, liability responsibility is 
about being responsible for an act (or omission) that carries with it liability for some 
further punishment or sanction. This has to do with deciding what further burdens to 
impose on individuals to reflect the fact that they have behaved in ways that are deemed 
unacceptable by society at large. Now it may be that as a result of his accident, the 
injured driver will incur a number of costs he did not previously face. He might need to 
take lessons in reading Braille, buy specialist audio equipment, purchase a guide dog, and 
so on. And I think that these costs are plausibly described as part of the consequences of 
the situation that his actions created. Yet it is difficult to see how the same could be said 
about Anderson’s suggestion that government-owned post offices could turn him away 
with justice.
57
Perhaps the situation would be different if his presence in these building caused an 
additional cost or burden to the staff. Maybe then it would be appropriate to ask him to 
bear these costs. But in reality most public buildings already have plenty of staff and 
facilities to cater for the special needs of the blind. In fact, it would probably cost the 
post office more money to pay specially trained members of staff to stand guard to check 
who is congenitally blind and who is blind as a result of faulty behaviour.
If we did believe that it would be just to turn him away from government buildings or 
to discriminate against him in some other way (such as if a person is passed over for a 
position or office because of the genesis of his disability) or to exclude him or her from 
society -  I am not saying we do believe this, but if we did believe this -  then surely the 
most natural way to explain, and try to justify, this policy would be to say that his actions 
rendered him liable for these sanctions. He made an illegal turn and was driving without 
insurance. So the justification for these sanctions, however misguided we think that 
justification is, would be that it is unacceptable to put other people at danger through this 
sort of behaviour and some form of deterrent is needed to dissuade others from behaving 
similarly.
Why is it important to make this distinction? Because we are seeking an 
understanding of implications of individual responsibility and to do this we require an 
accurate account of the concept of responsibility in play. According to Anderson, luck 
egalitarians believe that ‘assuming everyone had an equal opportunity to run a particular 
risk, any outcomes due to voluntary choices whose consequences could reasonably be
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foreseen by the agent should be bom or enjoyed by the agent’ (Anderson 1999: 295). 
However, not everything Anderson attributes to luck egalitarians can tolerably be 
attributed to that principle. What she says about the negligent driver seems more 
appropriate to the concept of liability responsibility.
The distinction between consequential responsibility and liability responsibility can 
be further illustrated with the case of the idle. In the past some writers have advocated 
punitive measures in dealing with the problem of homeless begging. In his proposals for 
the relief of the poor, for example, Locke argued that local guardians should be given the 
power to deal with the idle by sending them to work houses or overseas (see Locke 1993: 
460). Whatever one thinks about these proposals -  my own view is that they violate 
people’s human rights -  one thing I hope is clear by now is that they go far beyond 
anything the idea of consequential responsibility would demand. Even if we believe that 
the idle should be held responsible for the consequences of their actions, this implies, at 
most, that they do not have a right to money from the State.
III. Blame responsibility
Another distinction that should be bome in mind is between consequential 
responsibility and blame responsibility. Blame is attached to people when they are 
responsible for some kind of moral wrong or misdeed. Blame responsibility is primarily 
expressed through moral criticism or condemnation of the agent, but is often
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accompanied by an expectation that the offending agent should offer an apology, make 
amends or at least feel guilty for his or her behaviour. Why is it important to separate 
consequential responsibility from blame responsibility?
The distinction is important not least because: (1) it can be just to hold someone 
consequentially responsible for a situation in which he finds himself without it being the 
case that he is morally blameworthy, and (2) it can be morally fitting to blame a person 
for his actions but not necessarily right to leave him to bear the consequences. By way of 
illustration of the first point, consider a person who is aware of the fact that skiing can be 
a dangerous pastime but who nevertheless enjoys the sensation of sliding down alpine 
slopes, so much so that he is prepared to take the risk. We might, with justice, hold him 
responsible for part of the costs of mountain rescue team and for any medical attention he 
might need in the event that he injures himself, but this does not mean that he is morally 
blameworthy. It might be his choice to take these risks, and perhaps he cannot reasonably 
expect others to pay, but it does not follow from this that he deserves blame.
As an example of the second point, consider a 60-year-old factory worker who has 
smoked for 40 years and has inadequate medical insurance. Suppose he is aware of the 
risks, but has never been too bothered about how much of his income goes on cigarettes 
and how little health insurance he has. Perhaps it is open for others, not least his wife, to 
criticise his recklessness. So he is blameworthy in that sense. But it is at least 
questionable whether justice would be served by leaving him without adequate medical 
care if he became sick.
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A related point about consequential responsibility is that merely by saying that 
someone should be held responsible for the consequences of his actions nothing is 
implied about whether or not he or she has behaved irresponsibly. Sometimes the word 
‘irresponsible’ is used to describe people or actions that are imprudent. But this usage 
can be misleading. If we describe a person as behaving ‘irresponsibly’ it is generally 
because we think there are hidden negative consequences for other people. To take one 
example, consider the free climber who sets out on his own to scale an extremely unstable 
rock face. If someone claims that his actions are irresponsible, then it seems they have in 
mind not the possible injury or death of the climber himself, but the hidden consequences 
that his actions might have for others. These consequences might include: the fact that 
the mountain rescue team might have to put themselves in danger to save him; the fact 
that he could trigger a land slide that threatens villages lower down the slope; the fact that 
he has a wife and children to support, which he will be unable to do if he dies.
I have written that blame and consequential responsibility can come apart. Yet I do 
not deny that sometimes (perhaps often) blame and consequential go together. Consider 
the case of an ambulance team who are only able to carry one person to the hospital and 
must decide between the negligent driver and the innocent pedestrian. Aside from 
standard considerations about saving children before adults, and giving priority to those 
who are more likely to benefit from help and so on, a further reason that might enter into 
the ambulance team’s reasoning is consequential responsibility. They might think that
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the driver is rightly held responsible for the consequences of his actions. But if they are 
morally sensitive, they might also strongly blame the driver for his actions.
To recap, I have introduced three kinds of responsibility: consequential, liability and 
blame responsibility. Initially, the difference between consequential, liability and blame 
responsibility is due to substantive dissimilarities in the ways individuals are held 
responsible. If consequential responsibility has (partly) to do with attributing 
responsibility for personal disadvantages and misfortunes, then liability responsibility 
involves the imposition of punishments and sanctions for behaviour that society deems 
unacceptable, and blame responsibility involves the moral condemnation of wrongful 
actions and character traits. That being said, there are also likely to be differences 
between the specific criteria for holding individuals responsible in each of these ways, 
which differences depend on the particular aims and considerations that favour holding 
individuals responsible in these different ways. For example, it may well be fitting to 
punish an individual for breaking the law, even if he was very young at the time or in the 
grip of an addiction over which he had no control. And it may be appropriate for 
government to compel person A to compensate person B if A caused harm to B, even if 
the harm was neither intended nor foreseen. But it might be less appropriate to hold a 
person either morally or consequentially responsible for his actions if he was very young 
or out of his mind or had not understood what he was doing. The distinctions do not end 
here. It is perhaps suitable to morally condemn a person for his unruly behaviour, and to 
hold him liable to punishment if it is sufficiently bad, even if his behaviour resulted from 
his troubled upbringing. But these factors might call into question the justice of holding
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him consequentially responsible for the fact that he has no qualifications and cannot get a 
job.
It is a weighty theoretical enterprise to fully compare and contrast these different 
criteria of responsibility and identify all the similarities and dissimilarities. However, 
since this enterprise has been expertly undertaken elsewhere in the literature, it will not be 
taken up any further here (see, for example, Hart 1968: ch. 9; and Scanlon 1998: ch. 6). 
The main business of this investigation is to explore possible criteria for assigning 
consequential responsibility to individuals.
IV. Causal responsibility
One logical place to start thinking about whether or not individuals should be held 
responsible for the situations in which they find themselves is by working out the causal 
connection between their acts (and omissions) and those situations, which introduces into 
the discussion descriptive uses of the idea of individual responsibility.
Consider the vexed issue of poverty. Because they believe that poverty typically 
results from opportunities spumed rather than opportunities denied, some politicians and 
social commentators seek to individualise the causes of poverty. They will say: ‘The poor 
are responsible for their own situation’, ‘it is their own fault.’ Others, however, believe 
that poverty is not the responsibility of the individual, that it has other causes. So they
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might say: ‘The system is to blame’, ‘it is the responsibility of everybody that some 
people are poor.’
Judgements of causal responsibility, however, can be problematic in a number of 
different ways. One problem concerns counter-factual causes. Suppose someone 
neglects to take rudimentary safety precautions whilst engaged in some dangerous 
sporting activity and suffers a serious head injury as a consequence. Were it not for his 
failure he probably would not have suffered the injury. Nevertheless, there may have 
been things that other people could have done to prevent the injury. Had a government 
agency been set up to supervise those engaged in this activity, for example, he might not 
have been injured.
A second problem arises when there are, in fact, multiple causal factors. There can 
be many causes of a person’s being unemployed, for example. Suppose someone does 
not make much effort to attend his local job centre, which apathy greatly decreases his 
chances of finding work. This surely is one cause. Nevertheless, suppose the local job 
centre is poorly managed and does not have much useful information on job vacancies. 
Here is a second cause. Now imagine that there are very few job opportunities where this 
person lives. This is a third cause. And finally, suppose he is in a minority that finds it 
difficult to gain the acceptance of employers. Another cause. We are then faced with a 
difficult question: which is the ‘real’ cause of his unemployment?
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A third problem occurs where there is causal distance between the actions of the 
agents and the relevant consequences. Consider again the example of the person injured 
whilst engaged in a dangerous sporting activity. Suppose whilst recovering at home from 
his head injury, our hapless sportsman stumbles over a table leg, falls to the floor and 
seriously damages his back, resulting in his being forced to give up work as a manual 
labourer. Welfare officials will now have to make a judgement about whether this 
secondary consequence (the fact that he has injured his back) is proximate to the original 
negligence in a way that justifies holding him responsible.
Even if these difficulties could be overcome with additional theory, it is still 
uncertain whether causal responsibility offers a plausible reading of consequential 
responsibility. On the other hand, it is tempting to say that a person cannot be held 
responsible for a situation in which he finds himself unless there is a causal connection 
between his acts (or omissions) and the specific outcomes for which he is being held 
responsible. Thus we only discuss the possibility of asking smokers to pay more for their 
health care because we are told there is a causal link between smoking and the increased 
risk of developing certain diseases. In this respect individual responsibility differs from 
vicarious responsibility. Yet judgements of causal responsibility can become very 
involved so that it is unclear at what point to cease the causal regression.
As if to demonstrate this problem, some philosophers extend judgements of causal 
responsibility to encompass the source of a person’s conduct. So even if someone’s 
actions caused the situation in which he finds himself, it might still be inappropriate to
65
speak of him being causally responsible for his situation if he was not the cause of his 
actions; that is, if he did not cause the desires and character traits that caused him to 
behave as he did, that caused his current difficulties. But if it is a necessary condition of 
holding individuals responsible for the consequences of their actions that they are 
causally responsible in this sense, then possibly nobody should be held individually 
responsible.
One solution to this problem is to say that a person does not have to be causally 
responsible for his or her situations all the way back for it to be just that he or she bears 
the consequences. However, even in cases where individuals are causally responsible in 
this weaker sense, it is still questionable whether this is sufficient to justify consequential 
responsibility. From the mere fact that someone is causally responsible for a certain 
misfortune it does not follow that it is just that he or she should bear the consequences. 
To see why, consider someone who freely elects to do a job that means he is at risk of 
injuring himself. If his is injured, then a simple causal description of the situation might 
lead one to conclude he is rightly held responsible for the consequences. Nevertheless, 
suppose we learn this man is a fire-fighter risking his life to save others. What do we 
think now? The situation has not changed but the information we use to judge it has. We 
may well be inclined to conclude that he does have a right to our help.
It appears, therefore, that further criteria are required for assigning consequential 
responsibility to individuals than the simple claim that individuals should be held 
responsible for the causal outcomes of their actions. As I have already indicated, the
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main business of my investigation is to explore these criteria, and to see exactly why 
causal responsibility is not enough. But before doing so, a few words about a type of 
responsibility often ignored in the literature on distributive justice.
V. Preventive responsibility
Reading only the literature on distributive justice can leave one with the impression 
that individual responsibility is solely to do with how we respond to disadvantages or 
misfortunes once they arise. Yet even a cursory glance at public policy shows that 
individual responsibility is not only about what society owes (or does not owe) to people 
when things turn out badly. A great deal of what is written about this subject concerns 
the steps that individuals can, and should, take to avoid misfortune or disadvantage in the 
first place. This is the idea of preventive responsibility.
For example, when politicians and social commentators use the language of 
individual responsibility in connection with public health issues, they often do so with the 
aim of urging individuals to avoid unhealthy lifestyles and dangerous activities. If there 
is a government initiative designed to get people to quit smoking and take regular 
exercise, for example, it is not uncommon for its advocates to employ the language of 
individual responsibility. They will probably say: ‘Our aim is to encourage individuals to 
take greater responsibility for their own health.’ This appears to be a perfectly natural 
way of using the idea of individual responsibility. Yet, on the surface at least, the aim of
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the initiative is not to distribute the costs of smoking, to force smokers to pay, but to get 
them to quit smoking so that nobody is forced to pay, not least smokers.
Preventive responsibility is not limited to public health issues. When people talk 
about individual responsibility in connection with the problem of poverty, they often have 
in mind the practical steps that individuals can take to stay in school, work hard, maintain 
a steady flow of income, save for their retirement and limit their financial burdens 
wherever possible, so that they can afford to support themselves in the future. Similarly, 
it is often suggested that individuals should take precautions not to have more children 
than they can afford to support. Now it is certainly true that in theory poor families could 
be asked to bear the consequences of their own situations themselves -  poor households 
could be required to take out personal loans or depend on friends and families or else 
learn to make do and live in poverty. Even so, my present suggestion is that 
consequential responsibility is not the only way to approach the issue.
Even though we are not particularly well served by the English language in terms of 
labelling the different types of individual responsibility, the word ‘preventive’ perhaps 
comes closest to expressing the basic differences between this and other types of 
responsibility. The word ‘preventive’ is commonly used to describe measures that are 
designed to keep from happening, or address the underlying causes of, undesirable 
situations. Preventive medicine, for example, is that area of medicine that is concerned 
with thwarting illnesses and diseases, rather than treating symptoms. Indeed, some 
specialists within the field of preventive medicine focus on the underlying social and
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behavioural causes of poor health, such as poverty, smoking and alcoholism. And this 
way of approaching public health is echoed in the way other social ills such as poverty are 
often discussed.
Notice also that, like remedial and mitigative responsibilities, it makes sense to talk 
about the ‘steps’ which individuals take to avoid adverse situations. I do this because 
avoiding personal disadvantage is not something that individuals do with ease or 
certainty. In most cases individuals have to do a series of intervening things to protect 
their interests and sometimes not even a great deal of effort on their part has the desired 
outcome. Even the most proactive individuals can only do so much to help themselves; 
the rest is often down to factors beyond their control. In a time of economic recession, 
for example, it is possible for someone to make every effort to keep his job, but 
nevertheless fail to succeed. It may be appropriate, therefore, to talk about people 
displaying individual responsibility in their intentions and actions even though, despite 
their best efforts, they have not actually been able to avoid misfortune.
2.3 ON THE LOGICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE KINDS OF 
RESPONSIBILITY
Even focusing on the distinction between remedial, mitigative, and preventive 
responsibility, we now have a six-way distinction between: individual remedial 
responsibility, collective remedial responsibility, individual mitigative responsibility,
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collective mitigative responsibility, individual preventive responsibility, and collective 
preventive responsibility. So, I want to end this chapter with a few words about the 
logical relations between remedial, mitigative, and preventive responsibilities.
One detail worth making clear is that judgements of remedial responsibility are 
logically prior to judgements of preventive and mitigative responsibility. The point of 
requiring individuals to take preventive or mitigative responsibility for certain 
disadvantages (and of demanding that governments offer individuals the opportunity to 
do so) is that we do not believe that the cost of remedying those disadvantages should fall 
on society at large. In other words, it would not make sense to force people to take 
responsibility for preventing or mitigating their own misfortunes if we believed they had 
a right to assistance anyway.
Pensions offer a clear example of this relationship. We generally only ask people to 
pay for their own pensions because we do not think that society at large should have to 
pay to support the elderly. If we thought that the elderly should be looked after at the 
public’s expense, then presumably we would not ask individuals to pay for pensions. 
Another example is smoking. What justification does government have for encouraging 
people not to smoke? One obvious justification is that it has an obligation to preserve life 
(both smokers and passive smokers). But a second possible justification is that taxpayers 
currently pay for the treatment of smoking-related diseases and we do not think this result 
is fair. If we cannot force them to pay themselves we try to persuade them to quit. 
Asking or even requiring smokers to try to quit would make much less sense if we do not
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think it unfair that others pay for their treatment. Looking at the same example from a 
slightly different perspective, requiring smokers to pay for their medical treatment by 
imposing a special tax on cigarettes, can be a way of deterring people from smoking and 
of reforming the behaviour of existing smokers. In that sense this policy promotes 
preventive responsibility. Yet it also presupposes that taxpayers should not have to pay 
for the treatment of smoking-related diseases.
2.4 THE CURRENCIES OF CONSEQUENTIAL RESPONSIBILITY
The rest of the thesis, then, seeks to explore questions of consequential responsibility, that 
is, questions about when, and how far, government may hold individuals responsible for 
the success or failure of their own lives understood in terms of dividing the burden of 
remedying or mitigating personal disadvantage. The main issue I want to address is under 
what circumstances individuals may be held responsible and why. However, we begin 
with a prior question: for which types of success and failure might agents conceivably be 
held responsible in a consequential sense?
Even a brief survey of the literature reveals that agents can take responsibility, or be 
held responsible, for a variety of different types of outcome. Helpfully, some writers 
divide the subject matter between responsibility for good (or positive) outcomes and 
responsibility for bad (or negative) outcomes. To claim that someone should be held 
individually responsible for a positive outcome is to claim that he or she should reap the
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benefits of that outcome. Conversely, to claim that someone should be held individually 
responsible for a negative outcome is to claim that he or she may rightly be left to bear 
the burden of that outcome. Both of these forms of responsibility are important, but 
critics of current thinking about the cut between individual and collective responsibility 
have tended to focus on negative outcomes, misfortunes and disadvantages (see, for 
example, Anderson 1999).
There are some good reasons for this. If there has been a decline in moral outrage 
about inequalities in people’s wealth, standards of living and quality of life in recent 
years, few things are more important in explaining this adjustment than the thought that it 
is not inequality that matters as such but the fact that some individuals fare so badly. 
Nevertheless, once we accept that some inequalities are rightly a matter of individual 
responsibility we also raise the following possibility. In a world where it is fitting to hold 
individuals responsible for the success or failure of their own lives, it is also fitting to 
leave individuals to bear the consequences of very bad situations. It is perhaps not very 
surprising, therefore, that sceptics about the role of individual responsibility in social 
policy have concentrated on negative outcomes. It is likely that we will find policies of 
individual responsibility most alarming where people find themselves in dire straits. For 
this reason my discussion will also centre on negative outcomes. I hope there is enough 
interest and controversy in these cases to make for a fruitful discussion of the subject 
matter, even without venturing very deeply into the terrain of responsibility for positive 
outcomes.
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4What kinds of personal disadvantages raise concern? Inequalities of income and 
wealth are an obvious place to begin. We only have to look at people who do not work as 
hard as others, people who take gambles with their money, people who fritter away their 
wealth on lavish lifestyles, to see why individual responsibility might be appropriate. 
However, to see just how successful or unsuccessful a person’s life is, or has been, we 
need to look not only at his share of resources, but also how much pleasure or preference 
satisfaction he enjoys and how successful his life is from his own perspective. And this 
opens up the possibility of yet more individual responsibility. The list does not end here. 
There is a glut of further disadvantages for which individuals might conceivably be held 
responsible that are not easily defined in terms of either resources or welfare.
In light of all this, I think that it would be useful to pause to clarify some of the 
different types of currencies of consequential responsibility before looking at the criteria 
for assigning responsibility themselves. Which aspects of a person’s success or failure 
matter when we are talking about holding him or her responsible? There is a bewildering 
array of measures of personal advantage and disadvantage that might be taken into 
consideration when deciding how to divide consequential responsibility. Nevertheless, 
the following benefits and burdens seem to me to be key interests from the perspective o f 
deciding what is just as opposed to merely desirable.
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I. Resources and labour
Human societies have always made good use of raw materials turning them into 
goods or else trading them with others for goods and services they do not have. Yet the 
creation and trade of goods and services in this way requires labour. Some people gather 
what they need from nature, others produce things by themselves or in unison with others, 
some people sell their labour power to others who are themselves engaged in production, 
and some people perform services for others -  all of these activities feed into various 
processes by which goods, materials, products, payments, wealth, services, and 
experiences are exploited, created and transferred. Not surprisingly, then, normative 
questions about how resources and labour should be shared out are among the most 
important questions humans can ask.
How, then, should resources be distributed? I shall not try to deny the relevance of 
the choice/luck distinction in answering this question. Among other things this 
distinction implies that those people who choose less productive ways to work (as 
measured by what others want) should have less residual income as a consequence. Even 
so, I intend to argue that this distinction is not the only thing that matters as far as justice 
is concerned. I shall say more in support of this claim in the next section where I 
introduce other relevant criteria, but to anticipate one example briefly, sometimes 
common intuitions do not support holding people responsible for the consequences of 
choosing non-wage-eaming occupations because we believe it is wrong for society to
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benefit from this work without paying for it. The example of unpaid carers in the home is 
often cited (see, for example, Anderson 1999: 324).
II. Freedoms and restrictions
One important thing that resources can do for people is remove restrictions on what 
they want to do and be. It is sometimes said that a free society is one in which people can 
own private property, buy and sell goods and labour, manufacture, turn a profit, live and 
consume; all because they have these basic liberties protected under the rule of law. But 
freedom is not only about what individuals are at liberty to do and not do. Some have 
argued that in order to have ‘real’ freedom an agent must also have the means available to 
consume the things he likes, to do the things he prefers to do, and to make the trade-off 
between work and leisure. So if, for example, a person is unable to engage in leisure 
activity because he cannot afford not to work or to consume certain items because they 
are expensive, then he is in one sense as little free to do those things and consume those 
products as if he were forbidden to do so by law (for more on the notion of real freedom 
see, for example, Van Parijs 1995: 21-24).
I think that few people would deny that a person’s real freedom, in the above sense, 
can raise some important questions of consequential responsibility. But it is important to 
keep in mind the fact that even if we accept that real freedom is one of the currencies of 
responsibility, nothing follows about which policy offers the best expression of this
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concern. We require further arguments and principles to show how people’s interest in 
real freedom should be translated into divisions of responsibility. For example, Van 
Parijs defends the policy of ‘basic income’ (an unconditional, non-means-tested income 
paid to every citizen) on the grounds that this is the right way to serve everyone’s interest 
in having real freedom (see Van Parijs 1995: 33; 2004: 18). But this implication has been 
contested. On the one hand, some people argue that access to income should be 
ambition-sensitive, and so there is no unconditional right to income (see Dworkin 19816). 
Ackerman and Alstott, on the other hand, agree that it is right to view private property (or 
money) as the birthright of every citizen on the grounds of real freedom, but insist that for 
government to pay basic income to citizens rather than a lump-sum capital grant is to treat 
all young men and women as spendthrifts and ‘demeans their standing as autonomous 
citizens and radically constrains their real freedom’ (Ackerman and Alstott 2004: 45).
Now, at this stage I might face the challenge that by highlighting real freedom as one 
of the currencies of consequential responsibility, I am begging the question at hand. For 
example, Amartya Sen defines ‘freedom’ partly in terms of ‘capabilities to function’ 
where this is understood to mean the various things that an agent has the ability to do and 
be (Sen 1993: 33). However, he notes that because the space of freedom is not a measure 
of the doings and beings an agent actually achieves but what he or she is able to achieve, 
there is scope for personal responsibility. ‘If the social arrangements are such that a 
responsible adult is given no less freedom (in terms of set comparisons) than others, but 
he still ‘muffs’ the opportunities and ends up worse off than others, it is possible to argue 
that no particular injustice is involved’ (Sen 1993: 39n.23). The present challenge, then,
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is that by focusing on freedom rather than achieved functionings I am assuming precisely 
what is at stake, namely, that agents should be held responsible for their achieved 
functionings.
I fully accept this challenge and, therefore, intend to count functionings (doings and 
beings) as a distinct category of interests that deserve consideration in their own right. 
But before turning to this category, there are two additional points worth noting. The first 
is that, according to Cohen, there is an ambiguity in Sen’s use of ‘freedom’ (Cohen 1993: 
24). Cohen notes that the freedom to achieve doings and beings can, but does not 
necessarily have to, involve acts of achievement on the part of the agent. For example, 
being free from malaria is not something an agent must achieve himself. A policy of 
killing malaria-carrying flies may produce widespread freedom from malaria without an 
agent having to exercise the freedom in any sense (Cohen 1993: 22). Therefore, whilst 
freedom and achieved functioning can come apart because of responsibility, the 
separation is not universal. However, in reply to this it should be noted that a question of 
justice and responsibility still hangs over the above example. Even if people can achieve 
the function of being free from malaria without taking ‘action’, the question is whether or 
not this is just. Some people might argue that it is a form of free-riding to benefit from 
the anti-malaria policy without paying taxes. On this view, an agent should be held 
responsible for part of the costs if he benefits from the policy.
The second point is that whether or not we accept that real freedom and functioning 
may come apart because of responsibility, this still leaves open the question of whether or
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not a person has a right to real freedom. The question we must ask is not ‘Government 
responsibility for real freedom or for achieved functioning?’ but ‘Government 
responsibility for real freedom, achieved functioning, both, or neither?’ For example, 
consider a person who lacks the real freedom to do certain things because of actions he 
has taken in the past. What should government do? One answer could be that he should 
be held responsible for the consequences of his past actions and so should not be given 
real freedom now. A second answer could be that he was not responsible for what he did 
(for some reason to be specified) so should be given real freedom. I do not deny that in 
thinking about this case we might also want to bear in mind whether or not he is likely to 
make use of real freedom if we decide to give it to him. (‘Why give him real freedom if 
he is only going to squander it?’) However, from the fact that a person is unlikely to 
make good use of real freedom, nothing must follow about how responsibility for 
providing real freedom should be divided. Some people might argue that government has 
responsibility for both real freedom and achieved functioning. Others might take a 
different view.
III. Levels of achieved functioning
One of Sen’s great contributions to philosophy and economics has been to point out 
that there are things that resources do for people that are not reducible to pleasure and 
preference satisfaction. He notes that there are also the functionings (the doings and 
beings) that resources give people the freedom to attain. There are many possible types
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of functionings that might be important, but Sen cites the functionings of being 
nourished, clothed, and sheltered as illustrations of what we care about most, these are 
what we might call ‘basic functionings’ (Sen 1985: 73). Some might argue that freedom 
is the key metric and that we should be concerned about functionings only in so far as 
they are linked to freedom. However, Cohen argues that Sen is ‘most’ concerned about 
the basic functionings, and he defends a person’s right to the basic doings and beings of 
life whether or not people are given a form of freedom that allows them to ‘exercise’ or 
‘achieve’ the functionings themselves (Cohen 1993: 22).
That being said, it should also be noted that freedom and functioning can come apart 
because of responsibility, and it is worth pausing to look at some examples of how this 
can happen. Consider the person who has impaired mobility because he injured himself 
whilst engaging in a highly dangerous pastime. Or consider the person who is 
malnourished because she devotes all of her time and energy to caring for others. Or else, 
think about the person who does not have any shelter because he built his house in an area 
that is prone to natural disasters and the house was washed away in a flood. How far 
should these individuals be held responsible for their lack of functioning? It is the central 
business of this thesis to explore some of the criteria that might be used in settling these 
and other similar questions of consequential responsibility.
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IV. Securities and dangers
Similar to the notion of real freedom, let us say that to have ‘real security’ is to be 
able to engage in risky activities but have a safety-net if things go wrong such as medical 
treatment in the event one becomes sick or injured. In that sense medical insurance gives 
people the real security to take risks in the face of danger. It is worth pointing out that 
giving a person real security can but does not always mean giving them personal 
responsibility about whether or not safety is then actually achieved. By way of 
illustration, a policy of eradicating a disease (or the insects that carry the disease) or of 
having armed forces or police services can leave people with the real security to do the 
things they want to do. But it is not necessarily right to think of this as an exercise in 
security on the part of the agent, something that depends on some assignable activity he 
must perform (cf. Cohen 1993: 22).
One key point that should be emphasised at this fledgling stage in the development of 
the inclusive theory is the extent to which people’s interests are interconnected. 
Freedoms and securities are a good example of this. Whilst forcing someone to bear the 
costs of his choices can make him less free and secure to do the things he wants to do (to 
live, work, earn, and consume as he would like), forcing society as a collective body to 
bear these same costs can make taxpayers less free to do the things they want to do (to 
live, work, earn, and consume as they would like). Putting the same point slightly 
differently, if a society, through the tax raising powers of the State, assumes responsibility 
for providing an income to those who choose low-wage jobs and/or pays subsidies to
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those with expensive tastes and/or gives public health care to those who risk their lives, 
then it offers these recipients the real freedom and security to live as they wish to live. 
But it also decreases the real freedom of taxpayers who might want to spend their money 
doing what they want to do. If a person must hand over a proportion of what he earns to 
the State, then he is, in one sense, as little free to decide what to do with his income than 
if others were permitted to take his income without his permission. In other words, the 
desire to be really free is among the reasons some individuals within society might have 
to favour collective responsibility for the provision of income, health care, and other basic 
goods and services, but it is also a reason some taxpayers might have to object to such 
policies. To answer questions about how freedoms and securities should get distributed, 
then, requires further criteria of distribution. The choice/luck distinction and 
identification are two such criteria but there are others (to be explored in the next 
section).
V. Opportunities and obstacles
Opportunities are another fairly obvious interest of justice. Without opportunities we 
cannot pursue our conceptions of the good, and this state of affairs is something that 
could easily be construed as unjust, especially where those opportunities are distributed 
unequally for reasons that seem unfair. Now, opportunities are often defined in terms of 
what the opportunity is for: various conceptions have been proposed but most notably, in 
the egalitarian literature, they include opportunity for resources and opportunity for
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welfare. Yet it is also worth making clear at this stage that there are a number of other 
elements that go into making an opportunity. To say that someone has the opportunity to 
achieve X is, in one sense, to say there are a combination of circumstances helpful for 
achieving X such that even though achieving X is not automatically guaranteed if the 
person acts in the specified ways, obstacles which in the past made it difficult to achieve 
X have been removed and useful instruments which are sometimes absent are now in 
place facilitating the achievement of X (see Westen 1985).
It seems to me that the interest we have in possessing opportunities invites two 
questions of consequential responsibility. The first question is whether the State has a 
responsibility to provide opportunities for people to achieve desired outcomes, to provide 
the outcomes themselves, to do both, or to do neither. For example, it is open to debate 
whether the State has a responsibility to give people opportunities to become better off, to 
make them better off, to do both, or to leave it up to each person to make his own 
opportunities and to make himself better off. This question is well-discussed in the 
literature. However, let us assume for the sake of argument that the State does have a 
responsibility to provide equal opportunities. Much less commented on is the further 
question of whether or not the State has a responsibility to continue to offer opportunities 
to people who fail to make good use of them the first time around. The issue of adult 
education or ‘lifelong learning’ is a good illustration of this question. Even if we agree 
that society should pay for every child to have the opportunity to gain a good education, it 
is a further question whether or not the State should offer that opportunity again to adults 
later on in life if they failed to take their opportunities the first time around. This second
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question, then, is about whether or not we should offer equal opportunity (say) at one 
canonical point in people’s lives or intervene to maintain equality of opportunity at 
recurring intervals throughout a person’s life. I shall try to explore both of these 
questions of opportunity in more detail below.
VI. Self-respect and shame
Another set of interests on my list has to do with the impact that diving responsibility 
in different ways might have on people’s evaluation of themselves and, specifically, in 
terms of their self-respect and/or sense shame. Self-respect is a notoriously difficult 
notion to pin down, but one thing we can say with at least some degree of certainty is that 
self-respect is not something we can simply distribute among people like other ordinary 
material resources. Self-respect is a feeling, sense, or impression one has of oneself. It 
has a psychological standing. Yet self-respect also has social and normative elements 
which the State can appropriately influence.
To see this, consider Stephen Darwall’s notion of ‘evaluative self-respect’ (Darwall 
1977). According to Darwall, this kind of self-respect is predicated on our appraisal of 
ourselves as people. To lack self-respect, in this sense, is to measure ourselves against 
the sort of person we desire to be but then to form the impression that we come up short 
of those standards. Conversely, shame is something people commonly feel when they 
lack self-respect. Even though the object of evaluative self-respect is our own character,
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conduct, power and so on, other people help to shape the perception we have. Not only 
do our interactions with others partly define the standards of merit by which we come to 
measure ourselves, but they also offer a constant test of whether or not we have lived up 
to those standards. Public shame occurs when our failure to live up to standards is made 
common knowledge to others.
What, therefore, is the connection between evaluative self-respect and policies of 
consequential responsibility? The connections are complicated. On the one hand, one of 
the ways in which people can develop self-respect is through an awareness of their ability 
to assume responsibility for their own lives. To succeed in securing one’s own long-term 
health and safety; to have the self-mastery to develop and successfully pursue a realistic 
set of goals and ambitions; to increase one’s skills and work for a living -  these are all 
things that can enhance one’s evaluation of oneself as a person with merit. Different 
types of individual responsibility, then, can be foci for seeing ourselves in a favourable 
light. But there is no suggestion that encouraging greater individual responsibility is the 
only way to promote self-respect. Nor is it suggested that individual responsibility is the 
only foci of self-respect. On the contrary, government must secure the social bases of 
self-respect through a variety of means.
All of this also invites a further question: can policies which are designed to promote 
individual responsibility sometimes bring shame? I shall postpone a full discussion of 
this issue until later. But I do want to stress now that when dealing with the interest of 
self-respect one must also take seriously the possibility that in trying to weed out those
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whom we believe should assume personal responsibility we risk humiliating those who, 
through no fault of their own, are unable to do so. Jonathan W olffs “Fairness, Respect, 
and the Egalitarian Ethos” contains valuable insights into this problem, which he has 
dubbed the problem of ‘shameful revelation’ (see Wolff 1998: 113-5). This article has 
inspired Timothy Hinton to defend basic income as a way of combating the problem of 
shameful revelation (see Hinton 2001).
VII. Public interests and public menaces
Yet another group of interests worth examining are the interests of people as 
members of political communities. For example, in disputes about what is in ‘the public 
interest’, the word ‘interest’ attaches most plausibly to the common interests we have qua 
members of society. National defence would be an obvious example. Arguably it is in 
the public interest for government to collect taxes in order to fund armed forces against 
the menace of foreign invasion or, more likely, acts of terrorism. Even so, this definition 
might tolerably be relaxed so that it encompasses interests that are common to an 
assignable group of citizens. Consider the claim that there is a public interest in funding 
the work of mountain rescue teams and fire-services that protect the public against the 
menaces of avalanches and wild fires.
It should not be overlooked that there are competing ideas about what is and what is 
not in the public interest, but it is certainly conceivable to think that sometimes it will,
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and sometimes it will not, be in the public interest to impose the costs of people’s choices 
individually rather than on society as a collective body. In some cases, however, a further 
distinction is required to define the field of collective responsibility more accurately. For 
example, when we are asking whether or not it is in the public interest to include medical 
insurance as part of the remuneration package given to mountain rescue workers, the term 
‘collective responsibility’ could refer simply to those who use the mountains. I shall say 
more about this distinction below.
VIII. Levels of welfare
Welfare is a measure of what is good for a person, what makes his or her life go 
better. Whilst it does not necessarily exclude the interests discussed already, welfare 
might include more than has been discussed. The relevance of welfare metrics to debates 
about consequential responsibility may or may not seem obvious, but the proposition is 
that justice demands that our divisions of responsibility must take account of the impact 
on proposed divisions understood in terms of making people’s lives go better or worse. 
Hence, as with the six other types of interest discussed so far, the substantive question is 
this: what should we do in respect of welfare and how does this affect our judgements 
about how we should assign consequential responsibility? I shall tackle this question in 
the next section, but before doing so I want first to say a little more about what welfare is 
and why it is important.
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Welfare can be defined in various ways but the possibilities are often classified 
together as follows: hedonistic welfare (psychological states that it is alleged the vast 
majority of people want to experience such as pleasure, happiness, and enjoyment), 
desire-based welfare (the satisfaction of a person’s tastes, preferences, desires, and deeper 
convictions about what gives value to life), and substantive welfare (a concrete list of 
things that it is believed are objectively good for a person to have, quite apart from any 
hedonistic experiences he might have in light of those things, his desires, or what he 
believes gives value to life). The various advantages and disadvantages of these different 
conceptions of welfare have been ably discussed elsewhere in the literature, and so I do 
not intend to discuss them in great detail here (see, for example, Parfit 1986: app. I; 
Griffin 1986; and Scanlon 1998: ch. 3).
However, I do want to discuss some general problems that are commonly associated 
with welfare metrics in debates on distributive justice and social welfare policy.
(1) Problems o f measurement and interpersonal comparison. Welfare metrics do not 
easily lend themselves to measurements of how much advantage individuals have and 
to interpersonal comparisons between different people. This can render welfare 
unhelpful when trying to establish distributed goals and comparing the outcomes 
produced by different policies (see, for example, Sen 1982).
(2) Problems o f assessment. Even where individual measurement and interpersonal 
comparison of welfare are possible, in practice the testing of welfare can be intrusive 
and open to error and abuse (see Cohen 1989: 910).
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(3) The problem o f the contented slave. Some people adapt to their current 
disadvantages (even grossly unjust disadvantages) developing such lowly desires as 
to give a misleading impression of how badly they are in fact doing and any 
redistributive claims they might have against others (see Sen 1985: 21).
(4) The problem o f offensive tastes. Some desires are morally offensive and as such 
are unsuitable criteria by which to judge outcomes (see Rawls 1971: 30-1).
(5) The problem o f expensive tastes. Some preferences are too much a matter of 
personal identification to be fitting bases for the assessment of people’s redistributive 
claims (see Dworkin 198 lb: 302-3).
I do not deny that these problems demand careful attention. However, it should be 
noted that they do not amount to a blanket objection to welfare because they can be 
defused in the following ways. In answer to (1) and (2), the defender of welfare can point 
out that even though the effective measurement and comparison of people’s welfare is a 
problem, the same problems can affect other metrics of advantage. Freedoms and 
opportunities, for example, are sometimes not easily compared. Nor is it without the 
potential for difficulty finding out which particular freedoms and opportunities agents 
have or lack. In reply to (3), the defender of welfare can adopt an informed desire theory 
of welfare in which we focus exclusively on those desires which the agent would have if, 
contrary to fact, he had a full understanding of how others live and what his life might be 
like. In responding to (4), the defender of welfare can appeal to an ‘objective list’ 
account of welfare that excludes morally offensive desires from interpersonal 
comparisons of welfare (as well as the desires of the happy slave). Finally, in reply to (5),
in chapter 4 1 shall attempt to motivate the claim that whilst some desires can be ruled out 
on the criteria of second-order preference identification, this does not necessarily exclude 
all preferences as fitting bases for claims in justice. In some cases, people can make 
plausible claims in respect of the arbitrary expense of their preferences.
In the light of all this, what should be the significance of welfare in judging how 
consequential responsibility should be divided? I certainly think that arguments couched 
in terms of welfare cannot be ruled out as plausible grounds for arguing for or against 
proposed divisions of responsibility. And, as far as possible, I want to leave open the 
question of which conception of welfare is best. However, the present question is 
whether or not welfare sui generis is the most important interest. In fact I have chosen to 
discuss welfare last because of the thesis (often associated with utilitarianism) that 
welfare is the supreme value. Is this thesis correct? Whilst I think that this thesis might 
be plausible for some conceptions of welfare, it is certainly not true for all conceptions. 
Classical utilitarianism, for example, rests on the view that pleasure is the only thing that 
is intrinsically valuable; that all other things are only valuable in so far as they tend to 
promote pleasure and the absence of pain (see, for example, Mill 1972: 39). However, 
even bearing in mind Mill’s qualitative distinction between higher and lower pleasures, it 
is far from obvious that pleasure is the only thing that fundamentally matters. Perhaps we 
care about freedom, security, opportunity, and self-respect in addition to any pleasure they 
might bring. The inclusive theory, therefore, recognises the possibility that a number of 
interests could fundamentally matter and must be given proper consideration as such.
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Nevertheless, even if we accept that welfare is the supreme value, this does not 
necessarily imply that it is right to ignore reasons favouring particular divisions of 
responsibility which are not specified directly in terms of welfare. On the contrary, the 
bare importance of other reasons can remain untouched by the thesis that welfare is the 
supreme value. It is simply that we reinterpret that importance as instrumental 
importance rather than intrinsic importance. Thus, suppose we believe that when 
assessing alternative divisions of responsibility we should take account of the impact on 
people’s self-respect. (Of course, this raises the question of how precisely our 
judgements of consequential responsibility should be sensitive to the impact on people’s 
self-respect. But let us just assume for the sake of argument we simply believe that 
nobody should suffer a loss of self-respect as a result of our policies.) Would we abandon 
this belief if we subsequently realised that self-respect is only valuable to the extent that it 
is a part of welfare or tends to promote welfare? I doubt it. It seems to me that this 
additional information (the fact that self-respect can make people’s lives go better) would 
do little to lessen the belief that our judgements of consequential responsibility should be 
sensitive to the impact on people’s self-respect.
In summary, I hope I have been able to show that whilst there are many types of 
responsibility, consequential responsibility is primarily a question of what is just and 
unjust: when and how far is it right that individuals bear the disadvantages or misfortunes
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of their own situations themselves, and when, in contrast to this, is it right that society as 
a collective body relieves or mitigates these individual deprivations? We have also seen 
that there are an array of different types of disadvantage about which questions of 
consequential responsibility can be asked. In what follows I want to explore different 
criteria for dividing consequential responsibility between individuals and society.
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3 CHOICE
Of all the reasons for holding individuals responsible for their own disadvantages and 
misfortunes, initially the most compelling is the thought that individuals have voluntary 
choice. It is, after all, a familiar feature of the market that what people owe each other 
and ultimately what they end up with depends on the transactions and gambles they freely 
enter into. So choice may seem an obvious candidate for a more general theory of 
individual responsibility. But why is it fitting to hold individuals responsible in this way, 
and is such a theory suitable in every case?
3.1 CHOICE AS GROUNDS FOR INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY
Since Amartya Sen first raised the question in an article of the same name, “Equality of 
What?”, a significant amount of philosophical work has been devoted to answering this 
deceptively simple question. Various metrics have been proposed, but one recurring 
theme has been that equality of opportunity is preferable to equality of outcome. One 
reason for this preference has been that equality of opportunity is sensitive to individual 
responsibility in a way that equality of outcome is not. Equality of opportunity offers 
everybody an equal chance of success, but allows inequalities of outcome to develop on 
the strength of people’s voluntary choices. As Richard Ameson puts it:
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The argument for equal opportunity rather than straight equality is simply that it 
is morally fitting to hold individuals responsible for the foreseeable consequences 
of their voluntary choices. (Ameson 1989: 88)
These developments in egalitarian thinking, however, raise the following question: why is 
it fitting to hold individuals responsible for the foreseeable consequences of their 
voluntary choices?
I think that much has to do with the thought that government ought to treat citizens as 
beings who are competent to be in charge of their own lives. No doubt this involves a 
number of different things, but holding individuals responsible for the foreseeable 
consequences of their voluntary choices is certainly one way of treating citizens as 
competent. But what happens when individuals act imprudently? The choice theorist is 
then faced with a difficult dilemma: whether to continue to regard individuals as 
competent in charge of their own lives (even in the face of glaring imprudence) and 
accept misfortune as an unavoidable consequence of the view, or to say that because such 
people clearly have deficient choice-making and choice-following abilities they do not in 
fact have genuine choice. I am going to continue to explore this dilemma throughout the 
investigation, but for the moment I want to focus on a second reason why it may seem 
fitting to hold individuals responsible for the foreseeable consequences of their voluntary 
choices.
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A second reason for thinking that voluntary choice should be operative in deciding 
questions of distributive justice is the belief that herein lies a workable procedure for 
regulating the arena of production, trade and consumption. The are perhaps two 
principles that a choice theorist might want to endorse in these areas. The first is that a 
person cannot owe something to someone else unless he has agreed to give or trade that 
thing. The second principle is that a person does not have a right to the resources of those 
who are wealthier simply on the grounds that he has less, if the inequality between he and 
they flows from the different choices he and they have made. When a society has a 
dynamic distribution of income and wealth that operates through a process of production, 
trade and consumption, there is potential for satisfying both principles. A government 
that effectively enforces contracts between individuals ensures that what one person owes 
to a second person depends on whether the two have voluntarily entered into a transaction 
or agreement. This adheres to the first principle. And if government does not intervene 
in market outcomes, then a dynamic distribution of goods through the free market means 
that people have, at different points in their lives, more or less than others in part 
depending on the choices they and others have freely made. This potentially upholds the 
second principle.
This type of system is mutually beneficial because it confers upon each individual the 
power to determine what he or she owes other people and what other people owe him or 
her. This power is important because, provided the system is operating effectively, it 
enables individuals (1) to get what they want (through the various transactions they freely 
enter into), and (2) to plan their lives on the basis of confident predictions about the
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resources they (and others) will have available to them in the future. This does not, 
however, rule out the possibility of government interference in market outcomes where 
justice demands such interference. Whilst the choice theorist believes that choice should 
be operative in deciding what we owe each other, he does not say that all market 
outcomes are fair.
One point is that some people have fewer resources than others because they are 
unable to enter into production and trade due to shortfalls on the side of their physical 
abilities. It might be appropriate, then, for government to intervene in market outcomes 
to mitigate the ill effects of brute luck. As Dworkin puts it in his article, “Why Liberals 
Should Care about Equality”:
a liberal cannot, after all, accept the market results as defining equal shares. His 
theory of economic justice must be complex, because he accepts two principles 
which are difficult to hold in the administration of a dynamic economy. The first 
requires that people have, at any point in their lives, different amounts of wealth 
insofar as the genuine choices they have made have been more or less expensive 
or beneficial to the community, measured by what other people want for their 
lives. The market seems indispensable for this principle. The second requires 
that people not have different amounts of wealth just because they have different 
inherent capacities to produce what others want, or are differently favored by 
chance. This means that market allocations must be corrected in order to bring 
some people closer to the share of resources they would have had but for these
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various differences of initial advantage, luck and inherent capacity. (Dworkin 
1985: 207)
However, even allowing for these corrections, surely part of the attraction of the market is 
that it does, at least to some degree, hold individuals responsible for the foreseeable 
consequences of their voluntary choices.
How individuals respond to risk is potentially another area where voluntary choice is 
important in determining just outcomes. We all face risk, but as Dworkin points out, 
when evaluating risk it is important to note the difference between ‘brute luck’ and 
‘option luck’:
Option luck is a matter of how deliberate and calculated gambles turn out -  
whether someone gains or loses through accepting an isolated risk he or she 
should have anticipated and might have declined. Brute luck is a matter of how 
risks fall out that are not in that sense deliberate gambles. (Dworkin 1981b: 293)
Of course, both kinds of luck can jointly determine what happens to a person. If 
someone develops cancer, for example, this can be down to brute luck. But the story is 
somewhat different if he or she had the opportunity to purchase medical insurance but 
opted not to do so. It also makes a difference if (say) the individual has been a heavy 
smoker for a number of years. These variations introduce a degree of option luck into the 
story. But even if there are degrees of brute luck and option luck, the question is this.
96
Why, if at all, is it fitting to hold individuals responsible for the consequences of option 
luck?
I think that one reason is again that it offers individuals the chance to get what they 
want out of life. Clearly a distributive scheme that holds individuals responsible for bad 
option luck does not offer individuals precisely the outcome they want. A person who 
voluntarily accepts a gamble does so because he or she wants the consequences that 
attend good option luck not bad option luck. But it can be argued that to mitigate the 
affects of option luck, even bad option luck, is to deprive people of a kind of life they 
want, namely, a life that includes gambles (see, for example, Dworkin 19816: 294-295).
One final reason we may have for wanting what happens to us, in terms of our 
distributive claims against others, to reflect our voluntary choices, is that under such a 
regime we have a powerful tool of expressing to other people certain beliefs and values 
we hold dear. Consider the case of an Amish man who, as an act of religious devotion, 
renounces material comfort in favour of a life of austerity and self-discipline. The 
diminished circumstances of this man are intimately bound up with the kind of life he 
thinks it is right to lead. To offer him additional resources because he is poor would not 
only ignore his personal convictions, but would also potentially undermine the message 
he wants to send out into the world by making the particular choices he does. Of course, 
perhaps some will question whether a person ever makes a genuine choice to live like 
this. But the Amish tradition of ‘rumspringa’ (which roughly translates as running 
around) is one reason for thinking that at least Amish individuals choose the lives they
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lead. During this coming-of-age experience, young adults between the ages of 17 and 20- 
years-old have more freedom from the supervision of their parents, community rules and 
the authority of the church. After this taste of freedom, the individual must decide 
whether to remain in their community. If he or she chooses to stay, then he or she will be 
formally baptised into the main church.
Bringing these points together, there seem to be a number of reasons for preferring a 
regime that makes our choices operative in deciding what claims, if any, we have against 
others. One reason is that it respects our status as competent beings. A second reason is 
that it gives us power to get what we want. A third and related reason is that it enables us 
to confidently predict what resources we may have at our disposal in the future. A final 
reason is that it respects our underlying beliefs and attitudes, and allows us to demonstrate 
those beliefs and attitudes to others.
However, if individual responsibility is to have these benefits, then presumably the 
choices involved must be of a certain kind. Not just any kind of behaviour will do. So 
what, more precisely, are the features of human agency that should have the power to 
confer responsibility on the part of individuals for the situations they face, even the bad 
situations?
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3.2 ‘VOLUNTARY’ CHOICES
Even though the idea of choice and responsibility has received a good deal of attention 
from egalitarian writers over the past twenty-five years or so, including articles by Cohen 
(1989), Ameson (1989), Rakowski (1991), Le grand (1991) and Roemer (1993), these 
writers have, in the first place, sought to map the egalitarian terrain in general terms, 
incorporating only the abstract notion that individuals should bear the consequences of 
their ‘voluntary’ or ‘genuine’ choices. Then again, it is possible to extract from this 
combined material seven features of human behaviour involved in voluntary choice.
Opportunity obviously has an important role to play. In general, it is only legitimate 
to hold people consequentially responsible for the situations in which they find 
themselves when they had the opportunity to assume preventive responsibility 
beforehand. If, on the other hand, someone had opportunities to avoid a bad situation, 
which opportunities he failed to seize, this can make it difficult to defend his right to 
public relief.
Which kinds of opportunities are relevant? Some examples are more clear-cut than 
others. Take work for example. One thing we can claim is that it is only legitimate to 
hold people consequentially responsible for lacking income, if they had the opportunity to 
work. But much depends on how those opportunities are defined. I think few people 
would say that a person who lacked the opportunity to work due to the racist attitudes of 
local employers is rightly held responsible for his situation. Yet a further question is how
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we regard shortfalls on the side of talent or physical capacity. Cohen argues that we do 
not normally regard such things as detracting from ‘opportunity’ as such, but as limiting 
‘access’ to advantage:
On my understanding of the egalitarianism, it does not enjoin redress of or 
compensation for disadvantage as such. It attends, rather, to “involuntary” 
disadvantage, which is the sort that does not reflect the subject’s choice. 
People’s advantages are unjustly unequal (or unjustly equal) when the inequality 
(or equality) reflects unequal access to advantage, as opposed to patterns of 
choice against a background of equality of access. Severe actual disadvantage is 
a fairly reliable sign of inequality of access to advantage, but the prescribed 
equality is not of advantage per se but of access, all things considered, to it. 
(Cohen 1989: 920)
So perhaps we should say, and I think Cohen would agree, that a person who is unable to 
work due to a shortfall on the side of his physical capacity does not have a choice whether 
or not to work and suffers an involuntary disadvantage.
Intention is a second feature of human volition that may be relevant to the attribution 
of consequential responsibility. We might say that an action only qualifies as a genuine 
choice provided it has expressed what the agent had in mind to do or bring about. The 
intention does not have to be made fully explicit to other people at the time, but the agent 
himself should at least be fully aware of what he or she is doing and minded to pass up
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alternatives. Someone who acts intentionally, in this sense, lacks a reason for public 
assistance that might be available to someone who embarked upon a course of action 
accidentally or was mistaken as to the true nature of what he or she was doing.
A third and related feature of choice is foresight. Foresight is relevant because 
genuine choice requires at least some knowledge of the possible outcomes, which 
includes not only an awareness of the outcomes but also some understanding of what they 
mean and how likely they are. It would seem wrong-headed, for instance, to claim that 
someone chose to take a certain risk even though he had no clue of the dangers he was 
facing. Knowledge of risk opens up the possibility of prudent choice, but it also opens up 
the possibility of recklessness. A person is reckless when he or she has foresight of very 
likely bad outcomes, but ignores this information and takes the risk anyway. In some 
cases this foresight alone may be enough to justify holding individuals responsible for any 
unpleasant situations in which they find themselves.
Freedom from coercion is another common feature of choice-based theories of 
responsibility. A familiar type of case is where a person has been coerced to make a 
certain choice by intimidation, threat, manipulation, blackmail and so on. Strictly 
speaking, it might still be possible to say that a person made a choice in such 
circumstances, even that he made the right choice, but it is open to dispute whether he 
made a voluntary choice, and whether he should be held responsible for the 
consequences. In these sorts of cases a person (or group of persons) unduly influences 
the choices of others by changing the payoffs.
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A fifth, more controversial aspect of genuine choice is authenticity. This is a 
notoriously difficult notion to pin down, but to qualify as authentic it seems that a 
person’s choice must in some sense be his or her own. If, for example, a person has been 
influenced to make a particular choice as a result of a cynical advertising campaign that 
contains hidden subliminal messages, we may well be disinclined to regard this as an 
authentic choice of the individual. Other authenticity-affecting influences, however, may 
be less clear-cut. Suppose a person has been influenced in the way he behaves (or 
chooses to behave) by the attitudes and beliefs of his friends, family, culture or religion. 
In what sense are these choices still his own, and is there some identity that persists 
beyond these sorts of influences?
Yet another important issue for the choice theorist is people’s choice-making and 
choice-following abilities. Some people may well be inclined to stop and deliberate 
before they act, and have the strength of mind to act on what they have calmly decided is 
in their best interests. But it is certainly possible that a person’s propensity to stop and 
think, to make prudent calculations, and to follow choices, is down to his natural 
tendency, level of maturity and his upbringing, which are all things he may have no 
control over. So if a person has not stopped to think about the risks he is taking, and how 
he might feel should things turn out badly, or has simply been unable to avoid the 
temptation of taking the risk, then it might not be his own fault, and it may not be fitting 
to hold him responsible for the consequences.
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One final, but related aspect of voluntary choice is free will. To say that a person has 
voluntary choice, in this sense, is to say he is the cause of his own actions. A person has 
free will if he could have chosen to act differently, everything about the situation and 
himself being the same prior to the choice being made. For a person to have free will 
there should not exist any set of antecedent conditions including past experiences, 
character traits, family life, environment, and the like, no matter how complex, that make 
it inevitable that he will choose to behave in a particular way. The assumption that 
human beings have free will is contrasted with the philosophical theory of hard 
determinism, that is: human choices are fully determined by a combination of internal and 
external aspects of life, which are themselves fully determined by other influences that 
are in turn regulated by inescapable laws of nature.
What is the significance of these different aspects of voluntary choice? Which of the 
above features, if absent, offers powerful grounds for waiving individual responsibility? 
Lack of opportunity appears to be of this order. It would certainly seem unfitting to hold 
someone responsible for not doing X if he lacked the outward opportunity of doing X. 
The fact that a person was ignorant or genuinely mistaken may also be a credible excuse 
in some cases. Allowing these sorts of excusing conditions compares favourably to a 
system of strict responsibility whereby individuals are held responsible even for genuine 
errors. Other grounds for waiving individual responsibility, however, can appear 
somewhat less convincing. The excuse that a person did not make an authentic choice 
may be open to question, as may the reason that human beings have different choice-
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making and choice-following abilities and might not have free will in the philosophical
sense.
However, in saying that the foregoing features of human behaviour are relevant to the 
idea of voluntary choice, I do not say that those who adopt a choice-based approach are 
committed to each of the above features. There are different variants of this view. Nor 
do I claim that voluntary choice is absolute. As Cohen puts it:
We are not looking for an absolute distinction between presence and absence of 
genuine choice. The amount of genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter 
of degree, and egalitarian redress is indicated to the extent that a disadvantage 
does not reflect genuine choice. That extent is a function of several things, and 
there is no aspect of a person’s situation which is wholly due to genuine choice . .
. One of the things that affects how genuine a choice was is the amount of 
relevant information that the chooser had. But we do not have to ask, Exactly 
what sort and amount of information must a person have to count as having 
genuinely chosen his fate? All we need to say, from the point of view of 
egalitarian justice, is: the more relevant information he had, the less cause for 
complaint he now has. (Cohen 1989: 934)
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3.3 EXAMPLES
Is the choice theory plausible? Let us begin with a relatively simple version of the choice 
view: inequalities of personal advantage are acceptable if, and only if, they reflect the 
choices of equally competent individuals deliberating freely over roughly the same set of 
options. Is this reading of consequential responsibility supported by specific cases?
A. Unemployment and underemployment.
Perhaps not surprisingly moral attitudes towards poverty are sensitive to its perceived 
causes. Unemployment and underemployment can be obvious reasons for someone’s 
being poor but we often make a moral distinction between cases. Those who are sick, 
disabled, elderly, or caring for children are generally viewed more favourably than those 
who are merely idle (see, for example, Digby 1989: 127). But what, if anything, can 
justify these commonplace distinctions?
The choice-theorist will emphasise the distinction between voluntary unemployment 
and underemployment and involuntary unemployment and underemployment. On the one 
hand, he will argue that we have a duty to mitigate the affects of brute luck on people’s 
life prospects. On any reasonable interpretation this will include individuals who are 
unable to earn a wage to support themselves due to debilitating difficulties that lie 
entirely beyond their control. Severe physical disablement from birth is one obvious
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example but others can include mental health problems such as severe depression or 
stress. On this view, reflecting on brute luck makes it almost impossible to say that 
individuals are rightly held responsible for their own poverty.
On the other hand, the choice theorist will argue that those who choose less 
productive occupations, measured by what others want, should have less residual income 
as a consequence. At first glance, finding plausible examples of voluntary unemployment 
seems straightforward. The media is full of stories of people who “choose” to be 
unemployed -  women who decide to have lots of children because they would rather stay 
at home than work; teenage girls who purposely get pregnant so they can qualify for 
public housing; young men who deliberately perform badly in job interviews so they do 
not have to accept jobs they do not want to do; career dole bludgers who lie and say they 
are unable to work because they are lazy. In fact the choice theorist does not even have to 
rely on these stories. He can accept that poverty occurs because partnerships break up 
and women cannot afford to work and pay for expensive child-care; because teenage girls 
do not think far enough ahead to be influenced by the prospect of public housing, and if 
they do think about the future, they do not believe that an unplanned pregnancy will 
happen to them; because young people live for the moment and fall in and out of work; 
because the long-term jobless lapse into idleness. Even so, he can insist that 
unemployment is voluntary in these cases in the sense that it is within the control of the 
agent that he or she has no job, the lack of employment is the product of lack of foresight 
not lack of equal opportunity.
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However, there is far more than meets the eye to these cases. Even among those who 
are able-bodied and of working age, in a time of high demand for labour, many find 
themselves out of work because they have lost the habit of work or never had the habit. 
For these people the tendency not to make an effort to find work or stay in jobs is ‘second 
nature’. Why might this fact be a problem for a choice-based account of responsibility? 
Because the tendency to make an effort to work can lie outside people’s control and on 
the choice view this constitutes a reason for responsibility-abrogation. So, if we seriously 
thought that the presence of genuine choice is a necessary condition for holding 
individuals responsible for lack of income, this would imply that few people who are 
currently unemployed are rightly held responsible. This might not be plausible.
The difficulties do not end here for the choice theorist. The choice theory can fail to 
deliver unambiguously just results even in cases where individuals do make a deliberate, 
voluntary choice to be unemployed. In some cases voluntary unemployment and 
responsibility can come apart. Consider those people who make a conscious decision to 
engage in low-paid or non-wage-eaming work out of a sense of devotion to a cause or 
familial or parental duty. Think of the budding artist living in poverty to produce great 
art. Or reflect on the plight of the woman who devotes her time to the care of the 
homeless, the sick and the elderly. Suppose for the sake of argument these are voluntary 
choices. On the choice-based account of responsibility, it is fitting that these people do 
not receive public money because their poverty flows from the lives they have voluntarily 
chosen to lead. It may even be consistent with justice if they end up in poverty and debt 
as a result of the paths they follow. Yet it is unclear whether the choice-based approach
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offers a plausible account of the moral landscape in this area. Surely it is not 
unreasonable for someone in this position to say: ‘It is not only my responsibility the fact 
that I am poor because morally speaking society should provide people like me with an 
income for these purposes. Whilst it is true that supplying this income will impose a 
burden on taxpayers, it is also true that this work makes a significant contribution to 
society as a whole.’
This may or may not be an argument that we ultimately accept but in any event I 
think these cases force us to reflect on not simply whether a person voluntarily chooses to 
do something that is badly paid but also the value or usefulness of the behaviour in 
question. The fact that an artist or carer (say) adds to the cultural life of his community 
and the well-being of her family are surely reasons that should be taken into account 
when contemplating just attributions of consequential responsibility. Consequently, it 
might be wrong to hold such individuals fully responsible for their diminished 
circumstances even though there is a sense in which they choose the lives they lead; this, 
at least, is arguable.
B. Smoking
Much recent moral concern about smoking has been sparked by relatively new 
scientific discoveries concerning the harmful affects of passive smoking. This moral 
disquiet has, in turn, resulted in calls for the banning of smoking in public spaces.
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Nevertheless, my main interest here is to consider whether the medical costs of treating 
smoking-related diseases should be held in common or imposed specifically on those who 
smoke. Following other philosophers in this area I make the simplifying assumption that 
the treatment of smoking-related diseases does impose burdens on health services that 
would not be present if people did not smoke. Thus I assume that within the public sector 
treating smoking-related diseases involves redirecting scarce medical resources (hospital 
beds, nurses, doctors, and so on) away from other equally important areas of health care. 
I shall not examine here, therefore, the hypothesis that smokers do not, in fact, place an 
unequal burden on health services because they generally have a shorter life expectancy 
than non-smokers.
One dominant view in the field of distributive justice is that smokers cannot fairly 
expect the rest of society to foot the bill for smoking-related diseases and so should pay 
additional sums to cover the medical costs caused by smoking (see, for example, 
Rakowski 1991: 89; Gutmann 1995: 112-114; and also Anderson 1999: 328). But what, 
if anything, can justify this policy? The choice theorist believes that the presence (or 
absence) of voluntary choices should be operative in responsibility-attribution: that we 
should draw a moral distinction between a voluntary smoker, who makes a voluntary 
choice to smoke, and an involuntary smoker, who does not. On this reading of justice, 
only the voluntary smokers ought to pay additional sums towards the treatment of 
smoking-related diseases.
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Now, in reply to this, the voluntary smoker might try to argue that the provision of 
medical care should in fact be collectivised -  with non-smokers contributing part of the 
cost of treating smoking-related diseases -  because this represents a quid pro quo for non- 
smokers being able to take slight risks with their health, such as eating too much or not 
taking regular exercise. But the choice theorist can retort quite rightly that one apparent 
difficulty with the aforesaid reply is that it might be the same people taking all of the 
risks, leaving generally more prudent individuals to foot the bill most of the time. The 
people who smoke might also be the same people who drink too much, fail to take regular 
exercise, and so on. So it is unclear why others who do not take these risks should have 
to bear the costs of medical treatment.
However, despite the fact that the choice theorist is able to say that voluntary smokers 
should contribute towards the costs of smoking, it is unclear whether the choice view 
always makes the right cut between individual and collective responsibility. It seems to 
me that basing responsibility-attribution on choice alone will be too generous to the 
‘involuntary’ smoker. This problem emerges into view when we reflect on the lack of 
choice exhibited by large numbers of smokers. Even though there is now plenty of 
information available to smokers about the risks of smoking, often people take up this 
habit when they are young and arguably before they can reasonably be held responsible 
for their actions. A second point is that plenty of older smokers became addicted when 
there was still a great deal of ignorance (and even misinformation) as to the medical risks 
associated with imbibing large quantities of nicotine into the body. A third consideration 
is that many people smoke not because they have made a deliberate and informed choice
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to do so but as a result of peer pressure or other life pressures such as stress in the work 
place. Taking these factors into account, the choice view would seem to imply that very 
few, if any, smokers should bear the cost of treating their own smoking-related diseases. 
This is because very few, if any, smokers seem to act voluntarily. Yet this permissive 
abrogation of responsibility is open to question. Surely the non-smoking taxpayer can 
reasonably object to a policy that compels him to pay the costs of treating smoking- 
related diseases on the grounds that absence of choice is not a sufficient reason to waive 
individual responsibility on the part of smokers.
To press this point, the willing smoker wants to be able to smoke without having to 
pay additional costs to insure himself against the risks, and the unwilling smoker wants 
both medical insurance and help in his efforts to quit smoking so that he may be free from 
his cravings. Yet by the same token the non-smoking taxpayer does not want to have to 
pay for other people’s risk-taking. In that sense smokers are not a special case. In other 
words, it seems that forcing smokers to pay for their own medical insurance (and/or their 
efforts to quit smoking) would diminish their ability to live as they wish as much as 
forcing non-smokers to bear these costs would diminish their ability to live as they wish. 
Given this fact it might not be entirely unreasonable to expect smokers to buy their own 
medical insurance.
Even if the choice theorist relaxes the definition of ‘voluntary’ so as to include the 
above smokers in the category of people it is right to hold responsible for the 
consequences of their actions, a second problem is that the choice view seems to ignore
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morally relevant facts about the behaviour of some smokers. My point is that even if 
people start out as voluntary smokers knowing the risks, many of them later decide that 
they no longer want to,smoke. They then make every reasonable effort to try to quit and 
lead a healthier lifestyle generally. With this added information it seems much less 
certain that he should continue to pay for the costs of smoking or at the very least that he 
should pay the same as the smoker who makes no attempt to quit. This seems to hold 
true even if such a person has not been completely successful in his efforts.
In reply to this last case, the choice theorist might try to argue that because the 
unwilling smoker is clearly very strongly addicted to nicotine he is, in effect, an 
involuntary smoker and so does in that sense have a case for subsidy on the choice view. 
He might say the smoker was once a voluntary smoker but is so no longer. However, 
even if we accept this gloss on the smoker’s attempts to kick the habit, we must not 
confuse what actually triggers the claim to subsidy with what is coincidentally true about 
his behaviour. For it is surely his willingness to take steps to quit that adds strength to his 
claim for assistance on grounds of reasonableness, not merely the fact that he is addicted 
to nicotine, so is in that restricted sense an involuntary smoker.
C. Dangerous activities and occupations
Consider those people who climb mountains, drive racing cars or engage in any 
number of risky pastimes. Who should pay when they hurt themselves? In his Equal
112
Justice, Eric Rakowski argues that injuries suffered by those who freely engage in 
dangerous activities and occupations are exemplary instances of bad ‘option luck’. 
Provided the agent had the opportunity to avoid the risk it is not unjust that he should 
bear the consequences of his choice. Those who accept these dangers participate in a 
lottery the results of which are not unjust (Rakowski 1991: 79).
Whilst I accept there can be a case for holding people responsible for the risks they 
freely enter into, I do not think choice is sufficient to ground individual responsibility in 
all cases. If someone wants to climb mountains at weekends for personal enjoyment, it 
does not seem unreasonable that he should buy insurance against possible accidents. But 
it is far less obvious that a person should have to pay to insure himself if he is the 
member of a mountain rescue team whose task it is to save stranded mountaineers. Some 
jobs seem to call for special consideration on the scales of justice. Mountain rescue is 
one example but there are others.
For example, consider soldiers, fire-fighters, police officers, and ambulance workers. 
It might be fitting to allow these workers to disclaim consequential responsibility for any 
injuries they might suffer for a number of reasons, but one plausible reason is that it is in 
taxpayers’ interests to offer a package of benefits that can be justified to these individuals 
and which will induce them to undertake these types of dangerous jobs. On this 
reasoning, if someone is actively considering various types of professions but opts to do a 
job that involves some form of public service, as these jobs do, then it is not unreasonable 
for society as a collective body to assume the costs of his or her medical insurance and
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life insurance, because this is a division of social responsibility that can be justified to 
taxpayers; this, at least, is arguable.
Arguably it is another problematic feature of the choice theory of consequential 
responsibility that it does not discriminate between those who do and those who do not 
deserve to be held responsible for the consequences of their imprudent choices. In some 
cases it seems entirely fitting to set aside impositions of individual responsibility implied 
by choice in order to ensure that people do not end up in situations they do not deserve. 
Consider the case of Mother Teresa of Calcutta, unselfishly devoting her life to the 
hungry and the sick (see Ameson 1999a: 238-241; 2001: 87-89).
Reflecting on all of the above cases, do we now have grounds for saying that 
voluntary choice is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for assigning 
consequential responsibility to individuals? I do not assume that I have offered invincible 
arguments in support of this conclusion, but I hope I have raised doubts over the choice- 
only view of consequential responsibility. In many cases individuals simply do not act in 
ways that can plausibly be described as ‘voluntary choice’ and even where they do, it is 
not always clear that they should be held responsible for the consequences.
My official view is that even though the presence (or absence) of choice can be useful 
in some cases, its incompleteness lies in its failure to take account of the wider moral 
significance of people’s actions, and the benefits and burdens to agents and society as a 
whole of different attributions of responsibility. Much more on this in chapter 5. But for
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now it is worth noting, of course, that the choice theorist does have a reply to this charge 
of incompleteness. He might insist that we should revise our considered intuitions to fit 
the theory rather than the other way around. Yet this response is far from mollifying. 
Whilst there may be little in this area that is uncontroversial, surely it would be better to 
admit that even though helpful and accurate in some cases, the choice-only approach is 
too crude to bear the weight of our intuitions in others. With this response in mind I want 
to introduce one final query I have regarding the choice theorist’s position.
3.4 CHOICE AND CIRCUMSTANCE
As I have already mentioned, many writers in the egalitarian tradition believe that it is a 
key demand of justice that governments try to level the playing field for personal success 
but allow inequalities of outcome to develop on the strength of the way people use their 
opportunities. However, some writers in this tradition, Roemer for one, have also 
stressed that even the way a person makes use of his opportunities can be dependent on 
his internal abilities and other factors that might lie beyond his control. Consequently, in 
his book, Equality o f Opportunity, Roemer offers a way of modelling equal opportunity 
that takes into account both voluntary choices and the circumstances that lie beyond a 
person’s control. I think there is something plausible about Roemer’s general approach to 
equal opportunity, but I also think it reveals some of the limitations of the choice 
theorist’s reading of responsibility, and this is what I want to try and bring out now.
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Roemer’s proposal is to define the degree of responsibility by looking at the sorts of 
behaviour we can expect from people of the same type. On this view, a person is 
responsible for how he acts within the range of behaviour that is predicted by type, but 
not for the range of behaviour. This, according to Roemer, provides a way of being 
sensitive to voluntary choice but at the same time being clear about the influences that 
diminish responsibility, such as: genes, family background, culture, and, more generally, 
the social milieu. Among a number of examples, Roemer suggests that in distributing 
educational resources we should see children as belonging to different types, each type 
having its own expected effort range. True equal opportunity for educational success is 
obtained when resources are distributed such that children at the same centile of effort, 
across different types, have similar expected educational success no matter what type they 
belong to and regardless of the absolute amount of effort they make (see Roemer 1998: 
10). The basic aim is to level the educational achievements of children who expend the 
same relative effort. In fact, Roemer claims it might not even be necessary to achieve 
equal achievement, provided the distribution maximises the minimum achievement levels 
of children at the same centile of effort, across type (see Roemer 1998: 11).
I think there is an element of justice in the claim that a person’s prospects should not 
simply depend on how he or she behaves, but that in working out degrees of individual 
responsibility we should consider how other, similarly situated people behave. 
Nevertheless, there are a number of potential difficulties with this way of thinking about 
responsibility. One elementary problem is how to determine which factors influence a 
person’s behaviour and whether such factors lie within his or her control. Staying with
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the example of educational achievement, suppose social science offers predictions about 
the level of effort for children of different types; when confronted with a type that appears 
to have a particular effort range, the temptation will then be to see this range as beyond 
the child’s control. But even if social science offers extremely accurate predictions, there 
is always a chance that the relevant effort range is statistically random; nothing 
whatsoever to do with genuine effort-influencing factors. What is more, suppose a child 
belongs to a number of groups, each of which has a different predicted effort range. One 
solution might be to say that the child belongs to a much smaller group which combines 
the characteristic of all these different types. But then, it might be difficult to arrive at 
accurate predictions about groups containing very few members, which renders the 
analysis much less useful.
In fact, this proposal only seems to invite vexed political disputes. Consider the case 
of unemployment. When confronted with a section of society that appears to have a 
particularly poor work ethic and high unemployment ratio, those on the political right 
might argue that effort is well within the control of the individual. In response to this, a 
liberal may well point out that a more relaxed attitude to work is a cultural trait among 
members of this group, and so social policy should be directed to mitigating the affect of 
this difference. Yet the other could come back by saying that there are individuals who 
appear to be members of this group but whose effort level falls outside the ‘typical’ effort 
range. The liberal then has two possible rejoinders, either that these individuals fall into a 
different group or that they are exceptions that prove the rule. And so the dispute may 
continue, back and forth.
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However, even if there were no disagreement over which factors make it inevitable 
that people will behave in a particular fashion, a further problem is that this still might not 
be the right basis on which to either uphold or waive consequential responsibility. From 
the fact that a person has been influenced to behave in a particular way as a result of 
circumstances that lie beyond his control, it does not follow that resulting disadvantages 
are unfair.
To see this, there are cases where people are appropriately blamed for their actions 
but should not be left to bear the consequences. Consider one example taken from 
Scanlon’s book, What We Owe to Each Other:
We can imagine a person who, as a result of generally horrible treatment as a 
child and lack of proper early training, is both undisciplined and unreliable. If 
this person lies to his employers, fails to do what he has agreed to do, and never 
exerts himself to get a job done, he is properly criticized for these actions and 
attitudes. But if they render him unemployable it would not be permissible to 
deny him welfare support on the ground that his unemployability is due to actions 
for which he is responsible. He is responsible (that is to say, open to criticism) 
for these actions, but he cannot simply be left to bear the consequences, since he 
has not had adequate opportunity to avoid being subject to them. (Scanlon 1998:
292)
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But it would be misleading to say -  and I think Scanlon would agree on this point -  that 
individuals should be relieved of consequential responsibility whenever they have been 
influenced by others to act as they do. As Dworkin quite correctly points out, it also 
seems to matter what type of influence is involved:
Scanlon suggests that in certain cases in which it would be proper to blame 
people for their decisions, their community might nevertheless have reason to 
relieve them from consequential responsibility for those decisions . . .  He 
discusses someone who has grown up work-shy in an environment in which his 
peers discourage a taste for work. We might not be as ready to refuse such a 
person unemployment relief, on the ground that he is unwilling to work, as 
someone not from such a background. We must take care, however, to 
distinguish two reasons we might think we have for that special treatment. We 
might think, first, that since he did not choose his distaste for work, he should not 
be asked to conquer it. Or we might think, second, that if he and his peers 
developed no interest in work because unjust and inadequate education or 
poverty or prejudice insured that work was not available to them on reasonable 
terms, it would be unfair to force him, to accept the consequences of his distaste 
now. We can distinguish the two cases by imagining two different stories: that 
Scanlon's work-shy person is an upper-class twit raised to think that work was 
beneath his class and, second, that he grew up in a desperately poor urban slum 
with high and endemic unemployment. The first of the two reasons just 
distinguished would treat both these stories alike; the second would treat them
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very differently. I accept the second reason, and would distinguish the stories. 
(Dworkin 2000: 490n.9)
So, for all the importance placed on the cut between influences on a person’s 
behaviour that do and influences that do not lie beyond his control, it seems we still 
require a theory that tells us which of the various influences that might lie beyond a 
person’s control are sufficient to relieve him of consequential responsibility. This theory, 
if successful, would explain, for example, why intuitively it seems fair that an upper-class 
twit should be held responsible for the consequences of his actions even though he did 
not choose his distaste for work. Faced with the task of identifying those aspects of 
environment that influence behaviour in a responsibility-abrogating way, Roemer openly 
admits, however, that he has no formal theory:
I do not have a theory which would enable me to discover exactly what aspects of 
a person’s environment are beyond his control and affect his relevant behaviour 
in a way that relieves him or her of personal accountability for that behaviour. In 
actual practice, the society in question shall decide, through some political 
process, what it wishes to deem “circumstances”. (Roemer 1998: 8)
Roemer’s contribution to egalitarian theory has been to offer a formal definition of 
equal opportunity that incorporates within its terms sensitivity to both voluntary choice 
and aspects of a person’s environment that lie beyond his control. So perhaps it would be 
too much to expect from Roemer, in addition to this, a formal account of those aspects of
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a person’s environment that relieve him of responsibility for his behaviour. However, 
having said that, it is not obvious (to me at least) that a formal account is even the right 
kind of theory. I think there is something attractive about the suggestion that: ‘In actual 
practice, the society in question shall decide, through some political process, what it 
wishes to deem ‘circumstances” . However, arguably, what is most attractive is not so 
much the thought that government should try to mitigate the influence of circumstances 
on people’s prospects, drawing on what the public deems circumstances to be, but that in 
a fair society the division of consequential responsibility is something that can be open to 
public discussion. I accept the spirit of this proposal and shall try to develop it further in 
chapter 5. Even so, if this is the spirit, then there is no reason not to bear in mind what 
other reasons, besides the distinction between voluntary and involuntary disadvantage, 
citizens might reasonably have for dividing consequential responsibility in one way or 
another. This seems to me to be the most likely outcome of leaving it to each society to 
decide what it wishes to deem circumstances.
Putting the same point slightly differently, Roemer’s proposal to consult the will of 
the people through some political process is plausible. The basic premise is that justice 
demands general agreement about which are the right divisions of consequential 
responsibility. However, this potentially takes us some distance from the original 
distinction between voluntary and involuntary disadvantage. There seems to be no way 
of ensuring -  nor do I think there should be -  that voters (or their representatives) will not 
consider (or be moved by) various reasons in deciding what they wish to deem 
circumstances. If an individual is out of work through stress or because she cannot find
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suitable employment for her skills or because she is looking after her children, society 
may well decide that these are responsibility-abrogating circumstances. I accept that this 
could well be a fair division of responsibility. But in forming this opinion it does not 
have to be assumed, nor is it likely, that these circumstances are actually beyond the 
control of the agent. The reason might simply be that, all things considered, it is not 
unreasonable for society at large to take responsibility for these circumstances. This, 
however, then raises the following question: which other reasons deserve to be considered 
in arriving at reasonable assignments of responsibility? It is to this important question 
that I turn in the next chapter.
To bring this chapter to a close, I do not deny that it can be fitting to hold individuals 
responsible for personal misfortunes if those misfortunes have resulted from their 
voluntary choices. Closer contemplation on specific cases, however, makes it difficult to 
believe that the justice of assigning responsibility to individuals depends solely on 
whether or not a voluntary choice was made. We have found that this justification either 
falls away because people do not make the relevant kinds of choices or is open to strong 
objections when they do. One plausible solution is to consult the will of the people to 
find out how, more exactly, the division between individual and collective responsibility 
should be made. However, this suggestion might well move us beyond the initial 
distinction between voluntary and involuntary disadvantage.
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4 PERSONALITY
We have seen that some writers offer a formal approach to questions of consequential 
responsibility in which the cut between individual and collective responsibility is reduced 
to a more basic, non-moral distinction between choice and brute luck. However, some 
egalitarians argue that crucial to understanding this distinction is an account of various 
elements of the self that underpin those choices including tastes, preferences, ambitions, 
beliefs, and judgements of value of different sorts. If successful, this theory would show 
why personality (not just choice) can be an appropriate basis for assignments of 
consequential responsibility. But what exactly is personality? And why does the fact that 
a person has a deeply held conviction justify holding him responsible for the 
consequences of his actions?
4.1 LOUIS AND fflS EXPENSIVE TASTES
Central to Dworkin’s work on equality has been the attempt to debunk ‘equality of 
welfare’ as a moral ideal. One pillar of Dworkin’s anti-welfarist position is the argument 
that there is no coherent conception of welfare (whether as a psychological state or as the 
bare satisfaction of preferences) with which to develop a theory of equality; not, that is, a 
conception which welfarists have hitherto been able to cash out (see Dworkin 1981 <2; 
2000: 285; 2004: 341-2). However, a second powerful argument that Dworkin directs
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against welfarism is the ‘expensive tastes’ objection, and this is what I want to explore in 
this chapter.
Few examples in the ‘equality of what?’ literature have been commented on as much 
as Dworkin’s example of Louis and his expensive tastes. We are asked to ‘suppose that 
someone (Louis) sets out deliberately to cultivate some taste or ambition he does not now 
have, but which will be expensive in the sense that once it has been cultivated he will not 
have as much welfare on the chosen conception as he had before unless he acquires more 
wealth’ (Dworkin 1981a: 229). Dworkin lights on the example of tastes for plovers’ eggs 
and pre-phylloxera claret. These tastes are deliberately obscure, designed as they are to 
cast doubt on equality of welfare as a moral ideal. The rest of Dworkin’s argument is 
formulated as follows. If we were serious about equalising people’s welfare (enjoyment 
or preference satisfaction), then we would have to give Louis extra resources taken from 
those with less expensive tastes. This is because Louis requires extra resources in order 
to achieve the same level of welfare as others. This result, however, is implausible, since 
it forces the less frivolous to pay for Louis’ expensive (‘champagne’) tastes. Therefore, 
equality of welfare is not an ideal we should endorse (see Dworkin 1981a: 229).
At first glance, it might seem obvious why Louis does not have a right to additional 
resources. Louis has deliberately set out to cultivate his new tastes, he has intentionally 
chosen to have these tastes rather than tastes he can afford. Influenced by the work of 
Dworkin, other egalitarians have taken up the challenge of redefining the basic egalitarian 
impulse to take account of this point. The standard response among egalitarians post-
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Dworkin to the case of Louis has been to argue that egalitarianism does not attend to 
voluntary inequalities of welfare (see, for example, Cohen 1989; 1993; and Ameson 
1989; 1993). This line of response first appeared in Cohen’s article, “On the Currency of 
Egalitarian Justice.” In this article Cohen argued that one of the primary egalitarian 
impulses is to extinguish the influence of exploitation on distribution (Cohen 1989: 908). 
But whereas those on the left have traditionally written about exploitation in terms of the 
exploitative relationships between wage labourers and those who own the means of 
production -  Marxists argue that the owners of capital are essentially idle but live off the 
hard work of the dispossessed, alienated masses -  in this article Cohen warned against the 
possible exploitation of taxpayers by those who, for example, develop expensive tastes:
Consider people who convert resources into welfare inefficiently, so that, if 
welfare is to be equalized, they must be given twice the resources that ordinary 
converters get. These bad converters divide into various subsets. Some of them 
are inefficient because they are negligent or feckless in a morally culpable way: 
they buy their food at Fortnum’s because they cannot be bothered to walk up to 
the Berwick Street market. Others are blamelessly inefficient, because they are in 
some way disabled. They need twice the normal ration because half of such a 
double-share is required to overcome the ill fare effects of a handicap from which 
they suffer. That half could be the cost of their renal dialysis. Now there seems 
to me to be an egalitarian objection to a policy of ensuring the Fortnum’s 
customer’s welfare level is as high as everybody else’s. It seems to me, when 
other people pay for his readily avoidable wastefulness, there is, pro tanto, an
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exploitative distribution of burden which egalitarians should condemn. Equality 
of welfare should here be rejected not because of other values but because it is 
inegalitarian. (Cohen 1989: 911)
So, initially it appears that the lesson we are supposed to glean from the example of 
Louis is the familiar thought that people should not have to pay for the voluntary choices 
of others. However, there are two important pieces of textual evidence that tell against 
this line of interpretation of Dworkin. The first piece of evidence is that, having 
introduced the example, Dworkin immediately plays down the significance of the fact 
that Louis deliberately set out to cultivate his expensive tastes. Dworkin begins by 
explaining in more detail why Louis set out to cultivate his expensive tastes:
If Louis develops a taste for plovers’ eggs, he must believe that a life of satisfying 
expensive tastes is a better life overall in spite of the fact that it will provide less 
enjoyment, and might believe it better even if it would provide much less 
enjoyment. . .  It is plausible to suppose that beliefs of that sort figure even in the 
best accounts of why people in our own economy develop the less admirable 
expensive tastes -  champagne tastes -  that figure in the usual examples. For if 
someone like Louis wishes to lead the life of people in New York magazine ads, 
this must be because he supposes that a life in which rare and costly goods are 
savoured is a life better because it knows a greater variety of pleasures, or more 
sophisticated pleasures, or, indeed, simply pleasures that others do not know, in 
spite of containing less pleasure overall. (Dworkin 1981a: 231-232)
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For Dworkin, then, what is significant about Louis’ new tastes is that they reflect his new 
beliefs about what kind of life is better overall. Dworkin continues:
This explanation of Louis’ behaviour challenges the importance of the distinction 
we have thus far been assuming between expensive tastes that are deliberately 
cultivated and other aspects of personality or person, such as native desires or 
socially imposed tastes, that affect people’s welfare. For the explanation suggests 
that such tastes are often cultivated in response to beliefs -  beliefs about what 
sort of life is overall more successful -  such beliefs are not themselves cultivated 
or chosen. Not, that is, in any sense that provides a reason for ignoring 
differences in welfare caused by these beliefs in a community otherwise 
committed to evening out differences in welfare. I do not mean that beliefs are 
afflictions, like blindness, that people find that they have and are stuck with. 
People reason about their theories of what gives value to life in something of the 
same way in which they reason about other sorts of beliefs. But they do not 
choose that a life of service to others, for example, or a life of creative art or 
scholarship, or a life of exquisite flavours, be the most valuable sort of life for 
them to lead, and therefore do not choose that they shall believe that it is. We 
may still distinguish between the voluntary decision someone makes to become a 
person with certain tastes, or to lead the sort of life likely to have that 
consequence, and his discovery of tastes and ambitions that he just has. But the
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distinction is less important than is sometimes thought, because that decision is 
rarely if ever voluntary all the way down. (Dworkin 1981a: 232)
So if there is any insight to be gleaned from the example of Louis, this passage clearly 
shows that it is far more subtle than the claim that Louis should bear the consequences of 
his tastes because they are voluntarily chosen.
A second piece of evidence for the subtler interpretation of Dworkin comes by way of 
the fact that Dworkin rejects the idea that unchosen tastes raise a case for compensation 
or subsidy. His many reflections on this point appear in his recent book, Sovereign 
Virtue, which includes the original article, “Equality of Welfare” as well as material 
published for the first time in that volume. Although these reflections are difficult to 
interpret, not least because it is unclear whether passages in the newly published chapters 
are supposed to expand upon the reprinted material or simply replace that material, it is 
possible to make out the following two claims.
(a) To compensate individuals for unsatisfied tastes and preferences is counter­
intuitive since it contradicts people’s ordinary ethical identifications and practices.
(b) To compensate individuals for unsatisfied tastes and preferences undermines the 
existing fair distribution of resources.
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The first claim (a) represents Dworkin’s intuitive case against compensation for unchosen 
tastes. The second claim (b) is based on his own principle of distributive justice, Equality 
of Resources, (b) is supported by two further hypothetical arguments.
(bl) Shipwreck survivors faced with the task of dividing the available resources on a 
desert island are unlikely to agree to divide resources in a way that is sensitive to 
some people’s expensive tastes.
(b2) Faced with questions about what kinds of insurance they would purchase 
against a range of misfortunes, the shipwreck survivors are unlikely to want to 
purchase insurance against having unsatisfied tastes and preferences.
I will consider the intuitive argument (a) first.
4.2 DWORKIN’S INTUITIVE CASE AGAINST EQUALITY OF WELFARE
It is possible to extract from Dworkin’s “Equality of Welfare” and chapter 7 of his 
Sovereign Virtue the following argument against compensating expensive tastes.
(1) There is an ethical distinction people ordinarily make between circumstances and 
personality.
(Dworkin 19816: 303; 2000: 290, 293).
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(2) There is a common practice of taking consequential responsibility for tastes,
preferences, values, beliefs, convictions, and so on.
(Dworkin 2000: 290, 294)
(3) There should be continuity between public principles of distributive justice and
conventional distinctions and practices such as (1) and (2).
(See Dworkin 2000: 294-6, 323-4)
Therefore,
(4) The State should hold individuals responsible for their expensive tastes.
(See Dworkin 2000: 298)
How convincing is this argument? To begin with the first premise, what does 
Dworkin mean when he asserts that ordinarily people draw an ethical distinction between 
circumstances and personality? Dworkin’s basic thought seems to be that whereas agents 
tend to look upon their tastes, preferences, ambitions, desires, character traits, and so on, 
as defining their ends, they regard their resources (such as talent, income and wealth) as 
defining the means they have at their disposal for achieving their ends (see Dworkin 
1981 b: 303; and 2000: 293). How is this separation manifest? Dworkin contends that we 
typically identify with our preferences, in the sense that we do not regret having them and 
do not believe we would be better off without them, but may disidentify with our 
circumstances, wishing things were different so that we might pursue our ends more 
easily (see Dworkin 1981 b: 302-303).
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In fact, Dworkin argues that almost everything that individuals are willing to count as 
tastes, preferences, ambitions, desires, and so on, are suffused with deeply held beliefs 
and judgements of value. Louis, for example, develops a passion for plovers’ eggs and 
pre-phylloxera claret, for example, because he believes that having these tastes will make 
his life better overall. This, according to Dworkin, is one thing that differentiates normal 
human beings from ‘buzz’ and ‘tick addicts’ who identify with their tastes and ambitions 
in an impersonal way. For them, the fundamental goal in life is to get as many thrills or 
satisfy as many preferences as they can, irrespective of the quality of the particular 
experience and the content of the particular preference. For normal human beings, 
however, it is the intimate connection with a taste or preference that explains why these 
things define what a successful life would be (see Dworkin 2000: 293). As Dworkin puts 
it:
It would strike us as bizarre for someone to say that he should be pitied, or 
compensated by his fellow citizens, because he had the bad luck to have decided 
that he should help his friend in need, or that Mozart is more intriguing than hip- 
hop, or that a life well lived includes foreign travel. (Dworkin 2000: 290)
I think there is something plausible about what Dworkin has to say about 
identification, in particular, the claim that individuals tend to look upon their tastes, 
preferences, ambitions, desires, and so on, as defining their ends. I am much less 
convinced, however, that identification in this sense is a sufficient condition for imposing 
responsibility on agents. The question we must consider is this: does the fact that a
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person identifies with his tastes and preferences necessarily carry over into any claims for 
extra resources he might make such that it would be bizarre for him to ask for extra 
resources for those expensive tastes and preferences he identifies with? It is not difficult 
to think of counter examples.
Would it be so strange for a person with a passion for opera (as opposed to rock 
music) to ask the government to subsidise the cost of this musical experience on the 
grounds that it is entirely beyond his control that opera is a relatively expensive interest to 
pursue? In the words of Cohen:
people can certainly without any self-misrepresentation or incoherence ask for 
compensation for (what might be, in every relevant sense) the circumstance that 
their taste is expensive. Whether or not it is weird to regret one’s preference for 
reading certain kinds of books (that happen to be expensive), there is nothing 
weird or self-alienating in regretting precisely this: that the kinds one wants to 
read are expensive. (Cohen 2004: 11)
The second premise in Dworkin’s argument alleges a common ‘practice’ of taking 
responsibility for personal tastes and preferences.
Ordinary people, in their ordinary lives, take consequential responsibility for their 
own personalities. (Dworkin 2000: 290)
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The critics could not just appeal to a supposed normative principle holding that 
people should never be held responsible, in any sense of responsibility, for what 
they have not deliberately chosen. That principle would be contradicted [ . . .  ] by 
our practice of taking consequential responsibility for our convictions. (Dworkin 
2000: 294)
It is not entirely clear what Dworkin has in mind by ‘our practice of taking consequential 
responsibility for our convictions’, but whatever it means it must entail something related 
to the ‘the conventional distinction we all make between circumstances and personality’. 
The conventional distinction informs the practice of taking consequential responsibility 
for our convictions? But what is the practice?
Perhaps the idea is that generally speaking people develop and adjust their personal 
ends to make themselves happy without hope or expectation that society at large will pay 
for their expensive tastes and preferences to be satisfied. To be more precise, people 
either work hard to pay for the items they desire or they try to reform or revise tastes and 
preferences they cannot achieve. Or else, they simply come to terms with their unhappy 
lot. Putting the same point slightly differently, if Louis were a real person, it is highly 
unlikely that he would turn up at the local welfare office and ask for special funds to 
purchase plovers’ eggs and pre-phylloxera claret, and even less likely that the welfare 
office would give him the money if he did.
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Dworkin, then, seems to regard the practice of taking consequential responsibility for 
our personal ends as a natural consequence of the fact that people ordinarily identify with 
their tastes and preferences. But can we imagine a world in which the practice does not 
match the distinction? Can we imagine a world in which a person has a propensity not to 
take responsibility for his preference for opera over rock music even though he identifies 
with his preference? I think it is possible to imagine such a world if we add to the story 
the fact that the person identifies with his preference but not with the arbitrary expense of 
satisfying that preference. In this scenario, our agent would be willing to ask for public 
funds not in spite of his strong identification with his preference but because of the 
importance he places on it.
Now it is certainly true that the terms ‘welfare state’ and ‘welfare worker’ are 
traditionally associated with the essentials of life such as food, clothing, housing, and 
health care. But one could certainly envisage a possible world in which there are many 
more strands to public spending besides these staples. More importantly, even if few 
people are willing to make distributive claims against others for these sorts of reasons, 
this would still not justify the claim that it is inappropriate to do so. One cannot proceed 
from a factual statement about the claims that people currently make, to a moral 
conclusion about how state authorities should treat possible claims in the future. So long 
as the claims that people are willing to make now reflect their beliefs about what 
government agencies are likely to accept, those agencies are not justified in denying 
alternative claims simply because people do not presently make them. If social welfare 
activities were broadened to include a much wider variety of human interests, it is
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certainly not inconceivable (quite likely even) that more people would be willing to make 
claims. Perhaps the anti-welfarist will try to insist that this merely proves that people will 
try anything on. But this is precisely the issue at stake; that is, whether we interpret such 
requests as ‘reasonable claims’ or as ‘people trying it on’. One way to establish the 
answer might be to ask those people who make these claims if they think that others 
should also be compensated for their expensive tastes. If they think they should, then 
arguably they are not trying it on.
There is also a difficulty here with Dworkin’s use of second-order preferences to 
establish personal responsibility or lack of it. Key to his analysis is his distinction 
between ordinary tastes and preferences, on the one hand, and obsessions and cravings, 
on the other hand. Dworkin argues that whereas people identify with their ordinary tastes 
and preferences, they tend to regard obsessions and cravings, if they have them, as 
impediments to a successful life. An obsession or craving is something that people do 
not see as an aspect of their own personality. These are difficulties they believe they 
would be better off without. For Dworkin, an obsession or craving is rightly considered a 
‘circumstance’ in a way that ordinary tastes and preferences are not (Dworkin 1981 b: 
302-303).
This distinction is certainly interesting but it is not difficult to find fault with it. One 
problem is that second-order preference-repudiating attitudes are much less helpful in 
identifying cravings than Dworkin seems to think. As Cohen has quite correctly pointed 
out, a person in the grip of a genuine obsession or craving is too unreflective to form the
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kind of second-order preference-repudiating attitude which Dworkin thinks is necessary 
to generate a claim to remedy or mitigation (Cohen 1989: 926). In fact, the inability to 
engage in critical reflection seems to be characteristic of an obsession or craving, where 
the victim is effectively rendered immobile except for all thoughts and deeds relating to 
the satisfaction of the relevant desire.
Further difficulties emerge in connection with Dworkin’s hypothetical insurance 
market. For one thing, implicit in this thought experiment is the assumption that it is 
right to consider the issue of insurance for cravings and obsessions from a perspective in 
which everyone has an equal chance of acquiring cravings and obsessions. What justifies 
this assumption? Surely in the real world some people are more likely to develop 
cravings than others, partly because of the way they lead their lives. This is not a trivial 
point. People who do not take drugs of any kind are extremely unlikely to ever become 
heroin addicts. And they might not unreasonably reject a proposal that sees them 
contributing the same amount towards drug rehabilitation clinics as those people who do 
take drugs. There is, then, a need for finer divisions of responsibility in terms of the exact 
details of the proposals. I do not think we can simply assume equality of chances.
Another problematic feature of Dworkin’s argument comes to the fore when we 
consider the steps some people take (or do not take) to thwart or conquer personal ends 
such as tastes, preferences, goals, and ambitions. To my mind the activity of preference- 
repudiation must go hand-in-hand with the genuine state of mind of preference- 
repudiation. When a person does try to divest himself of a taste or preference it is
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invariably because he disidentifies with that thing. Can we really give credence to the 
thought of someone taking steps to conquer or dispel an expensive taste or preference 
even though he identifies with that thing? Dworkin, however, seems rather unclear about 
the relevance of people’s efforts to conquer or dispel troublesome tastes, preferences, 
desires, and so on. At certain points he claims that any such things we struggle to 
conquer or dispel, we do so because we view them as impediments to our overall success 
and happiness. They are akin to obsessions and craving and therefore properly assigned 
to our circumstances (see Dworkin 1981b: 303; 2000: 293). At other places, however, he 
claims that trying to reform or overcome desires and character traits is one of the ways in 
which people commonly take responsibility for their choices:
We take responsibility for our choices in a variety of ways. When these choices 
are freely made, and not dictated by others we blame ourselves if we later decide 
that we should have chosen differently. We evaluate and criticize the ambitions 
out of which our choices are made. We try to reform or overcome those 
character traits that have led us to make choices we would prefer not to have 
made. (Dworkin 2000: 323)
My own view is that trying to thwart or conquer a taste or preference is linked to 
preference-repudiation but as a sign of that repudiation rather than as a consequence of it. 
To illustrate my interpretation, suppose someone claims to disidentify with his expensive 
tastes. He says that he regrets his tastes and thinks his life would be better overall if he 
did not have them. But what if this person has made no effort to try to prefer other
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things? Suppose, for example, he has made no effort to try cheaper alternatives. With 
this added information, it now seems much less certain that he really does disidentify 
with his tastes. Surely this example shows that it is ethical practices that shed light on 
people’s second-order taste-repudiating attitudes, not the other way around, as Dworkin 
appears to suggest.
In his later work Dworkin draws a further distinction which I think might help to 
clear up the present worry about preference-repudiation and preference-repudiating 
activity. The distinction has the following form:
[There are] two forms of bad luck that people might claim because their tastes are 
expensive: bad preference luck, which is their bad luck in having the preferences 
they do because these preferences are expensive, and bad price luck, which is bad 
luck in the high cost of the preferences they have. The difference appears when 
we ask whether the claimant would rid himself of the preference if he could; 
whether he would take a costless pill with no side effects to do that. (Dworkin 
2004: 344)
According to Dworkin, if the claimant would take the pill that would rid him of the 
preference, then he has bad preference luck. But if he would not take the pill, then he 
suffers bad price luck. Dworkin takes the further view that bad price luck is not 
something that merits compensation. So, for example, the person who prefers opera and 
would not take the pill because his preference is suffused with beliefs about how
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wonderful opera is does not, in Dworkin’s view, suffer from compensable bad luck (see 
Dworkin 2004: 345). I am uncertain whether this distinction is helpful in making just 
assignments of consequential responsibility; not, at least, defined in terms of the pill test. 
But what I think this test does help us to do is to cement the link between preference- 
repudiation as a state of mind and preference-repudiating as an activity. In the above 
description of preference-luck and price-luck, preference-repudiation is signalled very 
clearly by the willingness to perform a simple act of repudiation, by taking the pill.
Let us now turn to Dworkin’s final premise. One of the central claims of Dworkin’s 
Sovereign Virtue is that there ought to be ‘continuity’ between political principles of 
distribution and our ordinary ethical distinctions and practices (see Dworkin 2000: 294- 
295, 323-324). The task of evaluating this claim, however, is made more difficult by the 
fact that Dworkin offers scant description of the term ‘continuity’ and little evidence for 
supposing that continuity is something to be cherished. Even so, one thing we can say 
about continuity is that it refers to the way in which Dworkin thinks political judgements 
of responsibility should take account of people’s second-order preferences. On this view, 
we should, in politics, respect the fact that for most of us the reasons why we like the 
things we do is a result of our own particular beliefs and judgements of what gives value 
to life and not the desire to get as many ‘buzzes’ or ‘kicks’ as possible. In other words, 
people like opera because they consider it to be sublime. In contrast to this, Dworkin 
believes that those who do not adopt continuous theories ‘propose that we should all 
pretend, in politics, that we are addicts -  that we should all act collectively in ways that 
we would find demeaning individually’. He writes:
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There may be a reason for such collective self-degradation, but I do not know 
what it is. (Dworkin 2000: 295)
Of course, the idea that second-order preferences should offer a guide to 
responsibility is not original to Dworkin. This line of thought can be traced back to Harry 
Frankfurt’s case of the willing drug addict. This addict is unusual in that he fully 
identifies with the life he leads and does not regret the cravings that make him go out and 
do bad things. This, according to Frankfurt, may be sufficient to justify holding the 
addict morally responsible for his actions even though they are in a sense involuntary (see 
Frankfurt 1971). However, Dworkin’s contribution has been to apply the same kind of 
reasoning to questions of distributive justice. Dworkin’s view is that government should 
be willing to hold individuals responsible for their own tastes and preferences because 
those individuals identify with those tastes and preferences. Louis, for example, wishes 
to ape the lifestyles of the rich and famous (see Dworkin 1981a: 232). So it is debatable 
whether offering Louis free plovers’ eggs and pre-phylloxera claret is going to give him 
what he really wants. Louis wants to develop a taste for things that the vast majority of 
people cannot afford to experience. Surely it would destroy the point of having such 
tastes if everyone had the right to ask for money to enjoy them.
Now, at this stage in the discussion, some might wonder if facts about identification 
add anything to the interpretation of these sorts of cases that a choice-based analysis 
could not offer. In his “On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice”, for example, Cohen
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agrees that when assigning consequential responsibility sometimes it is not enough 
merely to ask if a person chose his personal ends. He considers the case of someone who 
experiences feelings of guilt caused by his religious beliefs, and admits that it might be 
fitting to hold him personally responsible for these feelings even if they are unchosen. 
Cohen claims that the following amendment to the orginal choice-based analysis is 
adequate to capture this thought. Instead of asking whether a person chose to have his 
tastes, desires, feelings and the like, we can ask whether ‘he would choose not to have 
them if he could’ (Cohen 1989: 937).
It is debatable, however, whether this revision is, as Cohen claims, ‘a natural 
development of the original view’ (Cohen 1989: 937). Whereas the original view took as 
its touchstone the genesis of personal disadvantages as a metaphysical question, the 
revision seems to bring into play how the agent views his disadvantages, in this case 
whether he would choose to be without his beliefs, desires and preferences. Even if we 
employ Cohen’s formulation, we still have to ask whether a person identifies with the 
relevant taste or preference because this is surely highly relevant as to whether he would 
choose to be without it if he could. So, by asking whether people would choose not to 
have their tastes and preferences if they could, we invite the claim that people generally 
would not choose to be without their tastes and preferences because they identify with 
them.
Returning now to the notion of continuity, a further clue to its meaning can be found 
in Dworkin’s discussion of the vexed problem of free will. Some egalitarians (including
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Cohen and Ameson) argue that individual responsibility is incompatible with the 
philosophical theory of hard determinism. To the extent that hard determinism is true, 
according to Cohen and Ameson, no individual should be held responsible for expensive 
tastes and all differential welfare is unjust (see Cohen 1993: 28; and also Ameson 1989: 
86). As Cohen ironically puts it:
We may indeed be up to our necks in the free will problem, but that is just “tough 
luck”. It is not a reason for not following the argument where it goes. (Cohen 
1989: 934)
Dworkin, however, rejects the suggestion that whether or not people are owed 
compensation depends on the truth or falsity of free will. The important point, as far as 
Dworkin is concerned, is that people commonly accept responsibility for outcomes that 
reflect aspects of their personality, and they do so without the assumption that they have 
chosen their personality (see Dworkin 2000: 6, 294, 323). Indeed, according to Dworkin:
The distinction between choice and circumstances is not only familiar in first- 
person ethics but is essential to it. We might think ourselves persuaded, 
intellectually, of the philosophical thesis that people have no free will, and that 
we are no more causally responsible for our fate when it is the upshot of our 
choices than when it flows only from a handicap or from society’s distribution of 
wealth. But we cannot lead a life out of that philosophical conviction. We 
cannot plan or judge our lives except by distinguishing what we must take
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responsibility for, because we chose it, and what we cannot take responsibility for 
because it was beyond our control. (Dworkin 2000: 323)
This then, for Dworkin, is another area where political judgements of consequential 
responsibility should be continuous with people’s ordinary ethical thoughts and 
experiences.
I trust that we now have enough material to understand, at least roughly, what 
Dworkin has in mind when he talks about ‘continuity’. Dworkin appears to be saying that 
our principles of just distribution should track the assignments of responsibility we 
ordinarily make in leading our lives from the inside, including first-person judgements 
about what is personal and what is circumstantial, and our conventional practices of 
taking responsibility. The question is, however, is Dworkin right?
The claim that continuity is a good thing is certainly compelling in some cases. The 
example of Louis is one such example. Even so, putting the argument in terms of 
continuity does open up the possibility of embarrassing outcomes for Dworkin if 
conventional distinctions and practices differ from those he has envisaged. Suppose 
someone draws a distinction in his mind between what he likes -  let us suppose he likes 
opera -  which he accepts responsibility for, and the arbitrary expense of what he likes, 
which he feels he is not responsible for. If we follow Dworkin’s claim that it is fitting 
that political decisions about responsibility should track first-personal attitudes about 
responsibility to its natural conclusion, this would imply that someone who made the
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above distinction would have a case for compensation. In my view this makes good sense 
but the difficulty for Dworkin is that this conclusion contradicts his central conviction 
that it would be bizarre to use taxpayers’ money to help people satisfy their unsatisfied 
tastes.
One retort potentially available to Dworkin is to point out that individuals develop 
and revise their personal tastes and preferences on the basis of an understanding of the 
relative expense of various things, their ability to acquire these things and judgements of 
different sorts about what is reasonable, just and fair. So if a person likes to see live 
opera (say), he will generally also know whether opera is expensive, whether he can 
afford to see live opera, and the reasonableness, justice and fairness of the situation. Thus 
he cannot claim any compensation because he developed his taste in the light of this 
information. Yet I do not think that it would be odd for someone to claim subsidy in the 
event that he is unable to afford to see live opera. The strangeness of this claim depends 
(in part) on how he perceives the fact that opera is expensive. And it is certainly 
conceivable that a person might continue to like opera, even though it is expensive, if he 
believes it is unfair that opera is more expensive than other kinds of live entertainment. If 
a person had such a belief, it hardly seems bizarre for him to ask for subsidy.
To come at the same questions from a slightly different angle, I think the reason why 
someone like Louis does not have a plausible case for additional resources is most 
naturally put by saying that Louis likes plovers’ eggs and pre-phylloxera claret because 
they are expensive and he wants to ape the lifestyles of the rich and famous. Arguably it
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would defeat the point of having these tastes if coupons for plovers’ eggs and pre­
phylloxera claret were freely available to the poor. If everyone had access to these items, 
they would no longer be ‘champagne tastes’ and the aping would fail. That it would 
destroy the point of Louis’ way of life if the State intervened in this way is a reason that 
he, and everybody else, can accept as grounds to reject subsidies. What is most important 
about the case of Louis for the present discussion, however, is to realise that Louis is a 
special case. The argument against collective responsibility for the expensive taste of 
Louis does not apply universally because some people have expensive tastes for other 
reasons. The person who loves opera does so because he loves the music and the drama, 
not necessarily the fact that it is expensive.
At this juncture some might question whether any amount of public subsidy for an 
expensive taste is an appropriate response to the problem. In his discussion of expensive 
tastes, for example, Norman Daniels argues that in so far as there is a case for public aid 
for people with expensive tastes, this case depends not on any shortfall in enjoyment or 
preference satisfaction as such but for any underlying psychological dysfunction there 
might be. For Daniels, the morally relevant question is whether or not the taste reflects 
an obsession or craving the individual cannot control, something that prevents him or her 
from leading a normal human life. On this view, if the psychological dysfunction is the 
problem, then the appropriate intervention is therapy rather than subsidies for 
consumption (see Daniels 1990: 288-290). But I think this interpretation is misleading. 
Though I do not deny that debilitating obsessions and cravings do raise a case for 
assistance, it does not logically follow from this that dysfunction is the only appropriate
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basis for assistance. On my reading, it might be fitting to subsidise consumption to 
reflect the arbitrary expense of the items. And I think it is a point in favour of my 
interpretation that it is not necessary to describe someone with an expensive taste or 
preference as somehow deranged, suffering from a psychological dysfunction, before we 
can take seriously her case for subsidy.
Reflecting on all of the above points, it seems to me that Dworkin’s idea of continuity 
is just a smoke screen for something far more familiar to political philosophers. In saying 
that political principles should be continuous with our ordinary ethical beliefs and 
practices, the thought appears to be that our political principles should not be counter 
intuitive, that government should make the kinds of distinctions we feel are just. But if 
this is what Dworkin has in mind, then continuity is precisely what all political 
philosophers aim to achieve, including Cohen whom Dworkin somewhat provokingly 
accuses of not being interested in continuity (see Dworkin 2000: 294-295).
So far I have examined Dworkin’s intuitive argument against the claim that 
expensive tastes and preferences raise a case for compensation or subsidy. I have argued 
that even though Dworkin’s argument is plausible in some cases -  think of Louis who 
prefers things because they are expensive -  it is very far from intuitive in other cases. As 
indicated above, however, the intuitive argument does not exhaust Dworkin’s case 
against compensation or subsidy for expensive tastes, and this is what I want to explore in 
the next section.
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4.3 EQUALITY OF RESOURCES
Towards the end of “Equality of Welfare” Dworkin’s offers the following reason as to 
why Louis does not have a right to additional resources:
Louis has a choice. He may choose to keep the presently equal resources I said 
he had, and settle for a life with the enjoyment he now has but without the tastes 
or ambitions he proposes to cultivate. Or he may keep his present resources and 
settle for a life that he deems more successful overall than his present life, but 
one that contains less enjoyment. It is quite unfair that he should have a third 
choice, that he should be able, at the expense of others, to lead a life that is more 
expensive than theirs at no sacrifice of enjoyment to himself just because he 
would, quite naturally, consider that life a more successful life overall than either 
of the other two. The reason why Louis does not deserve compensation is not 
that the more expensive life he might choose is necessarily a worse life. He 
might be right in thinking that enjoyment is not all that matters, and that a life 
poorer in enjoyment may be, just from the personal standpoint, a more successful 
life overall. We say only that the first two choices are rightly his, but that the 
third is not. I myself find this argument both powerful and appealing. It is also 
an important argument for the following reason. The objection to allowing Louis 
the third choice described is most naturally put this way. Louis should be free (at 
least within the limits allowed by a defensible form of paternalism) to make the
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best sort of life he can with his fair share of social resources. But he should not 
be free to trespass on the fair shares of others, because that would be unfair to 
them. But of course once the point is put that way it cannot stand simply as an 
argument for a compromise to equality of welfare tailored to the problem of 
expensive tastes. For the idea of fair shares cannot then mean simply shares that 
give people equal welfare on the chosen conception, because that is exactly the 
conception to which Louis appeals in asking for extra resources. If fair shares are 
shares fixed independently of that conception, however, then any compromise 
using the idea of fair shares becomes a contradiction. (Dworkin 1981a: 237-238)
This passage highlights the importance that Dworkin places on equality of resources. He 
claims that the objection to offering Louis additional resources is most naturally put by 
saying that he already has an equal share. But what is equality of resources?
Dworkin believes we can make considerable progress in developing a theory of 
equality of resources by looking at the following hypothetical situation. We are asked to 
imagine a number of shipwreck survivors washed-up on a desert island. The survivors 
must first distribute the available resources, and then consider how they are to deal with a 
range of further misfortunes. Dworkin asks us to imagine that they have the chance of 
purchasing insurance against a range of misfortunes, under the further stipulation that 
each person has the same antecedent chance of suffering these misfortunes. In answer to 
the first question, Dworkin believes that these individuals would agree upon an initial 
auction in which they can bid equally for different resources, under which scheme
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resources are not distributed to achieve equal welfare or to compensate for expensive 
tastes. In answer to the second question, he believes that although they would be likely to 
want to purchase insurance against shortfalls in their talents and abilities, they would be 
unlikely to want to purchase insurance against having expensive tastes. Hence, Dworkin 
excludes welfare as a dimension of justice partly on the basis of his thought experiments 
about shipwreck survivors and hypothetical insurance markets.
It is debatable, however, whether these thought experiments justify the exclusion of 
welfare as a relevant dimension. Firstly, it is not clear (to me at least) that Dworkin’s 
thought experiments offer a plausible guide to reasonable divisions of consequential 
responsibility here in the real world. Secondly, it is not even certain that shipwreck 
survivors would be willing to ignore the dimensions of preference satisfaction and 
pleasure when the auction is suggested, and that people would ignore the misfortune of 
having expensive tastes when the question of insurance is posed. I am going to say more 
in defence of the first point in the next chapter, so for the moment I shall concentrate on 
critically assessing the arguments on Dworkin’s own terms.
Dworkin believes that his shipwreck survivors would choose an auction as a fair way 
to divide the available resources. Each person is given an equal amount of clamshells to 
bid for resources. And although the auction gives people equal bidding power, it does not 
aim to achieve equal welfare, nor does it attempt to compensate some people for the fact 
that they just happen to have expensive tastes as determined by supply and demand (see 
Dworkin 1981b: 286-290). However, in addition to this Dworkin draws a distinction
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between a person whose constitution is such that he just happens to dislike the staples of 
his society and a person whose preferences are interwoven with his other beliefs and 
values. To illustrate the former, he gives the example of a person who dislikes the sour 
taste of tap water. This, according to Dworkin, is bad luck and is compensable; provided, 
that is, the person would agree to take a free and harmless pill to rid himself of the dislike 
if, contrary to fact, such a pill were available (see Dworkin 2000: 291). In respect of the 
latter, he gives the example of a photographer who savours his skill and would not take a 
pill. For Dworkin, this then is bad price luck and is not compensable (ibid.). How might 
this distinction impact on the desert island thought experiment?
Suppose the staple diet on the island is banana: bananas are in such abundance that 
people do not have to use many auction clamshells to bid for a lifetime supply of them. 
Other types of food, however, such as figs, mangoes, and coconuts are extremely rare. 
Now suppose among the shipwrecked there is someone whose constitution just happens 
to be such that he dislikes the taste of bananas so intensely that he is willing to pay almost 
anything not to have to eat them. He knows that he does not have an allergy (in the sense 
that bananas will not cause him any real harm) he just very much dislikes them. Because 
of his constitution, he must bid for some of the other types of food on the island and this 
will probably cost him almost all of his clamshells. Presumably Dworkin would accept 
that, as a victim of brute luck, the person who dislikes bananas can reasonably object to 
the proposed auction on the following grounds: ‘Why should I have to use up all my 
bidding power to buy a coconut tree just because I happen to dislike bananas?’ Dworkin 
could then either amend the auction so that the person is given extra clamshells at the
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start or allow the auction to proceed as normal and employ the device of a hypothetical 
insurance market so that the person would be entitled to compensation after the auction 
(see Dworkin 198 lb: 303).
What is the problem then? One problem is that potentially there is a huge domain of 
brute tastes that could leave very little for the auction. In other words, the scope for free 
choice when bidding for resources shrivels as we see that a great many tastes and 
preferences are brute luck, a matter of people’s unchosen constitutions (see, for example, 
Cohen 2004: 9). However, even if Dworkin does not have to significantly amend auction 
(because in fact not very many tastes are brute luck), a second difficulty for Dworkin is 
the case of someone who dislikes bananas on more personal grounds. Thus suppose one 
of the shipwrecked refuses to buy bananas, not because he has a brute dislike of the taste 
but because he thinks bananas are an ugly fruit. His value judgement is such that he does 
not want to eat phallic shaped foods. Presumably Dworkin would insist that this person 
does not suffer compensable bad luck because he identifies with his bias against bananas. 
However, as we have already seen, just because a person identifies with his likes and 
dislikes it does not automatically follow that any claims he might make for extra 
resources are unreasonable. So, the mere mention of the fact that a person identifies with 
his dislikes does not necessarily debar his complaint against the auction.
It seems, then, that the auction potentially stands on a weak footing not only in 
respect of brute tastes but also in respect of personal tastes. In reply to this last revealed 
point, Dworkin could argue that it is part of the ideal of equality of resources that
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individuals are expected to adjust their tastes in the light of information about what is 
available and what other people like and dislike. In “Equality of resources”, for example, 
he writes:
So the contingent facts of raw material and the distribution of tastes are not 
grounds on which someone might challenge a distribution as unequal. They are 
rather background facts that determine what equality of resources, in these 
circumstances, is. Under equality of resources, no test for calculating what 
equality requires can be abstracted from these background facts and used to test 
them. The market character of the auction is not simply a convenient or ad hoc 
device for resolving technical problems that arise for equality of resources in very 
simple exercises like our desert island case. It is an institutionalized form of the 
process of discovery and adaptation that is at the centre of the ethics of that ideal. 
Equality of resources supposes that the resources devoted to each person’s life 
should be equal. That goal needs a metric. The auction proposes what the envy 
test in fact assumes, that the true measure of the social resources devoted to the 
life of one person is fixed by asking how important, in fact, that resource is for 
others. It insists that the cost, measured in that way, figure in each person’s sense 
of what is rightly his and in each person’s judgement of what life he should lead, 
given that command of justice. Anyone who insists that equality is violated by 
any particular profile of initial tastes, therefore, must reject equality of resources, 
and fall back on equality of welfare. (Dworkin 1981b: 289)
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For Dworkin, then, even if someone is unlucky enough to be shipwrecked on an island 
that happens to be scarce in what he prefers and abundant in what he dislikes, there is no 
rationale of justice for factoring this detail into the distribution of resources.
The question remains however: why are the ethics of equality of resources, according 
to which individuals are expected to adapt their tastes, more ideal than other kinds of 
ethics, to wit, equality of welfare, which do not disallow compensation for expensive 
tastes? One plausible answer might be that it is good for agents to adjust their tastes in 
the light of changing supply and demand; that it is a valuable exercise in personal 
autonomy for them to do so. I shall say more about this perfectionist argument in chapter 
6. Nevertheless, the present issue has to do with fairness. Why are the ethics of 
resources fairer than the ethics of welfare? Simply reflecting on Dworkin’s desert island 
example it is very far from self-evident that they are.
Turning now to the question of insurance, in his article Dworkin further develops the 
desert island thought experiment to deal with differences in people’s talents, abilities and 
brute luck generally. He asks us to imagine what type and level of insurance people 
would purchase if (contrary to fact) they had an equal chance of suffering certain 
misfortunes. Dworkin believes that individuals would wish to purchase insurance against 
such misfortunes as being handicapped in certain ways, having insufficient talent to earn 
a decent wage, being made redundant, becoming sick, and being bom into poverty (see 
his 19816 and 2000). Dworkin also concedes that insurance is appropriate if an agent 
considers an expensive taste to be a handicap, something he wishes he did not have. The
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level and type of assistance offered to those with cravings and obsessions is then 
modelled on a hypothetical insurance market.
These are, for them, handicaps, and are therefore suitable for the regime proposed 
for handicaps generally. We may imagine that everyone has an equal chance of 
acquiring such a craving by accident. (Of course, for each person the content of a 
craving that would have that consequence would be different. We are supposing 
here, not the risk of any particular craving, but the risk of whatever craving 
would interfere with set of goals in that way.) We may then ask -  with as much 
or as little intelligibility as in the case of blindness -  whether people generally 
would purchase insurance against that risk, and if so at what premium and level 
of coverage. (Dworkin 198 lb: 303)
However, according to Dworkin, ‘It seems unlikely that many people would purchase 
such insurance, at the rates of premium likely to govern if they sought it, except in the 
case of cravings so severe and disabling as to fall under the category of mental disease’ 
(Dworkin 198lb: 303). Moreover, Dworkin does not think individuals will want to take 
out insurance against expensive tastes that they do identify with; that is to say, against 
being in a world where the things they dislike are relatively cheap and the things they like 
are relatively expensive. He thinks people would find it bizarre to insure themselves in 
respect of expensive tastes, in so far as they regard those tastes as part of their 
personalities as opposed to a handicap.
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How compelling are these assumptions? Dworkin’s assumption that people would 
not purchase insurance against cravings and obsessions, except in case of difficulties that 
are so severe and disabling as to fall under the category of mental disease, is certainly 
open doubt. If people have cravings for expensive things that interfere with their goals, 
then surely it is rational for them to purchase insurance against the risk of becoming 
addicted? I am also sceptical about his not taking seriously the feasibility of insurance for 
expensive tastes generally. If individuals are concerned to get what they want out of life, 
why should they not want to insure against the unfortunate eventuality of the things they 
like becoming too expensive due to changes in supply and demand?
Dworkin might insist that the insurance thought experiment is simply not appropriate 
in the case of expensive tastes either because people identify with their tastes or because 
they are able to adjust their tastes over time if they do not identify with them. 
Nevertheless, it is not against having a particular taste that a person may want to buy 
insurance. Insurance makes sense because a person might wish to indemnify himself 
against the possibility that at some point in the future he will be unable to afford to 
purchase the things he currently likes. He could opt to forgo insurance and rely on his 
capacity to develop new tastes. But it hardly seems bizarre if he prefers to buy insurance 
which indemnifies his ability to satisfy the tastes he currently has. Supposedly the great 
advantage of Dworkin’s hypothetical insurance approach is that it seeks out the informed, 
unforced decisions of equally situated persons with their own views about the type of 
insurance coverage (and at what level) it is wise to purchase. So it is unclear whether 
Dworkin can consistently ignore those who think that insurance against expensive tastes
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is worth the cost. Putting the same point slightly differently, Dworkin cannot simply 
define expensive tastes as ‘inappropriate for insurance’ just by appealing to the 
circumstances/personality distinction. People might want to buy insurance against 
expensive tastes because they identify with the taste but want to insure against its cost. In 
other words, they want insurance in respect of the expense of the taste not the taste itself. 
The plausibility of this type of insurance depends, in turn, on the quite correct point that 
only in very special cases (such as Louis) is the expense of the taste intrinsic to its 
importance to the agent.
One might attempt to argue on Dworkin’s behalf that the insurance market he 
envisages for talent luck already covers the eventuality of being unable to purchase the 
things one likes. Being adequately insured against lack of talent guarantees a decent level 
of income with which to satisfy one’s tastes. But the two questions are distinct. One 
question is whether or not a person might be concerned that he lacks the talent to earn 
income. A further question is whether or not a person might be concerned that the 
economy is such that the things he likes are very expensive. Even with adequate income 
protection, it is conceivable that a person might be unable to purchase the things he likes, 
or that he has to use nearly all of his income to do so.
Bringing the above points together, we have seen that it is unclear from the auction 
and the insurance market that expensive tastes only support claims for extra resources in 
so far as they reflect the handicaps of people’s minds and constitutions that they wish they
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did not have. I think it well worth considering at this stage Rawls’ version of the 
contractualist case against welfarism to see if it fares any better.
Like Dworkin, Rawls excludes preference satisfaction and pleasure as relevant 
dimensions for assessing citizens’ claims when questions of distributive justice arise. He 
argues that rights and liberties, income and wealth, and the social bases of self-respect are 
an acceptable basis for interpersonal comparison, and this list of ‘primary goods’ 
incorporates the following division of consequential responsibility:
society, citizens as a collective body, accepts responsibility for maintaining the 
equal basic liberties and fair equality of opportunity, and for providing a fair 
share of the primary goods for all within this framework; while citizens as 
individuals and associations accept responsibility for revising and adjusting their 
ends and aspirations in view of the all-purpose means they can expect, given their 
present and foreseeable situation. (Rawls 1996: 189)
Under the terms of Rawls’ proposed division of responsibility, then, it is assumed that 
citizens are capable of adjusting their personal ends over time, and so lack of end- 
satisfaction does not call forth compensation (see Rawls 1996: 186).
For Rawls, the idea is not simply that people should adjust their personal ends to 
whatever share of resources they end up with, but that they should adjust their ends to 
reflect the share of primary goods they can reasonably expect to have. According to what
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principles are these shares determined? On Rawls’ analysis, reasonable expectations are 
based on: firstly, the effective enforcement of procedural justice, including rules dealing 
with private ownership and fair equality of opportunity in the competition for jobs (see 
Rawls 1971: 83); and secondly, the idea of reciprocity or mutual benefit, namely, that 
those who have been favoured by nature, whoever they are, may gain from their good 
fortune only on terms that are to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, as defined by 
income and wealth, and the social bases of self-respect (Rawls 1971: 102).
However, the question is this: on what grounds does Rawls exclude the satisfaction of 
expensive tastes as a primary good and, therefore, as a possible basis of reasonable 
expectations? One line of argument is developed through the veil of ignorance. We are 
asked to imagine ourselves placed under conditions of ignorance whereby no one knows 
his or her place in society, class position or social status, or fortune in the distribution of 
natural assets and abilities. We are even asked to imagine that we do not know our 
particular tastes and preferences, or conception of the good (see Rawls 1971: 12). Rawls 
believes that under conditions of ignorance, the aforementioned primary goods offer 
people the all-purpose means by which to pursue their own conception of the good, 
whatever that good might be. The assumption that citizens are capable of adjusting their 
personal ends over time, therefore, is not introduced to motivate the exclusion of possible 
claims based on expensive tastes, but as a component of a reasonable division of 
consequential responsibility. For Rawls, the fundamental aim is to find a division of 
consequential responsibility that is acceptable to everyone given that each citizen has his 
own advantage which it is rational for him to pursue. And he believes that placing
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responsibility with individuals for expensive tastes is the best available division (see 
Rawls 1996: 187).
However, I am not persuaded that people would agree to this division of 
responsibility from behind the veil of ignorance. Surely it is not unreasonable for a 
person to be concerned by the possibility that he will end up with tastes he is unable to 
satisfy: that he has the ambition to climb a mountain but no opportunity of gaining public 
funds for the venture; a preference for opera but theatre seats he cannot afford; a taste for 
good food and drink but only the income to afford staples; a belief in organically grown 
produce but insufficient funds to buy those products. Even if one assumes that everyone 
is able to adjust his or her tastes and preferences over time, it is surely naive to think that 
this can be achieved without cost -  cost in time, effort, money, lost opportunities and 
even the sacrifice of some deeply held beliefs about what gives value to life.
I do not underestimate the affect ignorance is likely to have on the decisions people 
make. The gamble is that if I agree to the subsidisation of expensive tastes, then I might 
lose the gamble by turning out to have cheap tastes. I would then be able to satisfy my 
cheap tastes but I would also have to subsidise the expensive tastes of others. 
Nevertheless, as pointed out by Rawls, the veil of ignorance is (for the risk-averse) an 
exercise in planning for the worst. The question we must ask ourselves is this: would it 
be worse to end up with expensive tastes and not have the means to satisfy them or to end 
up with cheap tastes which one can satisfy but simultaneously have to subsidise the 
expensive tastes of others? It strikes me that even if we add in the worry ‘how can I be
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sure those with expensive tastes are not just pretending to have expensive tastes?’, it is 
not necessarily unreasonable to prefer not to gamble and, therefore, to opt for subsidising 
expensive tastes.
However, even if we accept that people would, if placed under conditions of 
ignorance, take the gamble and agree to rules not subsidising expensive tastes, this then 
raises a further question about the veil of ignorance: what is the justification, if any, for 
denying knowledge of possible expensive tastes from the contracting parties? Surely it is 
open for someone with an expensive taste to say: ‘I accept that if I were being asked to 
decide on proposals for a social division of responsibility with the stipulation that people 
must take responsibility for their welfare, then I would most probably endorse Rawls’ list 
of primary goods as the currency of distributive justice, but I do not see why I should be 
made to accept this stipulation when making these sorts of crucial decisions.’
Some might say it is part of the moral furniture of a liberal society that people are 
expected to take responsibility for their own welfare and adjust their tastes and 
preferences over time. So, in that sense, perhaps Rawls is justified in his stipulation. But 
it is also a legitimate exercise in political philosophy to question this expectation. What 
shared notion of justice is this bit of ignorance supposed to reflect? One thought might 
be that if a person does not know his particular tastes and preferences, then he cannot be 
accused of being partial towards his own idiosyncratic tastes and preferences. But then it 
is questionable whether it is fair to expect a person to be impartial about his tastes and 
preferences when he is being asked to agree to proposals for a social division of
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responsibility. The question is this: what right has the rest of society to expect him to be 
impartial on these issues? And the answer cannot be that individuals are capable of 
revising their ends over time. Why? Because this assumption is part of the division of 
consequential responsibility proposed by Rawls.
I do not deny there could be other moral reasons in favour of leaving those with 
expensive tastes to adjust their tastes over time or else learn to live with less preference 
satisfaction. Bruce Landesman, for example, insists that even though Rawls assumption 
that all individuals are capable of adjusting their personal ends over time might be 
factually incorrect, it is nevertheless a ‘morally sound’ assumption because it is a part of a 
person’s good to exercise self-control in this way (see Landesman 1983: 36). I shall say 
more about this argument in chapter 6. Nevertheless, this sort of perfectionist argument 
takes us beyond the original thought that it is unfair to compensate expensive tastes. It 
might be morally undesirable to compensate expensive tastes but that is not the same as 
saying that it is unfair.
In this chapter I have critically examined the claim that expensive tastes and preferences 
do not raise a case of justice for public compensation or subsidy. Whilst plausible in 
some cases, Dworkin’s intuitive argument for this claim is weak in certain respects. Even 
if people ordinarily identify with their tastes and preferences, this does not necessarily
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weaken their claim for assistance in satisfying them. A person might well identify with 
his tastes and preferences but still stake a reasonable claim for subsidy for the expense of 
his tastes. This is because people with expensive tastes might typically identify with 
them but only in relatively few cases do they identify with them qua expensive tastes. 
The fact that the preference or taste is expensive to satisfy may have nothing to do with 
why the person identifies with it, and the factors which made it expensive to satisfy may 
lie entirely beyond his control. To stake a claim for subsidy on these grounds is not 
bizarre. If Dworkin starts out by embracing the identification position, in the end he fails 
to embrace it fully and lapses into inconsistency.
In responding to this challenge both Dworkin and Rawls are able to retreat to a higher 
level of abstraction. They argue that we should seek a division of consequential 
responsibility that is acceptable to all under conditions of freedom and equality, and that 
viewed in this light it is fitting not to compensate or subsidise expensive tastes and 
preferences. However, even if we accept this general strategy, its conclusions are open to 
question. It is unclear whether either of the thought experiments employed by Dworkin 
or Rawls discount equality of welfare as they suggest. This is because it is unclear that 
individuals would reject public subsidy for expensive tastes, even when placed under 
hypothetical conditions of freedom, and equality. And it seems this outcome can only be 
undermined by assuming precisely what is at stake.
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5 REASONABLENESS
So far I have explored two main types of criteria for dividing consequential 
responsibility: the choice/luck distinction and personality. I have argued that focusing on 
these criteria can be useful in some cases but is unsatisfactory in many other cases where 
it offers at best an incomplete account of the subject matter and at worst misleading and, 
at times, false implications. My point is not just that theorists have sometimes neglected 
to apply these criteria consistently but that some of the existing literature runs into 
difficulty by failing to bear in mind other relevant criteria.
The aim of this chapter, then, is to explore if a better way of looking at the examined 
cases might be to focus on what a reasonable division of consequential responsibility 
would be like. I shall start by distinguishing two different ways that the idea of 
reasonableness might be incorporated into our judgements of consequential 
responsibility. I will try to defend the second of the two alternatives. According to what I 
call ‘inclusive’ theories of consequential responsibility, a reasonable (and in that sense 
just) division of responsibility is one that can be justified to each of the persons affected 
by it on the balance of all the reasons in play. Having outlined the main features of this, I 
shall attempt to flesh out some of the reasons that I believe have been overlooked by 
choice and personality theorists and apply these reasons to a number of examples. 
Finally, I shall explore some possible replies to the inclusive theory defended in the 
chapter.
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5.1 REASONABLENESS AND CONSEQUENTIAL RESPONSIBILITY
Let me begin, then, by distinguishing the two different ways in which the idea of 
reasonableness might figure in our assignments of consequential responsibility. Luck 
egalitarians argue that when evaluating the justice or otherwise of a person’s situation we 
should bear in mind not simply his outward opportunities but also his level of 
information, attitudes, character traits, abilities, and other internal factors that might 
influence the way he makes use of his opportunities, which factors could potentially lie 
beyond his control. On this formulation, the degree of individual responsibility depends 
on the conduct we can reasonably expect of him given his choice-making and choice- 
following abilities.
A second way of incorporating the idea of reasonableness into our assignments of 
consequential responsibility, on the other hand, is to try to establish which attributions of 
responsibility are reasonable in the sense of being justifiable to those concerned given a 
number of reasons not just the distinction between what does and does not lie within a 
person’s control. Under this second formulation, the primary aim is not to uncover 
underlying aspects of the person (his or her choices and/or second-order preferences) in 
virtue of which it is right to impose consequential responsibility but to uncover a range of 
reasons that may or may not support individual responsibility including reasons which 
have to do with the impact on people’s lives of imposing responsibility.
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The main difference between the two approaches rests on the following. According 
to the first view, if reasonableness has a role to play in responsibility attribution, then it 
must do so in the service of the choice/luck distinction. According to the second view, 
however, the truth is exactly the reverse. My central business in this chapter is to try to 
show that, cashed out in the right way (that is, with plausible reasons), the second 
formulation provides the best hope of a theory of consequential responsibility that has 
accurate and convincing implications. But before looking at the various reasons 
incorporated by the inclusive theory, let us begin with the first formulation.
I. Ameson on choice-making and choice-following abilities
In a series of articles on egalitarian justice, Richard Ameson has suggested that when 
assessing the justice or otherwise of people’s prospects we should weigh into our 
considerations not only the fact that people make different choices but also the fact that 
some people have better choice-making and choice-following abilities than others, 
through no fault of their own. Making a choice involves a number of abilities: the ability 
to consider the relevant information, to understand the possible consequences of actions, 
to calculate the different moves that might be necessary to achieve ends, as well as the 
strength of character to carry out intended courses of action in the face of temptation. 
What is more, Ameson holds out that people can differ in these abilities as a result of 
environmental and genetic factors over which they have no control. This, according to 
Ameson, affects the kinds of choices we can reasonably expect them to make and in turn
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the kinds of disadvantages we can reasonably hold them responsible for (see Ameson 
1995: 239; 2000: 507; 2001: 86; see also Barry 2005: 137).
For Ameson, therefore, true equality of opportunity for welfare obtains among a 
number of persons when government acts to mitigate the influence of variations in 
choice-making and choice-following abilities, so that from the outset each person has the 
same expected welfare as everybody else if he behaves as prudently as we can reasonably 
expect him to behave given his own particular choice-making and choice-following 
abilities. What, if any, implications does this view have for social policy? Ameson’s 
policy proposals include compulsory insurance schemes that counteract individual 
imprudence -  which is a matter of brute luck -  by taking certain choices out of people’s 
hands (see Ameson 1995: 239).
I do not think, however, that Ameson’s reading of reasonableness is conclusive. That 
something is awry with this reading becomes plain if one tries to make intelligible the 
reason why responsibility-abrogation is justified. There seem to be just two reasons. One 
reason is that people do not have control over their choice-making and choice-following 
abilities and so it would be unreasonable to impose consequential responsibility on 
someone who is prone to making impmdent choices. A second reason is that people do 
have control over their choice-making and choice-following abilities but that some people 
make such impmdent choices leading to such bad outcomes as to make it unreasonable 
that they bear the consequences. It is difficult to make sense of Ameson’s argument 
either way however, and this is what I intend to try to demonstrate now.
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To begin with the first reason, the basic idea is that if people do not have control over 
their choice-making and choice-following abilities, then it is wrong to impose 
consequential responsibility on the imprudent. And if people can disclaim responsibility 
on the grounds that they do not have control over their choice-making and choice- 
following abilities, the upshot is that it is right to take the relevant decisions out of 
people’s hands. However, if the real aim is to take responsibility-attracting-decisions out 
of people’s hands, what was presented as an equality of opportunity for welfare view 
becomes a straightforward equality of welfare view. There is no longer any opportunity 
for personal responsibility.
The second reason is that people do have genuine choice but that some people make 
such imprudent choices that it is unreasonable to leave them to bear the consequences. 
This still allows some room for personal responsibility but incorporates a much broader 
conception of reasonableness. The idea is no longer simply that the State should try to 
mitigate bad luck -  including bad luck in the distribution of choice-making and choice- 
following abilities -  but that we should not hold people responsible for their choices if 
those choices lead to very bad outcomes. If this is an important additional feature of 
reasonableness, however, then Ameson must supply an additional theory to explain how 
and why. This theory must explain when and for what reasons it is unreasonable to hold 
individuals responsible for the very bad consequences of their impmdent choices, and 
must not appeal to the distinction between choice and luck in doing so. I do not say that 
adopting a broader conception of reasonableness would be an inappropriate strategy in
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developing a theory of consequential responsibility. On the contrary, I shall argue below 
in favour of a theory of responsibility that relies on exactly this conception. Rather, my 
present point is that in order to make sense of Ameson’s use of the term ‘reasonable’ we 
must go beyond the original choice/luck-based theory of consequential responsibility. 
Can we do any better by analysing reasonableness more inclusively?
II. Inclusive theories of consequential responsibility
Thus far consequential responsibility has been described in the following terms. First 
we ask whether a person has made a genuine choice or, if not a choice, identifies with his 
or her preferences. This then helps us to decide if it is just to hold the agent responsible 
for the situations that his acts (or omissions) have created. Having established whether it 
is just to impose consequential responsibility, we then decide if in fact we should do so 
taking into account other moral considerations. At this point we might consider some of 
the possible effects of holding the agent responsible and possible reasons we could have 
for collectivising responsibility. There is, however, a second way of thinking about 
consequential responsibility which I believe is superior and that I shall try to defend in 
this chapter.
We need a distinction between two types of theories of consequential responsibility. 
According to what one might call ‘formal’ theories of consequential responsibility, the 
goal is to employ practical reason in order to uncover underlying non-moral features in
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virtue of which it is right to hold people responsible. These theories focus on the 
following types of question. Did the person have control over whether or not the 
disadvantage came about? If he had control, did he have foresight? Did he make a 
deliberate choice? Was the choice authentic or was it coerced? If the person did not have 
a choice, would he have chosen differently if, contrary to fact, he did have a choice? Did 
the choice reflect aspects of his personality such as beliefs/preferences/traits? Does he 
identify with or disidentify with (wish did not have) the beliefs/preferences/traits?
According to what I shall call ‘inclusive’ theories of consequential responsibility, on 
the other hand, it is entirely fitting to look at a broad range of normative criteria in 
deciding how to assign responsibility. This group of theories looks to a person’s choices 
and preferences but also his behaviour and the impact that imposing responsibility might 
have on his life in order to determine whether imposing responsibility can be justified to 
each person. On this view, only once we have borne in mind a number of criteria and 
established whether they are good enough, on balance, to justify proposed assignments to 
those affected by it, can we say when and how far it is just to hold individuals responsible 
for their own misfortunes. The theory of consequential responsibility that I want to try to 
defend in this chapter is inclusive.
There are various possible ways to construct an inclusive theory, depending on the 
reasons that one believes should be included, but it seems to me that common intuitions 
about examples support the following types of reason.
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I. The distinction between choice and luck.
II. Whether or not an agent identifies with his tastes and preferences.
HI. Special responsibilities.
IV. Desert.
V. Concerns about free-riding.
VI. Sufficiency.
VII. Maximin.
VIII. Simple equality.
IX. Utilitarian reasons.
X. Prioritarian reasons.
I intend to expand on each of these types of criteria of responsibility in the next section, 
but from now on I will simply refer to the theory that I want to try to defend as ‘the 
inclusive theory’. No doubt there are other types of criteria that could be incorporated 
into a theory of responsibility if the theory was not limited to justice as the subject matter. 
But in this chapter I want to focus exclusively on reasons of justice. I shall reserve 
discussion of other factors (moral and practical) for chapters 6 and 7.
It is perhaps worth noting at this juncture, then, that many of the criteria of 
responsibility on the above list represent familiar principles within the literature on 
distributive justice. A principle of distributive justice can be deployed as a criterion of 
responsibility because it specifies which disadvantages are just or unjust, and on the basis 
of the judgement we can say whether or not agents may be ‘held responsible’ for their
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disadvantages. At this stage some might question whether or not the inclusive theory is a 
theory of responsibility at all rather than a theory of distributive justice tout court. The 
challenge is that by appealing to the above principles I am unwittingly engaged in 
investigation creep. I shall say more in response to this challenge at the end of the 
chapter, but for now let me simply point out that introducing the principles is a feature of 
a broad approach to consequential responsibility and need not be viewed with suspicion. 
It is also worth making clear that the principles of distributive justice are brought in order 
to help define what a just division of consequential responsibility would be. There is no 
suggestion -  not from me at any rate -  that the resulting theory of responsibility can then 
be used to support the very same principles of distributive justice.
I also want to stress that the inclusive theory is developed with the ambition that its 
judgements of responsibility can be used to provide normative evaluation of social 
welfare institutions and practices and to offer a guide to reform where necessary. 
Consequently, I fully acknowledge the problem raised by Samuel Scheffler -  in the 
context of his attempt to critique of choice-based theories of responsibility -  that it can be 
difficult to hold a justificatory ambition for a theory of responsibility but at the same time 
to flesh the theory out in terms of criteria that have broad appeal to different types of 
people and diverse political standpoints (see Scheffler 2005: 8-9). However, I shall try to 
demonstrate that the inclusive theory stands a much better chance than its rival of 
achieving this broad appeal precisely because of the broad range of criteria it incorporates 
as well as the notion of interpersonal justification that it appeals to.
171
It should be fairly obvious by now, then, that the inclusive theory rests on the type of 
broad conception of reasonableness which, during my earlier discussion of Ameson’s 
theory, I suggested could be promising. Let me define a ‘broad’ conception of 
reasonableness as one that incorporates a range of different types of normative and formal 
reasons, and one can see that the inclusive theory has a broad conception of 
reasonableness. The inclusive theory also incorporates the notion of interpersonal 
justification where this is understood to mean that any proposed division of responsibility 
must be justified to each of those affected by it on the basis of the different types of 
reason. And this brings the theory closer to the goal of reasonableness viewed as a 
measure of broad appeal between different types of people and diverse political 
standpoints.
How, more precisely, do we determine what can or cannot be justified in this way? 
There are different possible answers to this question but some would argue that it has 
much to do with whether or not proposed divisions of responsibility can serve as bases 
for actual agreement between majorities of the public. Nicholas Rescher, for example, 
favours what he calls a ‘democratic conception of the issue’.
In what respects and to what extent is society, working through the 
instrumentality of the state, responsible for the welfare of its members? What 
demands for the promotion of his welfare can an individual reasonably make 
upon his society? These are questions to which no answer can be given in terms 
of some a priori approach with reference to universal ultimates. Whatever
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answer can appropriately be given will depend, in the final analysis, on what the 
society decides it should be. The questions carry us back straightaway to first 
principles of government. On any democratic conception of the issue, the 
propriety of governmental activity must be determined in accordance with “the 
consent of the governed” and must thus result from an explicit decision of the 
body politic. The purposes whose realization is pursued by any truly democratic 
government must ultimately be derived from a nation’s public mandate. (Rescher 
1972: 114)
Rescher freely accepts that there are some further questions to be answered about this 
democratic conception -  such as whether consent must flow from an explicit decision of 
the body politic, whether the decision should be unanimous or majority based, or whether 
it is sufficient that the will of the people is expressed through the decisions of elected 
representatives. Even so, he believes the basic tenet of the democratic approach is 
fundamentally the right one for questions about the just division of social responsibility: 
that it is a matter for each society to decide which personal disadvantages raise a case for 
remedy or mitigation by society at large.
Its reliance upon the will of the people is arguably the great strength of the 
democratic approach but it is also its potential weakness. The majority in some countries 
could support an extensive welfare state such that responsibility for remedying personal 
disadvantage is placed almost entirely in the hands of the welfare state. Because in this 
scenario the majority have agreed to collective responsibility it cannot be said (at least by
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the majority) that the division is unfair or exploitative. Regardless of what the majority 
has decided, however, it could be disadvantageous for vast numbers of individuals to rely 
on others to look after them. This might not in fact be in the public interest. The 
majority in other countries, on the other hand, could vote in favour of an ultraminimal 
welfare state. Here individuals are left to fend for themselves in all but the most extreme 
cases of deprivation. This too could have unpalatable consequences. It could ignore 
special duties of care that society has towards some of its members who find themselves 
in difficulty.
Now, there may be further checks and balances available to a democratic regime to 
curb possible excesses of majority decision-making. The constitution, for example, might 
contain guidelines preventing either too much expansion or erosion of the welfare state. 
Even so, if there is enough political will, amendments can be made to the constitution and 
existing constitutional guidelines can be reinterpreted to serve new goals. Consequently, 
there may be no fail-safe way to constrain the decisions of the majority and, therefore, no 
guarantee that the majority will strike a fair balance between individual and collective 
responsibility. Even Rescher accepts that the division of social responsibility is not 
entirely a matter of democratic decision making, but must also include some degree of 
normative justification. Rescher believes there are ‘reasonable limits to the extent of state 
responsibility for the public welfare’, including the protection of legitimate rights of 
individuals (Rescher 1972: 117-119).
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An important question, then, is precisely this: what further justification could be 
offered for any proposed division of responsibility aside from the fact that the electorate 
has decided in its favour? One of the most important traditions, if not the most important 
tradition in contractualist thinking, takes as its starting point the Kantian idea that the 
ultimate test for any principle is respect for persons, which in turn requires that principles 
of justice be such that they can be justified to each person. But how do we know if 
principles can be justified to each person?
One approach developed though the work of Rawls and Dworkin is to use a 
hypothetical (as opposed to actual) situation to determine what is mutually justifiable. On 
a hypothetical conception of the issue, we ask not what citizens in democratic societies do 
decide (or ought to decide), but what citizens would all agree to if, contrary to fact, 
circumstances were more free and equal. The merits of this proposal, at least on the 
surface, are: firstly, that it enables us to abstract from inequalities of personal experience 
and situation that we do not believe should affect decisions about social welfare, and 
secondly, that it gives everybody an equal say in how society is to be arranged -  a say that 
some citizens might lack if they have unequal power and influence over political 
decision-making in the real world.
How does this construction work? Rawls’ version places the citizens of a well- 
ordered liberal democracy behind a metaphorical veil of ignorance. These citizens (or 
their representatives) are asked to select principles of justice to regulate the basic 
institutions of their society. Whereas in real democratic societies people tend to use the
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electoral process to pursue a narrow range of interests, the veil of ignorance forces people 
to select principles of justice (including a division of consequential responsibility) that are 
adequate for them whatever talents, circumstances, and conception of the good they might 
have once the veil is lifted. Rawls’ method for finding a division of consequential 
responsibility that is acceptable to all citizens, then, is to abstract from differences that 
might otherwise imply disagreement. This, however, lays Rawls open to a number of 
charges among which are that the agreement made behind the veil of ignorance is no 
agreement at all because everybody is the same, and that, in any event, there is no 
guarantee that the contents of the ‘agreement’ reached by parties to the veil of ignorance 
are just.
Of course, a Rawlsian will respond to these charges by pointing out that the original 
position is not supposed to be a definition ab initio of conditions from which a fair 
outcome will follow. Rather, its conditions are intended to represent relatively 
uncontroversial beliefs about fair terms of contracting, which terms the vast majority of 
people in liberal democracy would be willing to accept (see Rawls 1971: 18). To be more 
specific, for Rawls, people outside of the veil of ignorance are not just ‘rational’ in the 
sense that they have their own interests at heart but also ‘reasonable’ in the sense that they 
are willing to propose and consider the proposals of others’ fair terms of cooperation for 
citizens of a well-ordered democratic society. Thus, whereas the conditions of the veil of 
ignorance are supposed to reflect what people believe are reasonable ways of seeking 
principles of justice, the motivations of agents behind the veil of ignorance (to wit, 
rational self-interest) reflect the rationality of people outside (see Rawls 1996: 48-54;
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2001: 6-7). For Rawls, then, both the veil of ignorance and the implications we draw 
from it are non-trivial and have a footing in justice.
However, the objector can persist that Rawls has lighted upon the wrong terms. As 
previously discussed in chapter 4, we can, for example, ask the following question: why 
is it fair that a person should be made ignorant of his personal ends when selecting rules 
for the regulation of social welfare? What conviction about fairness is this bit of 
ignorance supposed to reflect? This particular rhetorical question may or may not 
represent a devastating objection to the veil of ignorance, but it does I think help to 
motivate scepticism about the gross level of ignorance stipulated by Rawls into the 
original position and whether this can furnish a genuine opportunity for discussion and 
agreement between different sorts of people as per the real world.
Dworkin arguably is on slightly firmer ground with his hypothetical insurance 
markets. We are asked to imagine ourselves as a group of free, self-interested agents that 
have been given the opportunity to purchase insurance against a variety of misfortunes. 
For Dworkin, the main purpose of this thought experiment is to abstract from brute luck 
in the real world which affects both the types of handicaps people suffer and the resources 
they have to buy insurance. Hence, we are asked to imagine that everybody faces the 
same antecedent chance of suffering a range of misfortunes and everybody has the same 
means with which to purchase insurance against different outcomes. Unlike Rawls’ 
formulation, the insurance market does ‘allow people enough self-knowledge, as 
individuals, to keep relatively intact their sense of their own personality, and especially
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their theory of what is valuable in life’ (Dworkin 2000: 118). Dworkin’s reading of the 
hypothetical situation, then, leaves room for bona fide agreement (or disagreement) 
among the parties. For Dworkin, welfare policy in the real world should be modelled on 
the level and type of insurance that would be popular in the hypothetical insurance 
situation (see Dworkin 1981 b: 315). But the important point is that in principle each 
person in the hypothetical situation is asked to consider which trade-off between coverage 
and opportunity cost he believes is best for him given his particular preferences and what 
he wants out of life.
However, there is a nagging suspicion that neither Rawls’ veil of ignorance nor 
Dworkin’s hypothetical insurance markets adequately capture the ethos of mutual 
justifiability. The problem does not appear to be solely with the conditions of ignorance 
built into these situations but in the specified motives of the parties. For Rawls and 
Dworkin, the parties are motivated by a desire to advance their own interests. So any 
‘agreement’ they reach reflects a coming together of self-interests. The nagging doubt is 
whether parties motivated in this limited way will develop truly reasonable divisions of 
consequential responsibility even under conditions of partial equality. Surely 
reasonableness in the fullest sense implies not just that parties are willing to propose and 
consider different divisions of responsibility on the basis of their own self-interest, but 
also that they are committed to finding divisions of responsibility which can be publicly 
justified to each person taking into account various different points of view and a broad 
range of reasons.
It might be enlightening at this stage to consider the moral theory of T. M. Scanlon -  
a theory which I believe makes better (that is, more plausible) use of the idea of 
reasonableness. In his article, “Contractualism and Utilitarianism” and subsequent book, 
What We Owe to Each Other, Scanlon argues that thinking about right and wrong is, in 
essence, about trying to find principles and systems of rules ‘which no one could 
reasonably reject’. On this view, the fundamental question of right and wrong is whether 
any proposed set of rules can serve as a basis of mutual justification, where everybody has 
an equal say in the matter, is fully informed of the proposals, is not forced to agree, and is 
motivated to find rules and principles that others could not reasonably reject (Scanlon 
1982: 110; 1998: 153). Scanlon uses the term ‘reasonable’ here in part to highlight the 
fact that in most situations there will be reasons in play on both sides, and so what agents 
may reject is a matter of how the reasons compare in strength. As he puts it:
According to contractualism, in order to decide whether it would be wrong to do 
X in circumstances C, we should consider possible principles governing how one 
may act in such situations, and ask whether any principle that permitted one to do 
X in those circumstances could, for that reason, reasonably be rejected. In order 
to decide whether this is so, we need first to form an idea of the burdens that 
would be imposed on some people in such a situation if others were permitted to 
do X. Call these the objections to permission. We then need, in order to decide 
whether these objections provide grounds for reasonably rejecting the proposed 
principle, to consider the ways in which others would be burdened by a principle 
forbidding one to do X in these circumstances. Suppose that, compared to the
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objections to permission, the objections to prohibition are not significant, and 
that it is therefore reasonable to reject any principle that would permit one to do 
X in the circumstances in question. This means that this action is wrong, 
according to the contractualist formula. (Scanlon 1998: 195)
Scanlon is primarily concerned with a system of rules and principles for the 
regulation of ethics and right and wrong acts, but I do think his conception of 
reasonableness is well suited to the present discussion about a just division of 
consequential responsibility. The main thing that I want to take from Scanlon is the 
thought that a just division of consequential responsibility is one that can serve as a basis 
for mutual (or what we might call ‘interpersonal’) justification where this is understood to 
mean that the parties involved (those who are affected by the policies) are motivated not 
only to accept whatever is most likely to advance their own interests but also to find rules 
and principles that others can accept or at least can be publicly justified to others on the 
balance of the reasons in play.
Anderson adopts a similar position. She claims that any proposed division of 
responsibility should satisfy what she calls ‘the principle of interpersonal justification: 
any consideration offered as a reason for a policy must serve to justify that policy when 
uttered by anyone else who participates in the economy as a worker or consumer’ 
(Anderson 1999: 322). I think this is a plausible way of interpreting the demands of 
justice because it requires reasons to be formulated at a relatively high level of generality. 
If a person wishes to offer a reason that serves to justify collective responsibility for his
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medical treatment, for example, the reason must be general enough that anyone could 
accept and utter that reason publicly.
I hope we have, then, in all of this, the beginnings of a plausible approach to 
consequential responsibility. To make good this promising start, however, we must 
provide further convincing answers to the following three questions. Firstly, what 
reasons are relevant to the justification of proposed divisions of consequential 
responsibility from the perspective of what is just and unjust? Secondly, how do we 
balance these reasons -  that is to say, how do we know when a proposed division of 
responsibility is reasonable when it is supported by some reasons and not by others? And 
finally, what, if any, is the proper function of interpersonal justification in all this -  is the 
process of giving reasons for and against proposed divisions of responsibility supposed to 
supersede democratic decision-making or merely to provide normative constraints upon 
it? I shall try to answer each of these questions in turn as the chapter proceeds.
To begin with the first question, we want to know which types of reasons are relevant 
to deciding what is a reasonable (and in that sense just) assignment of consequential 
responsibility. As discussed at length in previous chapters, some egalitarians believe that 
reasons for and against responsibility-attribution should be developed on the basis of the 
distinction between choice and luck, and whether or not an agent identifies with his tastes 
and preferences. Whilst I think that choice and identification theorists have sometimes 
been guilty of failing to apply these criteria consistently, I do not disagree that these 
reasons deserve to be placed on the scales of justice. However, in this chapter I shall try
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to motivate the claim that other reasons have an equally important role to play in just 
assignments of consequential responsibility. The basic thought behind the inclusive 
theory is that if the fundamental aim is to find a division of consequential responsibility 
that can be justified to each person affected by it, then there is no logical reason why the 
only (or the most important) factors must be the choice/luck distinction and preference 
identification; at least, no reason that I can think of.
However, I should also make it clear at this early stage that no list of reasons can be 
presupposed. The question we must bear in mind is this: why should other people take 
seriously the reasons we put forward for or against a proposed assignment of 
consequential responsibility? Taking this question seriously implies that we must try 
wherever possible to develop arguments good enough, if not to convince others entirely, 
at least to make them concede that the reason is a serious one and merits attention. 
Reasonableness in this sense means that we cannot just assume a list of reasons but must 
do our best to try to explain to others why we take the reasons seriously and persuade 
them to do the same. I freely admit, therefore, that some or all of the items on the above 
list will be controversial to some. Accordingly, in what follows I shall try to defend my 
own choice of candidates using as many illustrations and arguments as possible. I intend 
to demonstrate that the inclusive theory incorporates reasons that are not only prominent 
in the philosophical literature on distributive justice but also fitting additions to a theory 
of consequential responsibility.
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That being said, in some cases it may be difficult to say exactly why a reason 
deserves consideration: if the reason has importance, then it is of the fundamental sort 
that cannot be further analysed or defended. Sometimes we have only our deeply held 
convictions about what justice demands. Of course, even at this point we can still refuse 
to accept the reasoning offered by others if it is based on obviously erroneous empirical 
premises or is clearly muddled. But where this is not the case, it may be a mistake to 
think that we can argue decisively against those who take a different view. It seems to me 
that it is against the background of this pluralism of conceptions of justice that 
reasonableness comes to the fore. It can scarcely be denied that agents give precedence to 
different demands justice. But agents can agree, not unreasonably, to respect each others’ 
convictions about what reasons are in play. Provided others are willing to take into 
account the fundamental convictions about consequential responsibility that I put 
forward, I can act reasonably by considering what other people sincerely believe about 
consequential responsibility, perhaps even accepting that government must give some 
weight to those beliefs in particular policies.
5.2 REASONS
Turning now to the reasons themselves, the inclusive theory offers a mixed conception of 
responsibility incorporating different types of reasons or criteria. The two main criteria 
discussed up until this point fall into a wider group of reasons which require us to assign 
responsibility independently of considering the impact on people’s lives. These two
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criteria only mention underlying facts about the agent as opposed to worrying about the 
moral significance of the behaviour in question or even what will happen to the individual 
if responsibility is imposed.
I. The distinction between choice and luck
This first reason trades on the distinction between what does and what does not lie 
within a person’s voluntary control. As we have already seen in chapter 3, it implies that 
if a painter and decorator starts working as an artist, or the son of a successful family 
butchers voluntarily decides to open a risky internet cafe, or a long distance lorry driver 
elects to take six months off work to walk the Sahara, or an office cleaner chooses to give 
up her job and become a part-time yoga teacher, it is not unjust if he or she has less 
residual income as a consequence. The claim here is that fairness requires that those who 
choose less productive occupations measured by what others want have less residual 
income in consequence. This reason is no way dependent on this being a beneficial 
consequence for the agent.
II. Whether or not an agent identifies with his tastes and preferences
This second reason lights on a person’s second-order preference-endorsing or 
preference-repudiating attitudes. It implies that if someone has or develops an expensive
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taste with which he identifies, it is only fitting that he end up with less taste satisfaction in 
consequence. On this view, it is wrong to expect those with inexpensive tastes to 
subsidise those who wish to live more lavishly, irrespective of any loss of real freedom of 
consumption or welfare suffered by those with expensive tastes as a consequence.
Whilst I think that each of the above reasons has a role to play, they scarcely exhaust 
the list of concerns about we might have about consequential responsibility. Consider 
again the seven types of interests outlined above. Suppose we believe that the primary 
aim of dividing consequential responsibility in any given case is to achieve a just 
distribution of these benefits and burdens. This raises the following question: what 
should we do in respect of resources and labour, freedoms and restrictions, securities and 
dangers, opportunities and obstacles, self-respect and shame, and welfare? Naturally for 
any distribution of benefits and burdens in times of relative scarcity there are different 
candidate views as to how things should get distributed as a matter of justice. And I 
accept that in some cases the distribution of these benefits and burdens should be choice- 
sensitive, and that in some cases the distribution should be sensitive to people’s second- 
order identifications. However, I intend to argue that these two criteria represent only the 
tip of the iceberg and that common intuitions support the following additional criteria as 
deserving serious consideration.
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III. Special responsibilities
The first group of reasons that I want to explore have to do with responsibilities that 
might apply to individuals or a society because an agent or a society has made some sort 
of commitment or undertaking or raised some type of an expectation in others or is 
charged with the task of righting a wrong committed by an agent or group of agents, and 
these factors can affect how consequential responsibility may be divided. These 
responsibilities can be acquired in different ways depending on the actions of the agent or 
society, and they can also be inherited from past generations. Let us begin with some 
illustrations of special responsibilities that agents can have for their own fate.
An agent can enter into a voluntary agreement with a government agency to take 
certain steps to search for work as a condition of receiving unemployment benefits. This 
means that government would have the right (if it did not have the right before) to 
withdraw benefits and leave the individual to bear the consequences of his actions. In 
this case the ‘special responsibility’ is easy to identify because there has been an 
assignable act on the part of the agent. However, some people might argue that agents 
can also acquire special responsibilities by ‘tacit’ consent. For example, some people 
might argue that citizens acquire at least some special responsibilities for the success or 
failure of their own lives merely by remaining resident in the political society.
The philosophy of tacit consent has been ably discussed elsewhere in the literature, so 
I do not intend to explore the issue in any great detail here (see, for example, Simmons
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1979: ch. 4). However, it is worth noting that even if we accept that agents can acquire 
special responsibilities through tacit consent, the normative questions do not end there. 
The expectations on individuals from government must be justified. Fortunately, in a 
democratic society, it is open to public decision whether, and to what extent, individuals 
are held responsible for what happens to them. For example, the citizenry can, and often 
does, decide through the ballot box if certain individuals should have the choice not to 
work and live off the public expense. If one is to acquire special responsibilities simply 
by living in a political society, then presumably it is better to have at least some say in 
deciding what those responsibilities will be rather than having none at all.
However, much also depends on whether one finds oneself in the majority, and this 
raises the following question: are there any limits to the special responsibilities that 
individuals may justly acquire merely by living in political societies? This is an 
important question to which I shall return below, but to anticipate my position, I intend to 
argue that whilst a reasonable division of consequential responsibility is one that takes 
account of the democratic decisions of each society, other criteria of responsibility rightly 
impose constraints on the kinds of responsibilities that may reasonably be assigned to 
individuals in this way.
It should also be pointed out at this stage that special responsibilities are not the 
preserve of individual citizens. Society can, and often does have, special responsibilities 
towards individuals, and we can say that sometimes discharging a special duty towards an
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individual citizen implies not imposing individual responsibility for his disadvantages. 
Let us consider some illustrations.
Among the more compelling types of reason a government has not to hold an agent 
responsible for his own disadvantages, is if he has been the victim of an injustice, 
inflicted by others, that caused those disadvantages. The types of excusing conditions 
relevant to these cases are as diverse as the bewildering array of injustices that man can 
inflict on fellow man. Consider the race issue in the United States. There are many 
dimensions to the race issue, but one often discussed dimension is the legacy of slavery. 
High levels of unemployment and poverty among African-Americans can be cited as one 
example of this legacy, not least because these problems appear to be intergenerational. 
On the face of it, then, the duty to help the victims of past injustice implies that African- 
Americans must not be held responsible for high levels of unemployment and poverty 
among their number because of the historical injustice of slavery that caused this 
situation. Of course, some claim there is no causal link between the injustice of slavery 
and the current disadvantages borne by many African-Americans. The fact that not all 
African-Americans are poor and unemployed can be offered in support of this claim. 
Indeed, some argue that it is a form of condescension by liberal policy makers to say that 
we should not hold African-Americans responsible if they have too much pride to sweep 
floors (see Murray 1984: 222). But this is not the only view. Another interpretation of 
the situation is that if African-Americans face unequal chances, then it must be due (at 
least in part) to historical injustice because there can be no other reasonable explanation. 
This debate is important, but from the perspective of justice we can say precisely this: to
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the extent that slavery has been a part of the cause of the difficulties faced by African- 
Americans, then justice demands that these individuals should not have to bear these 
difficulties alone, some of the cost of remedy or mitigation must be borne by society as a 
collective body.
Another example of how past injustices might inform current assignments of 
consequential responsibility is if a group of agents find themselves living in a hazardous 
geographical location because of the theft of their ancestral land. Consider those Native- 
Americans living on reservations in the United States, whose exposure to risk from 
natural disasters (such as forest fire) is higher than the national average (see Manson et al 
2005). It might be most appropriate, in order to rectify the injustice, to institute land 
reforms so that these groups no longer have to live in these areas. But suppose this is not 
possible. Some would argue that it is a basic requirement of social justice that 
government offers federal disaster relief to these people, or else pools the costs of 
commercial insurance. Naturally, more could be said here in terms of assigning the costs 
of federal disaster relief and/or commercial insurance more heavily to those that have 
benefited directly from the past injustice, but in the absence of precise historical 
information about who has done what to whom and when and which people have 
benefited and how, it might fitting to institute collective responsibility.
The choice theorist might reply at this stage that his theory already caters for the 
disadvantages that attend the legacy of slavery and land-theft under the heading ‘bad 
brute luck’, so there is no need for this additional category of excusing conditions. But I
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think that it is more than a little misleading to lump together, on the one hand, the 
disadvantages that attend the injustices of slavery and land-theft and, on the other hand, 
the disadvantages that accompany the bad luck of disability (say). Whereas the second 
type of disadvantage results from ‘acts of god’, the first type has to do with the crimes of 
mankind. In reply to this, some might insist that there is no real difference between the 
two types of disadvantage because disability, for example, is only a ‘disadvantage’ in so 
far as society allows it to be such. Luck egalitarians, for example, claim government 
action on behalf of certain groups in the name of justice because it is unjust for society 
not to mitigate the affects of bad luck. This is not a crazy position, but it is controversial 
and a relatively new arrival on the political agenda. Historically it has been more 
contentious to claim as one of the demands of justice that government must help the 
victims of bad luck than it has been to claim that government must help the victims of 
human wrongdoing such as slavery and theft of land.
Another type of special responsibility worth noting is what we might call ‘the duty to 
pool the costs of commissioned risks’. This reason for waiving individual responsibility 
appeals to the thought that it is unjust to force individuals to bear the consequences of 
their risky activities and occupations if society has ‘commissioned’ them to take these 
risks on its behalf. For example, Anderson points out that some people live in dangerous 
geographical areas in order to produce goods that consumers have commissioned them to 
produce. She asserts that where this is the case society has a special duty to share in the 
costs of those risks and that government should offer federal disaster relief (see Anderson 
1999a: 323).
190
I think that this is an interesting line of argument which deserves further 
consideration, but I want to put on record at this stage my scepticism about Anderson’s 
particular application of it. One could reply that consumers do no such thing as 
‘commission’ producers in hazardous geographical locations to take risks on their behalf. 
Instead they simply have a disposition to buy the products if the quality and price is right. 
I shall say more about Anderson’s argument and possible replies to it below, but for now 
let us assume for the sake of argument this reason can be forceful in at least some cases.
Yet another type of special responsibility is ‘the responsibility to meet people’s 
reasonable expectations of work’. If a person is engaged in a particular type of 
occupation for a long period of time or undertakes a course of study in a particular field, 
then he could develop reasonable expectations about future employment in these areas. 
Once the redundancy or graduation has taken place, then he expects to find employment 
within a period of time. It could be argued that if individuals develop this type of 
reasonable expectation of work, then the State has a responsibility to try to ensure that 
those expectations are met. In some cases this could mean that the State should waive the 
consequential responsibility of agents who choose to wait for ‘suitable’ employment. The 
State may or may not be able to force companies to give jobs to these people but they can 
at least give people the real freedom of being able to wait for a period of time for suitable 
employment by giving them income payments. Again, I do not deny that there might be 
objections to this kind of reasoning -  to be looked at below. Even so, there is at least a 
prima facie case to be answered here; or so I think.
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IV. Desert
Among the various criteria that ! believe should be incorporated into our judgements 
of consequential responsibility, the criterion that has perhaps the most obvious connection 
with common attitudes about justice is desert. Most people think that desert is an 
important feature of justice and it is potentially only a short step from here to the further 
claim that persons with merit do not deserve to be held fully responsible for the 
consequences of their imprudent actions. This, of course, raises two further questions. 
What is merit? And how can a person be said to have merit for doing something 
imprudent? But there are standard answers to these questions.
Consider the case of Mother Teresa of Calcutta, unselfishly devoting her life to the 
hungry and the sick. What is most interesting about Mother Teresa in the context of the 
present discussion of consequential responsibility is that she has merit despite the fact 
that she acts imprudently in the sense that she risks her own health and safety to help 
others. Perhaps there are self-evident reasons why the State should support her work. 
We might suppose that the people she helps have been the victims of past injustices. In 
this way Mother Teresa’s work is an instrument of rectification. However, let us focus on 
Mother Teresa herself. The choice theory of consequential responsibility seems to imply 
that she should be held responsible for the consequences of her choice to work with these 
children, not least in terms of her own entitlement to medical treatment if she becomes 
sick. Yet, as Ameson notes, in this case it might be more fitting to ignore impositions of 
responsibility implied by her voluntary choice in order to recognise her ‘virtuous
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imprudence’ (see Ameson 1999a: 238-241; 2001: 87-89). I suspect that most people 
would say that Mother Teresa has merit. And presumably her merit has to do with her 
unselfish devotion to others as well as her hard work and dedication in pursuing this good 
cause.
Perhaps some would argue that it is counter-intuitive to say that Mother Teresa 
deserves help because of her virtue. Surely it is an important part of what makes her 
virtuous the fact that she is self-reliant and willing to assume responsibility for the 
consequences of her actions? I accept the force of this question but I do not think that all 
forms of merit are bound up so closely with self-reliance and individual responsibility as 
to render inappropriate any or all collective responsibility for remedying personal 
disadvantages. It seems to me that there is room, in at least some cases, for saying that a 
person deserves help from others because of the merit of his or her actions, and that this 
help would not undermine what makes the actions deserving. Consider, for example, 
George Sher’s case of the man who breaks his leg whilst rescuing a child from the path of 
a speeding truck (Sher 1987: 46).
To raise desert, then, in the context of interpersonal justification, as a reason to hold 
(or not hold) a person responsible for the consequences of his ‘imprudent’ behaviour is to 
ask other people to consider whether it is right for persons with merit to bear the 
consequences of impmdent actions. This in turn relies on others accepting the general 
principle that consequential responsibility should be made proportional to the degree of 
desert persons have in their lives. I do not say that this is the only important principle,
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but I suspect that most people would react favourably when presented with such an 
argument, especially in cases like that of the man who breaks his leg whilst rescuing a 
child from the path of a speeding truck. It scarcely needs pointing out also that there are 
conflicting beliefs about what sort of conduct is deserving and, furthermore, differences 
of opinion about which consequences that conduct is or is not deserving of. I do not 
disregard these disagreements or seek to play them down. However, I would simply say 
that there is nothing in the concept of consequential responsibility itself which entails that 
its realisation can, or must, be conducted without disagreement. I shall return to this 
point at the end of the chapter.
V. Concerns about free-riding
Another criterion that I suspect is thought by most people to govern the just 
distribution of benefits and burdens within society is that persons should not be allowed 
to ffee-ride on the efforts of others. According to this criterion, an assignment of 
consequential responsibility is unjust if it allows some people to reap benefits without 
either sharing in or remunerating the cost of their production.
There are many examples of free-riding that could be highlighted, but the example of 
those who are idle or have expensive tastes being allowed to live off the income of 
hardworking and frugal taxpayers is well represented in both the political and the 
philosophical literature. Luck egalitarians, for example, regard the insistence on simple
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equality irrespective of people’s voluntary choices as an exploitative distribution of 
benefits and burdens that we should condemn (see Cohen 1989: 911).
However, critics of luck egalitarians claim that insisting on the choice/luck 
distinction permits other forms of free-riding that should also be viewed as objectionable 
from an egalitarian point of view. Consider those many thousands of low-paid or non- 
wage-eaming carers, activists, and youth workers who struggle to perform their work and 
make both ends meet in a world where the market does not remunerate their efforts and 
society as a whole is reluctant to recognise the benefits it receives from them. According 
to Anderson, the fact that such individuals make a significant contribution to society (that 
in a perfectly just world would not go unrecognised) is a good enough reason to 
collectivise responsibility for their income (see Anderson 1999: 324).
The criterion of desert, then, could potentially have a large role to play in deciding 
who should be held responsible for remedying of mitigating disadvantages. However, as 
with the criterion of desert, I do not ignore the possibility that there is disagreement about 
what type of conduct constitutes free-riding. Brian Barry points out that the full-time 
housewife could be seen as a free-rider on some conceptions of what free-riding is (Barry 
1996: 245). Consider a conception that defines ‘work’ as paid employment and 
‘contribution’ as paying one’s own way. Even so, any such argument about what 
constitutes free-riding must be seen in the context of the public justification of criteria of 
responsibility. And it seems extremely unlikely that the criteria “let us spend every day
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looking after children, cooking meals, and maintaining the home and not be adequately 
compensated for our efforts” can sustain interpersonal justification.
So far I have focused on criteria for assigning consequential responsibility that 
highlight the genesis of a person’s disadvantage as well as facts about his behaviour and 
contribution to society. Let us now consider some reasons that emphasise the impact on 
people’s lives of proposed assignments of responsibility. What is the difference between 
these two kinds of reasons? The criteria for assigning consequential responsibility 
examined so far have been ‘historical’ principles of justice in the sense that they focus on 
who ends up in what situations and for what reasons. Consider the principle of 
responsibility according to choice. Here the reason for assigning responsibility is the 
genesis of a person’s situation from the perspective of what does and does not lie within 
his voluntary control. The choice criterion can be further distinguished from another 
subtype of historical principles of responsibility. Consider the principle of responsibility 
according to desert. This is a ‘patterned’ (or ‘proportionality’) principle of responsibility. 
Such principles say ‘responsibility according to his X’ where ‘X’ picks out some relevant 
dimension along the lines of which responsibility is supposed to vary (see, for example, 
Ameson 2001: 86-87). However, certainly not excluded from the list of candidate 
principles of responsibility are those that define what a just division of responsibility 
would be on the basis of comparisons between ‘end-results’, and it is these kinds of 
criteria that I want to focus on now. (For more on the distinction between ‘historical’, 
‘patterned’ and ‘end-state’ principles of justice, see Nozick 1974: 153-160.)
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VI. Sufficiency
First on the list of important types of end-state criteria is sufficiency. A sufficiency 
criterion is one that rests on the principle that some disadvantages are so bad that, as we 
proceed from slight to middling to severe disadvantages, differences in degree of burden 
turn into differences in moral quality such that we have a prima facie obligation to 
eliminate the disadvantage. What is distinctive about sufficiency criteria is that whereas 
the choice criterion entails that agents may be held responsible for the consequences of 
their choices no matter how onerous the consequences might be, sufficiency criteria entail 
that there are some outcomes so bad that they should not be borne by any agent. Having 
said that, it is consistent with sufficiency criteria that once we get to the point where 
everybody has sufficient X, it is an open question how the relevant advantages get 
distributed by a proposed assignment of responsibility.
To put forward a sufficiency criterion as a reason in favour of a proposed division of 
responsibility is to ask other people to take seriously the importance of making sure that 
everyone has enough. It is, of course, no mere formality to describe adequately what it 
means for a person to have sufficient or to be doing sufficiently well, but there are 
credible answers in the literature. Consider, for example, the theory defended by 
Anderson, ‘democratic equality’. Influenced by the work of Amartya Sen, Anderson 
employs the metric of a person’s real freedom, or ‘capability’, to achieve valued 
functionings, that is, valued states of doing and being (see Sen 1981). Which capabilities 
matter? On her version of the sufficiency view, people are entitled to: (1) whatever
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capabilities are necessary to enable them to evade oppressive social relationships and (2) 
whatever capabilities are necessary for functioning as human beings, as participants in a 
system of cooperative production, and as citizens of a democratic state (see Anderson 
1999: 316-7). This is a sufficiency criterion because it concentrates on people having 
enough real freedom to achieve valued functionings. The point is that ‘democratic 
equality guarantees not effective access to equal levels of functioning but effective access 
to levels of functioning sufficient to stand as an equal in society’ (Anderson 1999: 318).
VII. Maximin
Another type of end-state criteria worth exploring is maximin. Those who defend 
this type of criteria argue that we ought to adopt whichever assignments of responsibility 
are to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged. To put forward maximin as a reason in 
favour of a proposed division of responsibility is, on the one hand, to appeal to the 
rational self-interest of the least advantaged to allow inequalities only on terms that are to 
their own greatest advantage, and, on the other hand, to appeal to the sense of social 
justice of the advantaged, namely, that they should be willing to gain advantages whilst 
living within political communities only on terms that benefit the least advantaged.
The substantive question is how we define ‘the least advantaged’. Rawls is perhaps 
the best-known advocate of maximin. On his version, the criterion only applies to 
‘primary goods’, that is, to rights, liberties, opportunities, income, wealth, and the social
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bases of self-respect (Rawls 1971: 62). On the one hand, citizens as a collective body are 
to accept responsibility for arranging inequalities in the distribution of primary goods so 
that they to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged. Citizens as individuals, on the 
other hand, are to accept responsibility for their own happiness and preference 
satisfaction (see, for example, Rawls 1996: 189). Whilst I agree with Rawls that 
maximin is a plausible criterion -  not least because it might support a person’s self- 
respect to live in a society where the advantage undertake to gain advantages for 
themselves only on terms that benefit the least advantaged (see Rawls 1971: 178-80) -  I 
do not share his further conviction that the criterion of maximin must be limited to a 
person’s share of primary goods. We need to focus on the distinction between types of 
criteria and types of interest.
Whatever number of types of disadvantage there may be, it seems to me that maximin 
potentially applies to each such that we should maximise the position of the least 
advantaged broadly construed (cf. Cohen 1989: 914-5). In saying this, I do not deny that 
there are objections to welfare as a suitable measure of personal disadvantage. Even so, 
as discussed in the previous section, I disagree with Rawls that these objections are 
decisive. And so I do not discount the criterion of maximin welfare. In the context of the 
present discussion, therefore, the term ‘the least advantaged’ is to be understood in terms 
of the seven types of interest outlined above.
For example, some defenders of maximin define ‘the least advantaged’ in terms of 
real freedom. Van Parijs, for example, argues for a criterion of lexicographic maximin
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real freedom combined with a well enforced system of private property rights including 
self-ownership. On this view, society has a collective responsibility to arrange the 
distribution of income, subject to securing people’s private property rights and self­
ownership under the rule of law, so that the person with the least real freedom has real 
freedom that is no smaller than is enjoyed by the person with least freedom under any 
other feasible arrangement, and in the event that more than one arrangement satisfies this 
condition, the person who is second-to-least free should be no less free than the person 
who is second-to-least free under any other feasible arrangement, and so on (see, for 
example, Van Parijs 1995: 25). It seems to me that this version of maximin deserves no 
less attention than that offered by Rawls.
As a final point, it is worth underlining that criteria of maximin have the potential to 
be more demanding than criteria of sufficiency by virtue of the fact that the requirement 
to maximise the position of the least advantaged applies even if the least advantaged are 
above what some regard as a level of sufficiency. More demanding still, however, are 
criteria of simple equality, and this is what I want to examine now.
VIII. Simple equality
Of all the end-state principles of justice raised in political disputes about the 
distribution of benefits and burdens in society, perhaps the most familiar is simple 
equality. As a criterion of responsibility it says precisely this: that it is an unjust state of
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affairs if as a result of the division of responsibility benefits and burdens get distributed 
unequally. To accept this criterion is to accept the idea that we should adopt assignments 
of responsibility that bring us closer to equality and not those that lead us away from 
equality. Let us consider one frequently cited example.
It is true that forcing those who are rich to give money to those who are poor can 
meet with opposition from opponents across the political spectrum, but some have tried 
to justify this type of policy on the grounds that each person has a right to an equal share 
of the earth’s natural resources simply by virtue of being an equal citizen. It is a further 
substantive question how and when that share is given to each person. In his “Agrarian 
Justice”, Thomas Paine proposed both a lump-sum payment at the age of twenty-one and 
an income for life starting at the age of fifty (Paine 1987: 477-478). Hillel Steiner 
suggests basic income or a lump-sum payment (Steiner 1998: 99-100n.l2). But 
whichever form of payment one defends, the right to an equal share of the earth’s 
resources is untouched if a person decides not to earn a living or contribute to society in 
some obvious way. In this sense the present argument about the right division of social 
responsibility is an argument from simple equality.
Let us pause to reflect on the criteria of responsibility that I have introduced. It 
should be fairly obvious to the reader that taking account of additional criteria of 
responsibility such as desert, sufficiency, maximin, or simple equality has the 
consequence of greatly multiplying the number of possible reasons that can be put 
forward in favour of or against a proposed division of responsibility. This is because any
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or all of these criteria can be allied to any or all of the various currencies outlined in 
chapter 2, namely, resources and labour, freedoms and restrictions, levels of achieved 
functioning, securities and dangers, opportunities and obstacles, self-respect and shame, 
public interests and public menaces, and levels of welfare. The inclusive theory of 
consequential responsibility, then, embodies a splintering of reasons in favour of and 
against holding agents responsible for their own situations, and this is unparalleled by 
formal theories.
Reflecting on all of these possibilities, however, invites the following obvious 
question: why should we take seriously any of these reasons? Whilst there are some 
noteworthy arguments in favour of the above criteria, there are few knock-down 
arguments. Those who seek to defend a particular criterion of responsibility can quickly 
reach a point where they can offer no further evidence or argument than to say that they 
have a fundamental impulse the criterion is important. Some people might ask: why 
simple equality? Others might ask the same question about sufficiency or maximin. For 
that matter, we could ask: why is free-riding so bad? However, one mollifying thing we 
can say to defenders of these criteria is that it can be just as difficult to come up with 
devastating negative arguments against sufficiency, maximin, simple equality, and the 
like.
Consider the criteria of simple equality. Perhaps the best known argument against 
simple equality is the so-called ‘levelling down’ objection. According to this objection, 
we do not really care about equality because if we did then we would welcome a situation
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in which, as a result of some unforeseen natural disaster, the better off lose all their extra 
resources. Or, we would countenance inflicting injuries on the able-bodied to make them 
as badly off as the disabled. The fact that we do not welcome natural disasters and would 
not countenance disablement is alleged to show that we do not really care about equality 
(see Parfit 1998: 9-10). However, the quite correct response to this objection is that it is a 
mistake to assume egalitarians must welcome levelling down all things considered. A 
moderate egalitarian is someone who believes inequalities are bad but not the only things 
which matter. A moderate egalitarian, therefore, will say that even though the fall from 
grace of the well off or the disablement of the able-bodied is in one respect better -  for 
making things more equal -  these situations are not better overall because they involve a 
waste of resources, the violating of human rights, and perhaps even a diminution in 
aggregate advantage. (For more on the levelling down objection and the possible replies 
to it, see, for example, Speigelberg 1944: 118-121; Scanlon 1976: 9-10; Parfit, 1998: 17; 
Sen 1992: 92-3; and Tempkin 1993: 282.)
It is difficult, then, to dislodge the belief that inequality is bad simply by pointing to 
the fact that we do not always welcome equalities and are not always moved to try to 
achieve them. The egalitarian can stick to his guns and say that equality is not the only 
thing that matters. However, the task of making a positive case for simple equality is no 
less difficult than the task of making a negative case against it. To illustrate this point, 
there are arguments in the liberal tradition supporting simple equality which invite 
forceful criticisms. In his book, Rethinking Liberal Equality, for example, Andrew 
Levine starts from the not implausible assumption that governments should try to be
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neutral between competing conceptions of the good. However, he makes the further 
claim that it is not satisfactory for a liberal government just to tolerate a diversity of 
different lifestyles, it must also furnish people with the income they require to seek out 
what fundamentally matters to them even if what fundamentally matters to them is 
surfing all day (say). Levine dubs this view ‘fairness to idleness’, an ironic take on 
Rawls’ paper, “Fairness to goodness”. For Levine, free-riding is not always indefensible. 
Legitimate concerns about ‘idle’ surfers free-riding on the efforts of others do not 
undermine entirely the principle of liberal neutrality (see Levine 1998: ch. 1, esp. p. 28). 
One notable snag with Levine’s argument, however, is that even if we accept the principle 
that governments should try to be neutral between different conceptions of the good, it 
does not follow from this that the liberal government has an obligation to tolerate and 
support invasive conceptions of the good and associated life plans. Not all ways of life 
must be treated with neutrality. Few people seriously think, for example, that a liberal 
society is obliged to tolerate the life plans of people who disseminate racist literature or 
subject others to lesser liberty. Nor do we believe that welfare authorities should turn a 
blind eye to people who make fraudulent claims against the Welfare State by assuming 
bogus identities (say). To make his case for ‘fairness to idleness’, therefore, Levine must 
first show that surfers have an acceptable conception of the good and associated life plan.
In taking up this challenge, Levine might claim a moral difference between the 
person who wants to surf all day (rather than work for a living) and a racist or a benefits 
fraudster, on the grounds that there is nothing malicious or dishonest about what the 
surfer would like to do: the surfer is not guilty of racial hatred or of pulling the wool over
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people’s eyes, he merely wants to surf all day and, if he can, live off the public expense. 
Also, if the liberal government does support surfers, the cost is shared between all 
taxpayers and no particular taxpayer is significantly worse off as a result (see Levine 
1998: 31). Now there is at least one fairly obvious reply to this. As Jonathan Wolff has 
quite correctly indicated, it is also true of some people who engage in fraud that they do 
not necessarily make any particular person worse off, and the costs they impose on others 
can be negligible, but we hardly think such behaviour should be supported by the State 
(see Wolff 2000: 28). And some may believe the case against surfers is decisive on this 
score (see Torsky 1993). Nevertheless, my point here is that even if the lifestyle of 
surfers is invasive, there remains here a liberal case for equality in the distribution of real 
freedoms and securities that cannot just be ignored and could succeed in some cases.
Therefore, my rationale for introducing the levelling down objection and the 
argument from liberal neutrality into the discussion at this stage has been to motivate the 
following position: whilst I do not believe it is reasonable simply to ignore objections 
against proposed criteria at the level of first principle (not least objections to the criteria 
of choice-insensitivity and free-riding) it is not self-evident that the arguments against 
other criteria besides choice-insensitivity and free-riding are decisive. On the contrary, it 
is at least arguable -  arguments can be presented -  that from the perspective of finding 
assignments of responsibility which can be justified to those concerned, concerns about 
sufficiency, maximin, and even simple equality deserve to be given proper consideration 
and in some cases should be given some weight in the overall system of reasons. It is, of 
course, a matter for further discussion -  to be undertaken below -  the precise degree of
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weight given to the different criteria in any given situation and on what basis. But we can 
at least make a start by spelling out the different reasons.
IX. Utilitarian reasons
A utilitarian reason is one that lights on the total amount of utility as a criterion on 
which to judge proposed divisions of responsibility. This type of reason holds that 
distributions of responsibility should be arranged so that they maximise the total amount 
of utility or good consequences. To put forward utilitarianism as a reason in favour of a 
proposed division of responsibility, then, is to ask other people to adopt arguably one of 
the most ethical motivations humans can have, that is, to be impartial between one’s own 
happiness and that of others (see, for example, Mill 1972: 17).
Utilitarian reasons can be contrasted with criteria that focus on how good 
consequences should be distributed among individual members. Whilst it is right to note 
the difference between distributive and aggregative reasons, I think that it can be 
misleading to express that difference using the heading ‘distributive justice versus social 
expediency’. I accept that these reasons can come apart but deny the further implication 
that only the former is appropriately a matter of justice. On the inclusive theory, justice 
has to do with finding divisions of responsibility which can be justified to each of the 
people affected by them and I can see no reason why this process of interpersonal
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justification should not appropriately include both distributive and aggregative reasons. 
In other words, it seems to me that they are both fitting reasons of justice.
Utilitarian reasons rest on the assumption that what we care about most is welfare. 
But the point I want to make now is that utility need not be the only thing that it is right to 
aggregate and then maximise. Another plausible example of aggregative reasoning starts 
from the premise that it is right to adopt whichever divisions of responsibility maximise 
the overall amount of freedom and security in society. There are stronger versions of this 
thought but consider the version that says: maximising freedom and security matters, 
though it is not the only thing that matters. This version of the public interest argument is 
an evaluation of: (1) how onerous (understood in terms of freedom and security) it is for 
individuals to be held responsible for the consequences of their choices, (2) how onerous 
(understood in the same way) it is for the rest of society in the event that individual 
responsibility is waived, and (3) the potential benefits (again in terms of freedom and 
security) of collective responsibility for society as a whole. Under what conditions would 
this argument support collective responsibility rather than individual responsibility? Put 
simply, if forcing individuals to bear the consequences of their own choices diminishes 
real freedom and security more than forcing the rest of society to bear these same costs 
diminishes real freedom and security, then the aforementioned argument will have the 
implication that it is better not to force individuals to bear the consequences, because not 
doing so results in greater real freedom and security overall. This will be the case if 
forcing individuals to bear the consequences of their own choices results in them being 
very little able to do what they want to do and having very little real security, whereas
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assigning responsibility for the same costs collectively very little diminishes the real 
freedom and security of the rest of society because the same costs shared collectively has 
a decreasing impact on agents’ real freedom and security as the number of people sharing 
responsibility increases. In short, in some cases we can say that it is not in the public 
interest to insist on individual responsibility.
X. Prioritarian reasons
I have said that the utilitarian family of reasons holds that divisions of responsibility 
should be set to maximise good consequences for people’s interests. It is a central tenet 
of utilitarian reasoning, then, that everyone’s utility should count the same. Defenders of 
prioritarian reasons, on the other hand, hold the following view: ‘We should not give 
equal weight to equal benefits, whoever receives them. Benefits to the worse off should 
be given more weight’ (Parfit 1998:. 12). Whereas a utilitarian division of responsibility 
demands that the division maximise the sum total of good consequences, prioritarianism 
demands that the division maximise the sum total of weighted good consequences, with 
additional weight going to the least well off. Prioritarianism does not imply that benefits 
to those who are worse off could not be outweighed by sufficiently great benefits to those 
who are better off, but it does imply that the overall importance of each good 
consequence depends on the recipient.
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Ameson’s article “Luck Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism” is an exemplary study of 
how an appropriately weighted utilitarianism (in his view, prioritarianism) can be 
combined with the choice/luck criterion to produce a more powerful theory of justice. On 
this pluralistic theory of justice, social institutions and practices should be arranged so 
that they maximise preference satisfaction, but with two important stipulations. The first 
stipulation is that benefits are more important the lower the person’s welfare prior to 
receipt of the benefit. The second stipulation is that benefits are less important the greater 
the degree to which the person’s position reflects his voluntary choices (see Ameson 
199%: 497; 2000/?: 343). I think that there is something importantly right about this 
pluralistic theory of justice, namely, that it tries to incorporate a number of fundamentally 
important criteria, rather than attempting to reduce the subject matter to a single all- 
encompassing distinction or concern.
5.3 CO-RESPONSIBILITY
Thus far I have argued that reasonableness is a promising basis for assignments of 
consequential responsibility where reasonableness is defined in terms of giving 
consideration to, and the balancing of, a number of formal and normative reasons 
including, but not exhausted by, the choice/luck distinction and second-order preference 
identification. To recap, these reasons fall under the following categories:
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I. The distinction between choice and luck.
n. Whether or not an agent identifies with his tastes and preferences.
HI. Special responsibilities.
IV. Desert.
V. Concerns about free-riding.
VI. Sufficiency.
VII. Maximin.
VIII. Simple equality.
IX. Utilitarian reasons.
X. Prioritarian reasons.
I do not claim as definitive this list of reasons. My aim has been to defend an inclusive 
approach to consequential responsibility as opposed to a formal approach, and inclusive 
theories of responsibility are consistent with the inclusion of more reasons. Perhaps there 
are reasons that some people would argue should be put on the list. A society might 
come up with such a reason. However, in order to defend the addition of an extra reason 
it is necessary to show (1) that it is supported by common intuitions about consequential 
responsibility, (2) that it is of wide enough appeal to satisfy the constraint of interpersonal 
justification, and (3) that it cannot be subsumed under any of the above reasons. I cannot 
think of too many other reasons of justice that might do this, but I do not exclude the 
possibility in advance of further argument.
210
However, there remains one very important question that I have yet to address: how 
do policy makers translate the above reasons into actual judgements of responsibility? In 
the simplest cases we can say that a proposed division of responsibility is reasonable if 
each person has reason(s) to support it and no person has reason(s) to reject it and, 
conversely, that a proposed assignment of responsibility is unreasonable if some people 
would suffer burdens or would have reasons to object to the rule that under an alternative 
feasible rule nobody would bear or could object to and, furthermore, which nobody could 
object to on other grounds. In an ideal world, therefore, the State would be able to make 
only those divisions of responsibility which satisfy all the criteria fully. However, in 
practice this might be impossible due to the fact that the various criteria outlined above 
come into conflict. Far more likely will be situations in which a proposed assignment of 
responsibility is supported by some reasons but can be objected to for other reasons. 
With this in mind, let us now return to the second of the three questions raised at the start: 
how do we balance conflicting reasons?
To be sure, if we had rules determining the weight of different reasons, then it might 
be fairly straight forward to arrive at definitive judgements of responsibility. One option 
might be to develop a lexicographic order between the criteria. Assuming, for the sake of 
argument, that criterion I. listed above is the most important criterion followed by criteria 
n., ID., IV., and so on, this would mean that the State should make divisions which satisfy 
criterion I., then, if there are any choices between divisions left to be made, the State 
should make divisions which satisfy II., then HI., and so on. Or else, we could try to 
develop a more sophisticated weighting system bringing in real numbers between a range
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of 0 to 10 (say) representing the cardinal values of the relevant criteria. (Ordinal 
functions of value for pairs of criteria might be intransitive and, therefore, too 
complicated to be of any real use to policy makers.) The State could then aim to make 
divisions of responsibility which satisfy the given values of all the criteria in play. And, 
if it is impossible to satisfy all the criteria in line with their appropriate values, the State 
could at least try to satisfy the most important criteria first (as determined by the criteria 
with the highest values) and partially satisfy the less valuable criteria. Or, the State could 
try to make whichever divisions bring us closest to satisfying all the criteria. However, 
the crucial question then becomes this: how do we determine these weights?
It will not have escaped the reader’s attention that so far I have not provided any 
functions or rules determining the relative value or weight of the different reasons. This 
is no mere oversight on my part. I am sceptical about whether we can develop, in any 
non-arbitrary way, universal functions or rules at the level of first principle. Why so? 
The theory of responsibility defended here (the inclusive theory) takes into account a 
wide variety of reasons based on different sorts of interests, so it is unclear whether the 
different reasons can be measured against a unified interest -  such as utility -  and then 
given a lexical ordering or system of weights accordingly. In other words, there may be 
no way of saying which reasons are decisive or carry more weight on the strength of a 
single interest. Much the same problem applies to any further attempt we might make to 
determine the weight of the criteria themselves. It could be right, for example, to give 
more weight to choice-sensitive than other criteria, but it could also be right to give more 
weight to other criteria besides choice-sensitivity. It is unclear to me how we should
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decide. Both outcomes seem equally consistent with justice. There will, then, be a range 
of different ways to make trade-offs between the interests in play and the different criteria 
of distribution and no formal way to choose between the possibilities at the level of first 
principle. Of course, we cannot appeal to the interests or the criteria themselves in order 
to make the choice because the relative importance of the different interests and criteria is 
precisely what is at stake.
At first glance, the fact that the inclusive theory does not determine single outcomes 
might appear to be a major weakness of the theory. But on closer examination I think that 
it is the strength of the theory. Current egalitarian literature puts a great deal of emphasis 
on the choice/luck distinction. After reading this literature one might be forgiven for 
assuming that there are metaphysical truths about consequential responsibility that need 
only be uncovered to know what justice demands. It remains the case, however, that in 
ordinary discourse people put forward different normative reasons in favour of and 
against proposed divisions of responsibility and disagree about the relative importance of 
those reasons. Rather than there being an agreed list of priority rules which settle debates 
decisively and with definitive outcomes, there are multiple arguments about which 
criteria are in play and which criteria matter most. This public disagreement is not 
eliminated under the inclusive theory but given pride of place. And this, as far as I can 
see, is a point in its favour not a deficiency. Sometimes the truth is more complicated 
than we might like it to be.
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So what, if anything, can we say to go further? It seems to me that when faced with a 
range of responsibility-criteria which do not admit of fine-grained outcomes in the 
abstract, a fitting solution is to revert to a lower level of abstraction, allowing decisions 
about how much weight is given to particular reasons, in given cases, to be made by 
citizens in each society. What I am proposing, therefore, are two levels of interpersonal 
justification. At the higher level we try to establish which normative reasons are in play 
and try to identify a range of assignments of responsibility that others can accept or at 
least can be justified to them on the balance of the reasons in play. Then, as voters, we 
select particular assignments of responsibility within the specified range. As voters our 
commitment is often to select policies which are in our own best interests, but this does 
not have to be the case. In any event, at the higher level our motivation must be to select 
a division of responsibility which can be justified to each other person. This surely is the 
hallmark of reasonableness.
With this in mind, I can now address the third of the three questions raised at the start 
of this chapter: what is the importance of abstract normative justification to the decisions 
we make about consequential responsibility qua voters? On the inclusive theory, the 
function of abstract normative justification is to impose constraints upon democratic 
decision-making. There is, therefore, latitude for the will of the people to be expressed 
but with limitations. The limitations on majority decisions are precisely this: the set of 
policies from which one policy is to be chosen should reflect or take into account 
normative reasons identified at the higher level. This will mean, for example, that if the 
democratic majority in a society decides to withhold all access to assistance from a
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particular group or, conversely, to waive all personal responsibility for the fate of that 
group, then we can say that it acts unjustly if such a decision can be reasonably rejected 
on normative grounds by a democratic minority. Thus, even if it falls short of 
determining the exact weight of different reasons at a high level of abstraction, political 
philosophy can do much in terms of identifying which reasons might be in play and 
highlighting policies which fail to take account of those reasons and, therefore, which 
treat a certain section of society unfairly.
Why must the higher level of interpersonal justification take precedence over 
democratic decision-making? The crucial point here is that we want to be able to criticise 
majority voting from a normative point of view if that voting threatens the interests of a 
minority. And in order to be able to do this we should not give the power to voters 
simply to rule out a particular reason, and the policies it supports, merely because they do 
not agree with it. In this way the inclusive theory draws heavily upon a Kantian tradition 
in contractualist thinking -  described earlier in this chapter -  that links Kant, Rawls, 
Scanlon, and Anderson. This line of thought holds that the ultimate test for any moral or 
political principle is respect for persons, which in turn requires that principles be such 
that they can be justified to each person. The higher level of interpersonal justification 
just outlined seems to be indispensable to reasonableness viewed in this way, not only as 
a political value that is allied to democratic decision-making but also as a more 
demanding requirement which protects the interests of every' person, even those in a 
minority.
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Returning now to the question of how the exact importance of different reasons is to 
be determined, some people might insist that priority rules are possible even at a high 
level of abstraction. However, it seems to me that attempts to specify the weight of 
different reasons swiftly lapse into arbitrariness. The problem is as follows: at the level 
of first principle, some people could say that a reason should be given the value of 3 in a 
range of 0 to 10, but other people could disagree and say that it should have the value 2 or 
4 or 9 even. In the end, all we have are competing assertions about what is most 
important. Consider, for example, the two criteria of maximin and choice-sensitivity. 
We could assert that maximin should have a value of 3 whereas choice-sensitivity should 
have a value of 6. Yet we could just as easily assert that choice-sensitivity should have a 
value of 3 and maximin a value of 6. There may be reasons why the first claim is correct 
and the second incorrect, but I must confess I do not know what they are. It seems to me 
that any weighting we select between 0 and 10 is going to be equally well motivated 
when viewed in the abstract, that is, without looking at what people in actual democratic 
societies care about most.
In response to this underdetermination at the level of first principle, the present theory 
says that it is acceptable for the specific valuation of reasons to be settled at the 
democratic level. The purpose is to develop definitive answers to substantive questions, 
whose answers we are unable to specify at the higher level. How is this to be done? It 
might be unrealistic to ask voters whether reason R1 is more important than R2, or how 
much value should be given to each reason on a scale between 0 and 10, without offering 
specific examples. On the other hand, it might be impractical to ask the public to
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consider every specific case before deciding. Nor are voters’ representatives likely to be 
asked to make decisions on every specific case. Even so, voters and their representatives 
do make choices about which policies they favour and could be asked to express general 
opinions about the importance of different reasons, and from these indications it might be 
possible to make a determination of where the priority and weighting of different reasons 
rests on a general basis. Where people have roughly similar beliefs about justice there 
might even be a large majority in favour of a particular weighting of reasons. However, 
where the reasons are of a very complicated or technical nature, it might be more 
appropriate to take the decision out of voters’ hands and even out of the hands of voters’ 
representatives and leave the decision to special committees of experts. They can then 
make determinate decisions based on their special understanding of the reasons in play 
and their assessment of what the will of the people would be if everybody were equally 
well informed.
Of course, saying that a number of reasons deserve consideration at higher and lower 
levels of interpersonal justification is not the same as saying that every reason must be 
given some weight in the final analysis. After reflection we could decide not to give any 
weight at all to a particular reason. This outcome is not unjust because reasonableness 
does not entail that all reasons are ruled in at all times. But how, in that case, do we 
determine which reasons are ruled in or out? Two grounds which are relevant at the 
higher level of interpersonal justification are: (1) whether our common intuitions support 
the reason as a fitting basis on which to assign responsibility in different ways and (2) 
whether the reason can be specified at a high enough level of generality to serve as a basis
217
for justification between the many and not just a few or one. The purpose of the 
democratic level is to determine the exact weight of different reasons and to close in on 
actual policies. This means that the majority decision is not sufficient by itself to rule out 
a reason on normative grounds. However, even at the democratic level reasons can be 
ruled in or out on the basis of: (3) whether any empirical conditions presupposed by the 
reason obtain in the given case.
I am aware that these three aspects of the inclusive theory require more detail, but I 
think the best, and perhaps only, way to furnish this detail is by looking again at the 
specific cases discussed in previous chapters and trying in each case to spell out which 
reasons I believe are ruled in or out and why. But before doing so I need first to address 
an issue about how diametrically opposed reasons can be accommodated by policy 
makers.
On my interpretation, reasonableness means a balancing act between potentially 
conflicting normative reasons as well as scope for the majority of people in each society 
to determine more precisely the weight of different reasons. However, this invites a 
problem if there are reasons which support imposing full individual responsibility in a 
particular case and reasons which support imposing full collective responsibility. The 
problem is this: if the choice is presented to voters as policy X or policy Y, then they 
might be forced to make an exclusive choice between reasons, which in turn could mean 
that the decision they reach runs foul of higher level reasonableness. At the higher level, 
it might be the case that both the reasons which support X and the reasons which support
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Y are sufficient grounds for reasonable rejection of the alternative policy, because both 
sets of reasons must be given some weight. The upshot is that whichever decision the 
majority takes will be unjust at the higher level because voters are being asked to make an 
either/or choice.
The solution to this problem is for policy makers to present voters with policies 
which accommodate both sets of reasons. But which policies are these? In these cases a 
just outcome is likely to be some form of what I shall call ‘co-responsibility’. Co­
responsibility is understood to mean that responsibility is shared between the individual 
and society as a collective body. To be more exact, a co-responsibility outcome is one in 
which the agent must assume part of the costs of his choices -  for example, the loss of 
some real freedom -  as a part of embracing responsibility, before society as a whole takes 
responsibility for the rest of the costs. I shall give further details of what I mean by co­
responsibility and why I think it can be a just outcome in the examples that follow, but 
before doing so I should first make clear a couple of extra points.
I do not say that co-responsibility will always be the just outcome. The justice or 
otherwise of co-responsibility depends on the presence of credible reasons both for and 
against a proposed division of responsibility. Where there are reasons deserving of 
weight on both sides, co-responsibility outcomes are just, otherwise they are not. Nor do 
I say that, in any given case, there will only be one co-responsibility outcome. On the 
contrary, there are likely to be a number of ways to share responsibility and so a range of 
co-responsibility policies for voters to choose between. Rather, my argument is
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essentially that reasonableness can, in some case, entail a compromise between important 
reasons such that it is right to share responsibility rather than forcing voters to make a 
polarised choice between full individual responsibility and full collective responsibility. 
In other words, if there are reasons on both sides of the debate that could offer grounds 
for reasonable rejection at the higher level, co-responsibility policies offer a suitable 
compromise. And it is entirely fitting for voters to decide which co-responsibility policy 
to adopt within the acceptable range.
5.4 EXAMPLES AGAIN
On my reading, then, reasonableness has to do with finding reasons for a policy that are, 
on balance, good enough to justify the policy to those affected by it. So, with this in 
mind, let us look again at some examples and ask: what reasons are in play and what 
might co-responsibility be like? As far as possible I intend to examine these reasons in 
the same order as in previous chapters, but I should make it plain that I have chosen the 
following examples because they capture very well the different reasons in play as well as 
the various interests mentioned above, and because they demonstrate the advantage in 
explanatory power that the inclusive theory has over its rivals; or so I believe.
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A. Unemployment and underemployment
As we have already seen, the criterion of choice-sensitivity stipulates that individuals 
should have less income as a consequence of choosing less productive ways to work. But 
there may also be countervailing reasons supporting collective responsibility. I intend to 
outline some of these reasons in a moment, but let me first say something about how 
these reasons might be bought together in a compromise.
A co-responsibility policy is one that balances competing reasons by sharing 
responsibility between individuals and society as a collective body. Even so, at the level 
of policy there is likely to be more than one way of achieving co-responsibility. One 
possibility is ‘social security’ for anyone who is unemployed but with reductions 
reflecting personal responsibility. Under this policy, even if an agent voluntarily chooses 
to earn less than the agreed level of coverage, he will still be entitled to receive some 
income from society in respect of the differential, but somewhat less than an amount that 
will bring him up to the agreed level of coverage. Another possibility is ‘unconditional 
basic income’. Unconditional basic income is a flat rate income paid to everybody rather 
than being based on the difference between a person’s actual earnings and his or her 
earning potential. Even so, it is a co-responsibility policy in the sense that whilst society 
assumes collective responsibility for providing a basic level of income for all, individuals 
are held responsible for any income they choose or do not choose to earn above that level.
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Which reasons, if any, support these possibilities? One reason for adopting an 
unconditional basic income is the criterion of maximin real freedom. According to this 
criterion, the question of when and how far individuals should assume responsibility for 
their own income depends on whether or not it is to the greatest benefit of the least 
advantaged (understood in terms of real freedom) that access to income should be 
conditional on some exercise of personal responsibility. And it might be argued that it is 
to the greatest benefit of the least advantage for society to assume collective responsibility 
for providing the highest sustainable unconditional basic income for all. This is precisely 
the argument put forward by Van Parijs.
To be more exact, Van Parijs defends the criterion of lexicographic maximin real 
freedom combined with a well enforced system of private property rights including self­
ownership (see Van Parijs 1995: 25). He argues from this criterion to an unconditional 
basic income for all set at the highest sustainable level. The argument is formulated as 
follows. Firstly, a free society is defined as one in which there is lexicographic real 
freedom. Secondly, a just society is defined as a free society in the same sense. Thirdly, 
priority is given to justice (understood in terms of freedom) above other values (see Van 
Parijs 1995: 27). And, the final step in the argument, is to argue that a just society is one 
in which there is unconditional basic income for all set at the highest sustainable level 
(see Van Parijs 1995: 33).
Van Parijs’ suggestion, then, is that unconditional basic income for all set at the 
highest sustainable level follows as an implication of the principle that access to income
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should be arranged so that it is to greatest benefit of the least advantaged. I shall not 
discuss here the possible reply that Van Parijs’ tripartite definition of a free society is 
incoherent because we cannot, in any meaningful sense, secure people’s private property 
rights and self-ownership and, at the same time, redistribute income and wealth to 
achieve lexicographic maximin real freedom (cf. Van Parijs 1995: 26). However, I do 
want to discuss the fact that Van Parijs defines a just society purely in terms of freedom.
I do not think that we can take it for granted that securing freedom in the defined 
sense is all there is to making a just society. If we assume this, then others can easily 
make the opposite assumption that securing choice-sensitivity and luck-insensitivity is all 
there is to justice. According to this opposite view, justice in fact supports the lowest 
feasible unconditional basic income for all. I must confess that I do not know of any 
decisive arguments in favour of either view that would silence their opponents. 
Consequently, I take the position that it is rightly a matter for each society to decide how 
much weight it gives to maximin real freedom and choice-sensitivity and, therefore, how 
much unconditional basic income is made available to citizens; this, at any rate is the 
implication of the inclusive theory.
Of course, some might try to argue that maximin real freedom should be ruled out 
entirely. Tony Atkinson argues that in order to secure political support it may be 
necessary for defenders of basic income to compromise on their commitment to 
unconditionality. He defends instead what, he calls ‘participation income’. A 
participation income would be non-means-tested but it would be eligibility-tested in the
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sense that it would be available only to those who participate in economic activity, paid 
or unpaid, or else are unable to participate (see Atkinson 1995: ch. 15). Eugene Torisky 
argues, in a similar vein, against unconditional basic income on the grounds that it fails to 
give due weight to concerns about those who choose not to contribute to society. His 
cites the case of surfers living on the public expense. Torisky seems to favour what we 
might call a ‘contributor’s income’, which implies that income should be paid to surfers 
who spend some of their time cleaning beaches but not to surfers who surf all day (see 
Torisky 1993: 294-5).
However, the proposition that access to income should be conditional on participation 
or contribution needs to be handled with caution from a normative point of view if not 
from a political perspective. I do not say Atkinson and Torisky are incorrect in wanting 
to give some weight to concerns about free-riding. Even so, they propose to mete out full 
consequential responsibility to individuals who choose not to participate or contribute. 
This means that in bending over backwards to give weight to participation and 
contribution, they do not give any weight to other reasons. I must admit I do not see how 
other criteria can be ruled out so easily.
Much depends on how we interpret common intuitions of course. At first glance, the 
case for giving money to surfers appears weak at best. As previously mentioned in this 
chapter, some have attempted to defend unconditional basic income on the grounds that it 
is right for the State to be neutral between competing conceptions of the good (see, for 
example, Levine 1998: ch. 1). But in reply to this, others can insist that we do not really
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care about giving people real freedom of occupation -  and, in that sense, being neutral 
between competing conceptions of the good -  if what they want to do is surf all day rather 
than work for a living. However, those who want to try to defend unconditional basic 
income against the surfer objection can appeal to three additional arguments in making 
their positive case.
The first argument that has frequently been made in favour of unconditional basic 
income takes as its starting point an alleged entitlement to an equal share of the earth’s 
natural resources. According to this ‘basic dividend argument’, surfers have a right to 
unconditional basic income conceived as a ‘rent’ to be paid by those currently in 
possession of (or benefiting from) an unequally large share of the earth’s natural 
resources (see, for example, Steiner 1998: 99-100n.l2). We might frown upon those who 
choose to use their share so frivolously, but that does not mean to say they have no right 
to do so. Why should we determine how others use the rent they are owed? Putting the 
same argument slightly differently, the mere mention of common intuitions does not 
destroy the case in favour of supporting surfers because intuitions shift when extra 
reasons are brought in. A simple description of the situation might lead one to conclude 
that surfers are rightly held responsible for their choices. Nevertheless, intuitions can 
change when we consider the possibility that surfers might have a claim to an equal 
dividend from the earth’s natural resources, the same as anyone else. What do we think 
now? The situation has not changed, but the reasons we use to judge it have. And we 
might be inclined to say that surfers do have a right to income.
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Rawls’ difference principle also bears notice at this juncture. The difference 
principle stipulates that inequalities of income and wealth should be arranged so that they 
are to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged (understood in terms of primary goods) 
(see Rawls 1971: 302). This seems to have the implication that people who prefer to surf 
all day are entitled to a share of the resources of the rich. In responding to this putative 
counter-example, Rawls subsequently considered the possibility of making leisure a 
primary good. ‘I shall only comment here that twenty-four hours less a standard working 
day might be included in the index [of primary goods] as leisure. Those who are 
unwilling to work under conditions where there is much work that needs to be done (I 
assume that positions and jobs are not scarce or rationed) would have extra leisure 
stipulated as equal to the index of the least advantaged. So those who surf all day off 
Malibu must find a way to support themselves and would not be entitled to public funds’ 
(Rawls 1996: 181-182n.9). Rawls, then, believed it might be possible to yield to the 
surfer objection by adjusting the weight of the primary goods such that surfers are no 
longer considered to be faring worse than others. Accordingly, Rawls’ proposal gives all 
the weight to concerns about free-riding and no weight to other criteria. Yet I do not 
think that we can simply assume that common intuitions are so clear-cut. When 
evaluating the difference principle we must also take account of other reasons that do 
support the claims of surfers such as the argument that surfers have a right to an equal 
share of the earth’s natural resources, conceived as manna to be distributed equally. An 
alternate proposal to the one envisaged by Rawls, therefore, would have extra leisure 
stipulated as almost equal to the index of primary goods, such that those who surf all day
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off Malibu would be interpreted as being entitled to some public funds. Surely we must 
take this proposal just as seriously as Rawls’ (see, for example, Van Parijs 1995: 97).
The second argument for paying an unconditional basic income to everybody rests on 
a frequently proposed utilitarian principle. Considerations of choice-sensitivity suggest 
that people should have less residual income as a consequence of the choices they make 
about work, whereas utilitarianism seems to support a policy of redistributing income to 
the poor regardless of an agent’s own responsibility for being rich or poor. This is 
because of the alleged principle that income has diminishing marginal utility: the more 
income people have, the less pleasure they derive from additional amounts (see, for 
example, Arrow 1971: 409). Even so, it is important to recognise at this stage that the 
success of this version of the public interest argument rests on the assumption that the 
principle of diminishing marginal utility outweighs any utility-maximising consequences 
of imposing responsibility on individuals. This assumption requires further exploration 
which it will receive below.
A third argument which supports giving unconditional basic income to everybody has 
to do with the social bases of self-respect. The link between unconditional basic income 
and self-respect can be supported in different ways. One question is this: what affect 
might the blind pursuit of choice-sensitivity have on the motivation of those people who 
are able to assume responsibility but have so far been disinclined to do so? Suppose we 
say that the main task of welfare officials in dealing with those who are unemployed is to 
assess whether or not a claimant has a valid excuse for being out of work. I do not ignore
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the fact that this is one obvious way of catering to individual responsibility, but there are 
drawbacks with this type of system. For one thing there is little or no evidence to suggest 
that this strategy can increase levels of work among the most recalcitrant work-shy. On 
the contrary, studies in the United States and Britain have shown that denying aid to 
people who elect not to work is not sufficient for a change in their pattern of behaviour 
and underlying work ethic. The idea is that ‘Merely to deny aid does not tell people what 
they should be doing instead of being dependent. It is not prescriptive enough’ (see Mead 
1997: 20). Why should we care? One thought is that this may constitute a missed 
opportunity for promoting the benefits of work and the increased self-respect that 
frequently comes with it. By maintaining aid there is always a chance that a person may, 
at a later stage, agree to learn new skills and engage in job searching behaviour. And the 
long-term result may be a new job and an increase in his self-respect. Of course, there 
will be people for whom the threat of losing benefits will be a powerful incentive: they 
will find a position for themselves in the labour market and this will enhance their self- 
respect precisely because they can no longer rely on aid from the State. But this might 
not always be the case.
This is not the only version of the argument from self-respect. Rawls argued that 
arranging social and economic inequalities so that they are to the greatest benefit of the 
least advantaged is an important social basis of self-respect (see Rawls 1971: 178-80). 
The basic idea is that parties give weight to how well the principles of justice support 
self-respect as something rooted in their ability to pursue a worthwhile conception of the 
good. And Rawls believed that the difference principle will support self-respect both in
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terms of the public affirmation that social and economic inequalities must be arranged so 
that everyone, rich and poor, can pursue a worthwhile conception of the good, and in 
terms of the practical point that arranging inequalities in accordance with the difference 
principle means that people are actually able to pursue a worthwhile conception of the 
good (see Rawls 1996: 318-9). For example, some people may derive self-respect from 
being able to engage in leisure activities that they would not be able to engage in if they 
did not receive unconditional income from the State and, therefore, had to work for a 
living (see McKinnon 2003: 148).
The link between unconditional basic income and self-respect can be further 
supported by looking at the consequences of not making access to income unconditional 
for people’s self-respect. Suppose, for example, the State were to make access to income 
conditional on the ability to prove that one is unable to work or find a job. This might 
have a negative impact on the self-respect of those who must go through this process. 
How can they hold on to their self-respect when there is public affirmation of the fact that 
they are unable to lead the type of life that others deem worthwhile? The problem is that 
in trying to encourage people to work for a living we risk humiliating or setting up for a 
fall those who are in fact incapable of work (see, for example, Ameson 1990: 1133; 
Wolff 1998: 113-5; and Anderson 1999: 305).
In the end, therefore, I do not think that a policy of unconditional basic income can be 
ruled out on normative grounds, since there are credible arguments which support some 
level of unconditional basic income. There is, however, a further wrinkle. Whilst I think
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it is right that we take seriously the three arguments just outlined in favour of 
unconditional basic income that I have, it is important not to read too much into them. It 
seems to me that although it can be right to limit choice-sensitivity, the three reasons 
which support the positive case for unconditional basic income do not entirely 
overshadow our commitment to choice-sensitivity, and this is what I want to explore 
now, starting with the argument for unconditional basic income which is based on the 
utilitarian calculus.
This argument rests on the idea that not imposing individual responsibility has utility- 
maximising consequences by virtue of the principle of diminishing marginal utility of 
income. One reply to this argument is to point out that diminishing marginal utility is 
not, in fact, a universal law. This reply is well rehearsed in both the economic and 
philosophical literature. In some cases, if resources went to those who are somehow 
impaired in their ability to convert income into welfare, they would not give those people 
much additional utility at all (see, for example, Sen 1973: 15-18). In other cases, if 
resources went to those who were already well off but were also ‘utility monsters’, then 
this would maximise the overall amount of utility (see Shaw 1999: 119-20). In these 
cases, utilitarianism would not support egalitarian redistribution. So, then, if there is a 
utilitarian argument for egalitarian redistribution, then it is contingent as well as 
instrumental.
However, a further reply I wish to stress here is that in consistently applying 
utilitarianism we must also treat any utility-increasing consequences of imposing
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responsibility on individuals just as seriously as any utility-increasing consequences of 
not doing so. What, therefore, might be the utility-increasing consequences of imposing 
consequential responsibility on individuals? For one thing, taxing the financial rewards 
given to hard working high-flyers may reduce the incentive to work hard and thereby 
lower efficiency, innovation, and economic growth, which may in turn lead to fewer 
opportunities and less wealth overall. Policies which require the poor to work for their 
income may also increase utility. This might happen in a number of ways including as a 
result of the greater prosperity of those who take up work, indirectly from an increase in 
the labour supply and reductions in social exclusion and crime and, more directly, as a 
result of the satisfaction people derive from earning their own keep (see Ameson 1990: 
1132).
These, then, are just some of the ways in which personal responsibility could actually 
enhance utility. The upshot of all this is that in so far as utilitarianism supports the policy 
of unconditional basic income by virtue of the principle of the diminishing marginal 
utility, some of that argument must be offset against any benefits that might accrue to 
individuals and society as a whole as result of forcing people to assume greater personal 
responsibility for their own income. Consequently, if taxing the rich for the sake of the 
poor is in the public interest, it may only be so up to a point.
The third argument in favour of unconditional basic income introduced above was 
based on the social bases of self-respect. This argument also repays closer investigation. 
The idea that the social bases of self-respect are important desiderata of justice is due, in
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large measure, to the influence of Rawls. Even before the Commission on Social Justice 
in the United Kingdom concluded that people have a right to self-respect (Commission on 
Social Justice 1993: 16), Rawls claimed in A Theory o f Justice that it is rational for 
parties behind the veil of ignorance to desire the social bases of self-respect (Rawls 1971: 
92-93); that the social bases of self-respect are ‘perhaps the most important primary 
goods’ (Rawls 1971: 440). For Rawls, self-respect is orientated around two things: (1) 
the conviction that one’s plan of life is worthwhile, and (2) confidence in one’s abilities 
to achieve that plan (Rawls 1971: 440). It is perhaps easy to see, therefore, why he placed 
such weight on the social bases of self-respect. Perhaps no rational person wants to feel 
as though nothing has any point and that all effort is hopeless.
However, it is far from clear-cut that the argument from the social bases of self- 
respect is able to completely trump possible concerns about choice-sensitivity. Even 
working within the methodological structure developed by Rawls, it is open to doubt 
whether the parties behind the veil of ignorance would choose unconditional basic 
income as a necessary social basis of self-respect, irrespective of other reasons. Some 
people, for example, might be willing to overlook the fact that without unconditional 
basic income (or with unconditional basic income set at a very low level) they will be 
without one important social basis of self-respect, so long as they would be able to reap 
more of the rewards of their labours, and not have to give up their money to people who 
choose to surf all day rather than work for a living. In this way they might be willing to 
gamble on the fact that they are the sort of person who wants to work. In other words, 
behind the veil of ignorance it might not be so irrational to want the State to insist on a
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relatively high degree of choice-sensitivity. This trade-off is all the more understandable 
when one considers the fact that in the perfect Rawlsian society citizens will have access 
to a number of social bases of self-respect. Rawls believed, for example, that equal basic 
rights and liberties for all can be a foundation for people’s sense of equal worth (Rawls 
1971: 544); he also believed that offering opportunities for education is an important way 
of securing, for each person, a sense of his or her own self worth (Rawls 1971: 101); and 
he claimed that opportunities for meaningful occupation should be available to all 
citizens because lack of meaningful occupation is destructive of citizens’ self-respect 
(Rawls 1996: lix).
Bringing all these points together, the substantive question is this: at what level of 
income does unconditional income become an unreasonable policy? And, on the 
inclusive theory, the answer to this questions rest on the various types of competing 
reasons that I have discussed, namely, choice-sensitivity, concerns about free-riding, 
maximin real freedom, the right to a basic dividend from the earth’s natural resources, 
utilitarianism, and the social bases of self-respect. However, it is worth emphasising 
again at this stage that I am doubtful whether any meaningful answer to this question can 
be unearthed in the abstract. According to the inclusive theory, it is a matter for each 
society to decide the level of unconditional basic income given to everybody in 
accordance with the amount of weight it assigns to the various reasons in play. This 
means, in effect, that the amount of income given to everybody unconditionally (surfers 
included) will slide between the lowest feasible level and the highest sustainable level as
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more or less weight is given to the different reasons by voters in different political 
communities.
All of this, however, invites the following fairly obvious question: what if the 
majority of voters would not be in favour of giving unconditional income to surfers? 
Even if the majority would not be in favour, it should be stressed that the process of 
normative justification rightly imposes limits on democratic-decision making. This 
means that it is rightly a matter for democracies to decide exactly how much income 
should be given to surfers but not whether or not that income should be unconditional. 
This is because there are normative grounds for reasonable rejection of policies which 
give no placing whatsoever to unconditionality.
I think that the clear benefit of analysing consequential responsibility in this way is 
that we can uphold the normative reasons in play at the higher level but also allow 
democracies to make their own decisions (within boundaries) about how more exactly the 
reasons will be translated into policy. What is more, I do not think this division of labour 
is open to the choice theorist for the simple reason that on his view assigning 
consequential responsibility is, at heart, a metaphysical enterprise. He could say that the 
public has a role to play in that enterprise in terms of pinning down the choice/luck 
distinction, but then he must explain how and why the public is better placed than 
metaphysicians to make fine-grained distinctions. Alternatively, if the choice theorist 
concedes that voters ought to be allowed to interpret the distinction as they see fit, take 
one step back from narrow metaphysical questions if they wish, then he is in danger of
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admitting ground to the inclusive theory. Surely how people commonly interpret the 
distinction will depend on their wider normative beliefs and their convictions about 
which divisions of responsibility are in their best interest and can be justified to others on 
a range of different types of criteria.
The ability of the inclusive theory to deliver nuanced as opposed to dogmatic results 
is not restricted to the case of surfers. Consider those skilled workers or university 
graduates who find themselves out of work. Should they accept whichever jobs are 
available to them at any given time or is it reasonable for society to support them whilst 
they wait for more suitable employment? Suppose an experienced and highly skilled ship 
builder has recently come to the end of his contract and has only a limited chance of 
finding a similar job in the near future. The only work he can get immediately is 
sweeping floors in a local factory or as a night watchman on an industrial estate, which he 
is not keen to do. Or suppose a talented and hard working young graduate has difficulty 
finding a job in his chosen area of specialisation, website design. Though there are some 
opportunities for website designers, he is likely to have to wait for a period of time before 
he gains employment. Though he has the chance of accepting a less well-paid job as a 
filing clerk in the meantime, he would like to spend time brushing up on his programming 
skills and doing some informal work for friends and family. I have already looked at 
arguments for an unconditional basic income for everybody based on the principle of a 
basic divided, aggregate utility, and the social bases of self-respect. But what else can we 
say to support these individuals’ claims to levels of income over and above the
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unconditional basic income given to everybody? That is, what specific arguments can be 
tailored to these particular cases?
The criterion of choice-sensitivity seems to entail that if a skilled worker or university 
graduate opts to wait for his preferred job, he must accept less residual income as a 
consequence. Even so, other reasons might suggest a different response. One reason for 
giving unemployment benefits to such individuals might be to compensate them for the 
failure of governments to meet their reasonable expectations. The basic idea is that if a 
person is engaged in a particular type of work for a long period of time or undertakes a 
course of study in a particular field, then he can develop expectations about future 
employment. He can believe that a job will be available to him and make economic plans 
such as buying a house or taking on board a student loan based on the wage he expects to 
earn. On this argument, it is unfair to make him bear the economic consequences of 
reasonable expectations which are not met, and so he should be given extra income as 
compensation.
Of course, it might be questioned (1) whether we have an obligation to offer income 
in lieu of actual job opportunities, and (2) whether the responsibility to satisfy reasonable 
expectations rightly attaches to society as a whole as opposed to employers or universities 
themselves. In support of (2) it might be argued that it is employers and universities who 
are guilty of playing up expectations of work, in some cases unrealistically. However, in 
reply to (1) it can be insisted upon that paying income is the most suitable form of 
compensation in the absence of being able to address the lack of opportunities.
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Furthermore, in reply to (2) it can be observed that it is society as a whole (or at least the 
government) that regulates the job market and structures university numbers. Even if we 
accept that the State is not responsible for maintaining full employment across the board, 
governments can, and often do, intervene to support particular industries and promote 
university education, and so cannot abdicate all responsibility when people find 
themselves unemployed having formed reasonable expectations of future employment. 
So, it is at least arguable that part of the responsibility must belong to society as a 
collective body.
A second reason that might support collective responsibility is that, in some 
instances, it is in everyone’s best interest to allocate skilled workers only into the relevant 
skilled jobs. Among the background conditions that might add support to this 
aggregative argument include the following: (1) that skilled workers taking unskilled jobs 
results in the unemployment of unskilled workers, and (2) that a reserve army of skilled 
labour ready to take up any newly available jobs leads to competition for jobs, moderation 
of the wage demands of those in work, increased levels of efficiency, and the ability of 
companies to expand and contract production as required. Naturally, these background 
conditions are will not always obtain, but where they do there is the potential to say that a 
just society is one in which society assumes collective responsibility for paying these 
individuals an income whilst they wait for suitable employment.
The upshot of all this is that whereas choice-sensitivity will not support 
‘compensation’ for those who voluntarily choose to wait for suitable employment post
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redundancy or training, reasons to do with reasonable expectations and the general 
interest might support public subsidies over and above the basic income. So what would 
a reasonable solution to this policy dilemma be? There are different possibilities here, 
but one feasible option is fixed cut-offs for those receiving unemployment benefit. Under 
this proposal, new claimants would have a right to benefits only for a specified period of 
time, after which they would no longer be eligible. This should be made clear to them at 
the outset so they do not develop further expectations.
Why pay compensation only for a fixed period? Arguments about reasonable 
expectations and whether or not it serves the general interest to pay such individuals a 
high income -  to match their high earning potential -  so that they do not have to work, 
may or may not support indefinite unemployment benefits. But in any event these are not 
the only reasons at stake and some reasons may not support indefinite benefits. For 
example, some weight must be given to choice-sensitivity. Hence, fixed cut-offs 
introduce a degree of personal responsibility for finding work after an initial period is 
over. Following on from this, it is rightly a matter for each society to decide how long 
this period should be -  in Germany, for example, the cut-off period for unemployment 
benefits for redundancy currently stands at one year (Woodhead 2001: 23).
Yet another illustration (if one were needed) of the subtleties required in making just 
assignments of consequential responsibility, and of the ability of the inclusive theory to 
deliver plausible results (more so than its rivals), is the vexed question of whether society 
owes anything to non-wage-earning carers. Rakowski briefly considers this sort of case
238
in his Equal Justice: ‘the daughter who selflessly devotes much of her life to her parents 
and siblings’ (Rakowski 1991: 109). In assessing the redistributive claims of unpaid 
carers, Rakowski lights on the fact that carers typically identify with their choice as a 
reason against compensation.
However worthy some of us might deem a particular cause, and however 
admirable we might think its proponents, justice does not favor any creed, or 
aspiration, or lifestyle in allocating material goods of opportunities. Even if it 
would be misleading to say that people choose at least certain careers or 
endeavors -  those pursuits thrust upon them, perhaps inescapable from their 
perspective -  they nevertheless endorse the convictions that steer and motivate 
their efforts; they do not view them as curses they are unfortunately unable to 
shed, as afflictions they would rather sunder from their highest-order preferences 
and values. So long as they do not sincerely disapprove of the course they are 
following and genuinely desire to be rid of the ambitions that consign them to 
poverty, they have no right to assistance in fulfilling or discarding their aims. 
(Rakowski 1991: 109)
On the inclusive theory, however, the more fundamental aim is to find divisions of 
consequential responsibility that can be justified to each of those affected by them given 
the balance of reasons. And I think that from this broader perspective it is very much an 
open question whether it is reasonable to assign consequential responsibility to carers 
merely because they sincerely identify with that work.
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So, can a plausible case be made for supporting these individuals? In what follows I 
am going to focus on those who fail to earn a wage because they stay at home to care for 
their own children. I also want to concentrate on Anderson’s attempt to defend the policy 
of a carers’ subsidy on the basis of an alleged contribution that carers make to society. 
But before doing so I want first to address a tendency I find on the part of Anderson to 
overstate her case against luck egalitarianism.
In her article, “What is the Point of Equality?” Anderson claims that luck egalitarians 
do not have any basis for remedying injustices that attend female dependency on male 
wage earners (see Anderson 1999a: 298). To be more specific, Anderson asserts that a 
society regulated by luck egalitarian principles would leave non-wage-eaming women, 
who are dependent on male wage earners, ‘vulnerable to domination and exploitation 
within the relationship’ (Anderson 1999a: 324). This assertion, however, seems 
unmotivated. Not even Rakowski -  who generally takes a hard line on these matters -  
claims that distributive arrangements should be based solely on people’s voluntary 
choices and second-order identifications. There is no reason (at least, not one I can think 
of) why Rakowski cannot conclude that men and women are equally responsible for 
bringing children into the world and that, as such, carers have a right to a proportion of 
their partner’s income in recognition of the work they do. In fact the case for recognising 
the work of carers in the home has often been developed through the idea that carers are 
entitled to a share of their partner’s income or of the income of absent fathers (see, for 
example, Okin 1989: 180-182).
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A further argument offered by Anderson for socialising some of the costs of 
dependent care (through a carers’ subsidy) is that this might be necessary to enable 
women to free themselves from domination and exploitation within their relationships 
with men (see Anderson 1999: 324). Of course, Anderson is not alone in highlighting the 
difficulties faced by women in the home. In a recent article, “Democratizing Citizenship: 
Some Advantages of a Basic Income”, for example, Carole Pateman defends basic 
income partly on the premise that it offers women a degree of autonomy both within the 
structure of the family and in their interactions with other members of society (see 
Pateman 2004: esp. 91, 96). But once again it is not obvious that Rakowski is committed 
to denying this type of argument. Rakowski can accept that the injustice of female 
oppression is a valid reason in favour of unconditional basic income even if he denies the 
further claim that carers have a right to income from society in recognition of their work 
as carers.
That being said, where there is a genuine disagreement between Rakowski and 
Anderson is on the question of whether or not carers, seen as workers in household 
production, have a right to subsidy from the State in recognition of the work they do as 
carers. Rakowski’s position is that if somebody wants to take time out to care for another 
person, then she has no right of justice to remuneration over and above what the market 
(including charitable donations) would confer (see Rakowski 1991: 109). Anderson, on 
the other hand, believes that non-wage-eaming carers have a case for public funds in 
recognition of the contribution they make to the economy in addition to any claim they
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could make for a share of their partner’s or absent father’s income (see Anderson 1999: 
324).
What is this contribution? Anderson highlights two elements. The first is that carers 
raise the future workers of the economy. ‘As long as one doesn’t plan to commit suicide 
once the next generation enters the workforce, one can’t help but demand the labor 
services of future generations’ (Anderson 1999: 324). The key thought here is that a 
child-carers’ subsidy is justified because children whose mothers stay at home when they 
are young are more likely to be well-adjusted contributors to society, and we will depend 
on this fact in our dotage. In addition to this, Anderson emphasises the fact that carers 
free others to participate in the economy. ‘Fathers would not be so productive in the 
market if the non-wage-eaming or part-time working mothers of their children did not 
relieve them of so much of their responsibility to engage in direct caretaking’ (Anderson 
1999a: 323-4). Anderson’s point here is that if society benefits from the contribution of 
these fathers, then it does so only because of the contribution of carers. The conclusion 
we are supposed to draw from these two points is that social policies which fail to 
recognise the contribution of unpaid carers are unlikely to secure mutual justification 
among those concerned (Anderson 1999: 324).
There are echoes here of a feminist critique of Rawls’ difference principle. Some 
feminists have argued that the difference principle fails to give due consideration to the 
plight of non-wage-eaming carers in the home by its omission of care from the list of 
primary goods. The methodological background is Rawls’ veil of ignorance but the
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argument is similar: social policies which fail to recognise the contribution of unpaid 
carers are unlikely to secure the hypothetical agreement of people placed under conditions 
of freedom and equality. Eva Feder Kittay, for example, has argued that it would be 
eminently rational for parties behind the veil of ignorance to agree to principles that make 
provision for dependant-care, and, therefore, for those who take on the work of caring for 
dependants.
Regardless of how we fashion our conception of the good, we would want to be 
cared for when we are dependent and would want to be adequately supported if 
we find ourselves having to be responsible for the care of a dependant. (Kittay 
1997: 238)
I think that the above arguments are persuasive and not easily subsumed by existing 
theories of consequential responsibility. True, not every carer makes a ‘choice’ to 
become a carer in any plausible sense of the term. Many young women are brought up in 
an environment where that lifestyle is valued above all others and foisted upon them from 
an early age. Mason points out that this can be due to a combination of gender 
socialisation and unjust cultural norms (see Mason 2000: 243-4). Some women may even 
disavow the caring instinct that is instilled in them. However, even if every case can be 
described in this way, this gloss can capture the conviction that it is an unreasonable 
division of responsibility for carers to contribute to society (in the ways described by 
Anderson) but not receive income from society in recompense. There is a criterion of
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responsibility here that is irreducible to the choice/luck distinction, and it has to do with 
the idea that we should not free-ride on the efforts of others.
Indeed, saying that carers are owed assistance from government as compensation for 
doing a job they did not choose to do, and would prefer not to do, seems a distinctly odd 
way to justify a carers’ subsidy. If the case for government intervention relies on this 
argument, then presumably a far more suitable form of assistance would be to allow such 
women to go out to work and pay others to care for their children. Or else, to offer 
women counselling to help them eschew the caring-instinct they wish they did not have. 
This would undo the injustice that sees caring work arrogated predominantly to women. 
In this way, then, perhaps the choice theorist fails to apply his own criterion coherently.
The present argument for a carers’ subsidy, then, is that whether or not carers choose 
the life they lead, others should not be permitted by the proposed division of 
consequential responsibility to free-ride on their efforts. Naturally, some taxpayers might 
try to disclaim they have ever benefited from the non-wage-eaming work of carers 
personally. But the important factor here is that people often benefit from the unpaid 
efforts of others in ways that they are unaware of but might be willing to recognise if the 
contribution is made plain to them. However, I also need to mention at this stage the fact 
that there might be different beliefs about which policy gives best expression to concerns 
about unpaid carers in the home. Pateman notes that feminists might be expected to 
strongly support the introduction of basic income or a carers’ subsidy, but some feminists 
are critical of the idea as they believe that it would reinforce the existing sexual division
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of labour (see Pateman 2004: 100). In addressing the concerns of feminists, then, policy­
makers may also need to attend to the institutions of marriage and the family injustice is 
to be eliminated. As Anderson puts, ‘Equality may require a change in social norms, by 
which men as well as women would be expected to share in caretaking responsibilities’ 
(Anderson 1999: 324).
Be that as it may, I also think that it would be unreasonable for feminists to ignore 
entirely the fact that for some people caring is a voluntary choice, and that for many 
carers it is something they identity with very strongly. On this point the choice theorist 
and the identification theorist both have a plausible case to make. It is a consequence of 
the inclusive theory, therefore, that these reason must also be reflected in the policies we 
pursue. So how, if at all, can we marry together the reasons that support a carers’ subsidy 
and the fact that caring is to some degree a personal choice and a matter of personal 
identification? One option is a policy of co-responsibility whereby the carer is entitled to 
subsidy, but somewhat less than would compensate her fully for her contribution in order 
to reflect her personal responsibility.
One more illustration of the inclusive theory which I think repays scrutiny has to do 
with the basic dividend argument previously discussed in this chapter. According to this 
argument, each person has a right to an equal share of the earth’s natural resources simply 
by virtue of being an equal citizen of the earth. I think that this is an interesting 
argument, but it does invite the following criticism: why should taxpayers in general have 
to fund basic dividend payments for newcomers into the world, given the fact that not
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every taxpayer brings new people into the world. Children are not brought into the world 
by factors beyond our control, but by the behaviour of specific individuals. And this 
raises a question of liability concerning who should pay the basic dividend for new 
arrivals. As Rakowski puts it:
If new people just appeared in the world from time to time, like fresh boatloads 
of unwitting settlers, and did not owe their birth to the actions of present 
members of society, then the foregoing principles [that children ought to receive 
a share of the earth’s natural resources] would in fact come into play. But babies 
are not brought by storks whose whims are beyond our control. Specific 
individuals are responsible for their existence. It is therefore unjust to declare, as 
the above principles do, that because two people decide to have a child, or 
through carelessness find themselves with one, everyone is required to share their 
resources with the new arrival, and to the same extent as its parents. With what 
right can two people force all the rest, through deliberate behavior rather than bad 
brute luck, to settle for less than their fair shares after resources have been 
divided justly? If the cultivation of expensive tastes, or silly gambles, or any 
other intentional action cannot give rise to redistributive claims, how can 
procreation? (Rakowski 1991: 153)
Rakowski’s argument -  and it is surely a compelling one -  is that it is not possible to 
entirely side-step reasons that favour individual responsibility by appealing to other 
principles of distribution, in the present case the principle that citizens have a right to an
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equal share of the earth’s natural resources. Having said that, I do not think we can 
proceed from the foregoing argument about the personal responsibility of parents to the 
conclusion that there should be no collective responsibility for providing the basic 
dividend to all new arrivals. I am not seeking to highlight the fact that in many cases it 
would be misleading to say of parents that they made a deliberate choice to bring new 
children into the world. Nor am I raising the detail that there are good reasons why we 
would not want officials to pursue these sorts of questions -  to do with whether someone 
decided to have a child or did so through carelessness or some other reason -  which are 
that these are potentially intrusive and offensive questions. Rather, my point is that there 
may be additional reasons that support collective responsibility even in the face of the 
personal responsibility of parents. Let us consider one standard reason.
One argument for asking society as a collective body to assume responsibility for 
guaranteeing a basic dividend for all children rests on the idea that we want all children to 
have equal opportunities in life. Whereas insisting on the principle that parents should 
bear the consequences of their own choices has the implication that children bom to poor 
parents will end up without the same financial backing as children bom to more affluent 
parents, the goal of giving every child an equal start in life entails that society as a 
collective body must step in to pay the dividend wherever necessary. This type of 
position is defended by Dworkin. Dworkin points out that from the perspective of the 
child it is a matter of brute luck to be bom to affluent or poor parents. Thus, Dworkin 
suggests that responsibility for paying an income to poor families should be replicated on 
a hypothetical insurance market. The question is this: how much insurance, and on what
247
terms, would we as prudent guardians recommend that children purchase against the 
possibility of being bom to poor parents on the understanding that a wage should be 
offered to carers without other sources of income and the cost of insurance repaid by each 
child at a later date on some suitable instalment plan? (see Dworkin 2000: 339).
Dworkin, then, puts the emphasis on social insurance as a practical solution to the 
problem of child poverty. However, it should be pointed out that on the inclusive theory 
some weight must still be given to the fact of personal responsibility on the part of 
parents themselves. Accordingly, it seems to me that reasonableness requires some form 
of co-responsibility. One way to achieve co-responsibility might be to say that adults 
who voluntarily bring children into the world are entitled to receive only some help from 
society as a whole in providing a basic dividend to these children. And if any taxpayers 
still have reasonable concerns about negligent parents free-riding on collective 
responsibility, finer adjustments to the policy of co-responsibility could be introduced to 
reflect the individual behaviour of parents. Had these adults taken sufficient steps to save 
enough money to cover an extended period without a wage? If the pregnancy was 
unplanned, had they taken contraceptive precautions? Now the child is here, are they 
taking steps to earn enough money to be self-reliant? In so far as it is right to speak of 
individual responsibility in these cases, these are the sorts of questions taxpayers could be 
entitled to ask. And if parents fail to live up to the foregoing standards, taxpayers might 
have reasonable grounds to reduce the level of public subsidy accordingly.
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B. Smokers
The issue of who should pay the cost of treating smoking related diseases is no less 
complicated, but well worth investigating because the reasons in play appear to run in 
reverse to what has hitherto been considered in the case of income and employment. 
Recall from chapter 3 my point about the lack of choice exhibited by many smokers -  
often people take up this habit when they are young and arguably before they can be held 
responsible for their actions; many older smokers became addicted when there was still 
ignorance about the medical risks; many people remain smokers due to the powerful 
addictive quality of cigarettes. Taking these factors into account, the criterion of choice- 
sensitivity would seem to imply that very few, if any, smokers should bear the expected 
medical costs associated with their habit. The case for collective responsibility, on the 
other hand, is hard to get off the ground. Let us consider some possibilities.
It is hard to make the argument that we should collectivise the cost of treating 
smoking-related diseases on grounds of real security for smokers. Whilst it is true that it 
will give smokers real security if the costs are held in common and cigarettes are not 
taxed, smokers will also have this security if there is a special tax on the price of each 
packet of cigarettes that forces smokers to pay for medical insurance themselves. Does 
this mean smokers are being denied the real freedom to live as they want to? Though the 
costs of medical treatment are not insignificant, the burden to the individual smoker of 
paying a tax every time he purchases a packet of cigarettes does not seem prohibitive. 
Perhaps not something that is going to limit his real freedom disproportionately. The
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reality is that smokers will not be any more unable to live as they wish to live in the event 
that responsibility is assigned individually than non-smokers will be unable to live as they 
wish to live if responsibility is assigned collectively. Smokers are not a special case in 
that sense. This means, in effect, that even if we believe that real security and real 
freedom should be distributed according to the criteria of sufficiency, maximin or even 
simple equality, it does not follow that the costs of smoking should be collectivised. It 
does not seem that imposing the tax would produce less real security and real freedom 
overall, or lead to an unacceptable distribution of real security and real freedom.
Of course, putting a tax on cigarettes could make some smokers more inclined to buy 
illegally imported tax free cigarettes. And this may be unfair to those smokers who 
choose to buy legal cigarettes. But it is difficult to move from this worry about illegal 
imports and fairness between smokers to the conclusion that we should not impose the 
tax. The fact that some people are able to escape personal responsibility by breaking the 
law is a practical objection that does not impugn the principle.
Why compel smokers to pay for their own insurance rather than letting them make 
the choice and denying them aid later? In order to answer this question it might be 
appropriate to appeal to paternalistic reasons and reasons to do with the public interest. 
The fact is that smoking can cause irreversible health problems. Even with adequate 
health insurance, people are more likely to be healthier and live longer if they do not 
smoke. And arguably it is in smokers’ best interest to have insurance. Perhaps this is one 
instance where it is acceptable to force people to do what they would probably accept is
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in their own best interest. In order to add further weight to the argument in favour of 
imposing the tax it should not be forgotten that the ‘public interest’ argument in the case 
of smoking has to do not just with the health of smokers themselves but also with the 
health of passive smokers.
All of this means, therefore, that whereas the criterion of choice (or lack of choice) 
supports collective responsibility, other criteria do not. So what should we do? 
According to the inclusive theory, our aim should be to establish a reasonable division of 
consequential responsibility which, in the present case, seems to entail giving some 
weight to the lack of choice exhibited by many smokers but also some weight to reasons 
that do not support public subsidy. What might a reasonable balance be like? Again, I 
think the answer is likely to be some form of co-responsibility. One alternative is if the 
State forces the smoker to bear some of the costs of the risks he takes -  perhaps by way of 
a tax on each packet of cigarettes -  but not the full costs. This means cigarette tax should 
be pitched to produce funds somewhat below the full cost structure. In addition to this, 
the State could do something to support the efforts of those smokers who wish to try and 
quit. Government-owned hospitals and clinics could, for example, provide subsidised 
nicotine patches or time with hypnotists to those who wish to try and quit. Smokers 
could be asked to pay some of these costs but not all.
It is perhaps interesting to compare what I have said about consequential 
responsibility for the costs of smoking with something Cohen -  the leading choice
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theorist -  has written about when society should and should not subsidise the efforts of 
individuals who want to try to overcome their disadvantages.
When deciding whether or not justice (as opposed to charity) requires 
redistribution, the egalitarian asks if someone with a disadvantage could have 
avoided it or could now overcome it. If he could have avoided it, he has no claim 
to remedy or mitigation from an egalitarian point of view. If he could not have 
avoided it but could now overcome it, then he can ask that his effort to overcome 
it be subsidized . . .  (Cohen 1989: 920)
I think that Cohen is right to some extent to draw attention to the issue of whether or not a 
person could have avoided a disadvantage he now faces (in this case smoking). But I also 
think the argument for helping an individual to overcome his disadvantage does not rest 
entirely on that issue. It seems to me that common intuitions can support subsidising the 
efforts of those who want to quit, even in the case of those who chose to start smoking. 
Let us consider some reasons.
Among the reasons for paying subsidies to everybody is that it is in everyone’s best 
interest to help and encourage those who want to try and quit, and sometimes it might be 
necessary to share the costs collectively in order to achieve this end. Another reason is 
that it is right that we should live in a world where everybody has enough real freedom to 
function as a normal human being and pursue his or her own conception of the good, and 
arguably the fact that smokers are addicted to nicotine could mean they lack the real
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freedom to do this. Subsidising their efforts to quit can be a way of giving them back this 
real freedom.
Yet another standard reason is that those who wish to quit do so because they 
disidentify with their habits and are prepared to make efforts to conquer their cravings as 
a consequence of that repudiation. In fact, there is evidence to suggest that Cohen 
himself accepts something like this amendment. In his “On the Currency of Egalitarian 
Justice” he suggests that, in some cases, instead of asking whether a person chose to have 
his cravings we can ask whether ‘he would choose not to have them if he could’ (Cohen 
1989: 937). Consequently, even if we accept that some people could have done more to 
avoid becoming smokers in the first place, the above reasons still support some level of 
subsidy if they now decide they want to try to quit.
C. Dangerous activities and occupations
It requires similarly complex reasoning to decide whether a person who knowingly 
engages in a dangerous activity or occupation has a right to collective remedy in the event 
that he or she suffers an injury. Consider first those people who like to play dangerous 
contact sports or climb mountains at weekends or take winter skiing trips or engage in 
other hazardous, thrill-seeking activities. Much depends on whether commercial 
insurance companies offer affordable packages for these activities (including emergency 
rescue, short-term medical treatment, and long-term physiotherapy where necessary). But
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in so far as the cost of commercial insurance is not prohibitive for most individuals, it is 
difficult to make a compelling case against expected individuals to pay for their own 
insurance themselves. To be sure, a further reason might be needed to support 
compulsory insurance, but on the question of who should pay, then it is hard to see 
beyond individual responsibility in these sorts of cases. As the choice theorist points out, 
injuries resulting from dangerous activities appear to be exemplary instances of bad 
‘option luck’ (see Rakowski 1991: 79).
Some might try to argue that the presence of voluntary choice does not support 
imposing full consequential responsibility in these types of cases because thrill-seekers 
make choices but do not choose the consequences of their choices. However, in reply to 
those who make this argument, it can be insisted that the various contingencies that 
determine who is injured and who is not are an integral part of the choice of the 
individual who knowingly takes the risk. People may or may not have a firm idea of the 
exact probabilities involved. So perhaps we cannot say that they choose the expected 
consequences. This might be unrealistic. Nevertheless, people who take these risks do so 
knowing that bad things could happen, which in turn implies that the consequences 
should not be detached from the choice. In other words, bearing the consequences of the 
choice seems bound up with the choice itself.
I freely admit that the exact link between choice and consequence needs further 
examination -  which it will receive in chapter 6 -  but for the moment the key point seems 
to be that if people freely and knowingly choose to take risks in playing dangerous
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contact sports or climbing mountains at weekends common intuitions seem to suggest 
that they should be willing to bear the costs themselves.
In the case of thrill-seekers, then, the choice theorist seems to be quite right to argue 
that the presence of choice carries a great deal of weight. However, contrary to the choice 
theorist, I believe that the balance of reasons slides in the opposite direction when we are 
talking about agents who run the risk of serious injury whilst working to protect public 
safety and this is what I want to investigate now.
Consider the examples of soldiers, fire-fighters, police officers, and ambulance 
workers. The question we must ask ourselves it this: can it be reasonable to force to these 
individuals to bear the consequences of their choices if they are injured as a result of their 
work? Anderson certainly believes that the risks taken by these workers should not be 
interpreted as ‘option luck’. She claims that not offering free medical treatment to 
soldiers, police officers, fire-fighters, and ambulance workers would fail the test of 
interpersonal justification.
It cannot be just to designate a work role in the division of labor that entails such 
risks and then assign a package of benefits to performance in the role that fails, 
given the risks, to secure the social conditions of freedom to those who occupy 
the role. The principle “let us be served by occupations so inadequately 
compensated that those in them shall lack the means necessary to secure their
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freedom, given the risks and conditions of their work” cannot survive the test of
interpersonal justification. (Anderson 1999: 323)
Anderson’s thought seems to be that benefits packages assigned to dangerous occupations 
must leave those engaged in them With access to the same level of basic functioning as 
those whom they are risking their health and safety to protect. The underlying argument, 
then, is based on Anderson’s own criterion of sufficiency of capabilities: that people are 
entitled to whatever capabilities are necessary to function as human beings and equal 
citizens.
I think that Anderson has given a plausible interpretation here of what is required, as 
an absolute minimum, for a reasonable division of responsibility. But also think that 
there are more specific reasons for collectivising the costs of medical treatment for these 
workers besides a general point about sufficiency. One reason rests on concerns about 
the lack of opportunity that makes some groups of individuals more likely to accept these 
types of jobs than other groups. One example of this type of concern focuses on the fact 
that in the United States disproportionately large numbers of African-Americans join the 
armed forces as compared to their white counterparts. Some might argue it is because of 
lack of equal opportunity and racial discrimination that many young African-Americans, 
especially those living in deprived areas, are left with the choice of taking these types of 
low-paid, dangerous jobs or else remaining unemployed. In so far as this represents an 
unjust distribution of background opportunities for employment, it might be unjust to
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insist that individuals who do accept these jobs bear all the consequences themselves. An 
obvious policy solution would be better health care for veterans.
Another fairly obvious source of support for collective responsibility arises from the 
fact that everyone has an interest in real security and these workers create real security. 
This argument has more than one element. We can mention the real security of the 
workers themselves: whether or not if we insist on individual responsibility, people can 
engage in this work with adequate levels of real security. But we can also mention the 
real security of society as a whole: whether or not it is in the interests of society to insure 
individuals who engage in such activities. The basic idea is that we can maximise overall 
real security by asking society as a collective body to assume responsibility for the costs 
of insurance for these workers.
To be successful, this justification for holding the costs of insurance in common must 
have the following three elements at least (corresponding to the three elements listed in 
my brief description of utilitarianism earlier in the chapter): (1) that collective 
responsibility for the injuries suffered by these workers greatly increases their real 
security; (2) that it greatly increases the real security of those people whose lives and 
property might not be saved if responsibility is not collectivised; (3) that it very little 
diminishes the real security of taxpayers to pay for public assistance.
Why not let these workers pay for their own insurance themselves and maximise real 
security in that way? This question makes plain the fact that the above argument rests on
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further empirical assumptions about what is and what is not required to induce people to 
accept dangerous jobs. It could be the case, in some societies, that individuals cannot be 
induced to work as soldiers, police officers, fire-fighters, and ambulance workers unless 
insurance is included in the remuneration package itself. But this does not exclude the 
possibility that, in other societies, it will be possible to induce people to take these jobs, 
even without insurance, provided the salaries are increased to a point at which they can 
purchase their own insurance. This is especially true if people can purchase insurance 
more cheaply through commercial insurers. However, even if contingencies will 
determine whether or not insurance must be included within the remuneration package 
directly, rather than accounted for in the salary, it remains the case that in order to induce 
people to take these jobs it might be necessary for society to assume collective 
responsibility for the cost of insurance, one way or the other. If insurance is not included 
in the package and the salary is too low, people cannot afford to buy insurance, and only 
the desperate will accept the jobs. This pool of individuals might not be large enough or 
suitable enough to protect the public.
However, even if a society votes in favour of paying these workers a higher salary 
rather than providing insurance directly, reasons of paternalism might still support a 
compulsory minimum level of insurance. Even though these workers would be free to 
choose where to buy the minimum level of insurance and whether or not to buy coverage 
above the minimum level if they wish, they would be required to buy the minimum level. 
This argument rests on the claim that it is in everyone’s best interests (society and the 
individuals themselves) to live in a society where those who work to protect the public
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have access to adequate medical care so that they can return to their jobs as swiftly as 
possible after injury. This state of affairs might be put in jeopardy if some workers end 
up not buying adequate insurance coverage because it is not mandatory to do so.
That being said, there is no reason why a society cannot vote to give these workers 
free insurance at high levels of coverage from the start. This is not to say that a society 
must choose to do so, rather my point is that on the inclusive theory exactly how much 
weight is given to the claims of these types of workers is open to democratic 
interpretation. On the other hand, it is also consistent with the inclusive theory if a 
society decides to vote in favour of finer adjustments to consequential responsibility 
using more sophisticated applications of the relevant criteria. Let us consider one 
example.
Suppose a police officer has negligently injured himself a number of times whilst 
protecting the public safety. The rule of thumb might be that police officers should not 
jump off roofs just to capture petty thieves, but he has flouted this (and other similar) 
elementary safety precaution on many occasions. What happens if his insurance 
premiums go up? I do not think that it would be unjust for a society to decide that such a 
worker is not entitled to additional funds to compensate him for the increase in his 
insurance premiums. One obvious argument could be that it does not serve the public 
interest for individuals to take very high risks for apparently small gains. So, justice 
might imply that if someone fails to take due care, then he is entitled to receive somewhat 
less assistance from society than those who do take due care. Indeed, the idea that levels
259
of remedy or mitigation ought to take account of contributory negligence is standard 
practice in other spheres of justice, such as tort (see, for example, Atiyah 1997: 38-43; 
and Cane 1999: 44-50).
On the other hand, what if the police officer is regarded as being courageous? In this 
case society is left with a difficult conundrum. On the one hand, the public interest might 
suggest that he is not entitled to additional money if his insurance premiums increase as a 
consequence of his exploits. On the other hand, we might think that something is awry 
with treating him in this way because he has acted courageously. We need, then, to 
recognise the distinction between dividing consequential responsibility on the grounds of 
the public interest and imposing responsibility on the grounds of desert. That being said, 
on the inclusive theory, both types of reasons are integrated into consequential 
responsibility. Much depends on the society in question, of course, but it is consistent 
with the inclusive theory to say that a person is to some extent rightly held responsible for 
the consequences of his actions, but at the same time does not deserve to be held fully 
responsible. So, it would not be unjust if a society voted not to reduce (or to reduce very 
slightly) the compensation given to injured police-officers on grounds of contributory 
negligence.
We have seen, therefore, that whereas choice-sensitivity is the operative factor when 
discussing the responsibility of thrill-seekers, in the case of soldiers, police officers, fire­
fighters, and ambulance workers, reasons to do with equal opportunity, the public interest 
(with some qualifications), and desert seem to point far more in the direction of collective
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responsibility. And since the foregoing arguments about reasonableness incorporate but 
cannot be reduced to the choice/luck distinction and facts about second-order preference 
identification, these examples demonstrate once again the explanatory power of the 
inclusive theory.
There is, however, one more complication that needs attention. The public interest is 
a protean notion. When we are talking about the public interest that might be served 
society agreeing as a collective body to pay for the insurance required by soldiers, police 
officers, fire-fighters, and ambulance workers, arguably we are talking about the interests 
of virtually every member of society and perhaps, to a large extent, the interests of people 
as members of the society. Soldiers who work to neutralise threats to society and its way 
of life protect not just the interests of private individuals but also the interests of 
individuals qua citizens. However, we need to contrast the foregoing question about 
insurance for soldiers, police officers, fire-fighters, and ambulance workers with the 
question of insurance for workers in much narrower fields of security and danger.
Consider the example mountain rescue workers. If there is a public interest argument 
for society assuming collective responsibility for the costs of insurance in these cases 
(that is, medical insurance and life insurance for mountain rescue workers), then the 
phrase ‘public interest’ picks out, at most, a special interest of some members of the 
public, that is, an assignable group who benefit from the presence of mountain rescue 
teams. This could be those who use the mountains, but it could also include those with 
close friends and family members who use the mountains, or even those who work for
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companies and business which sell holidays to the mountains or manufacture specialist 
mountain clothing and equipment.
Furthermore, if there is to be collective responsibility because of the public interest 
argument, then this implies that the costs should be borne collectively only by those who 
use the mountains as opposed to society at large. This is because ‘the public interest’ in 
this case is a special interest of an assignable group. The case for sharing the costs more 
broadly rests on further arguments. I do not say that these additional arguments cannot be 
made, merely that they are required. One argument could be that people who do not 
benefit from mountain rescue teams should, all the same, contribute as a quid pro quo for 
benefiting from similar agencies such as the coast-guards (say). However, whether this 
assumption holds up will depend on each society and will not hold up if there are some 
people in a society who always benefit form the work of these sorts of agencies and some 
people who do not.
D. Natural disasters
Another set of cases worth exploring -  because they further underline the explanatory 
power of the inclusive theory -  involve individuals who knowingly choose to live and 
work in areas prone to natural disasters. Consistent with his views on other cases, 
Rakowski avers the principle that provided everyone has the same opportunity to live 
where they want to live, and plenty of information about the hazards associated with
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living in different areas, those who choose to live in dangerous areas are rightly held 
responsible for bad option luck:
If a citizen of a large and geographically diverse nation like the United States 
builds his home in a floodplain, or near the San Andreas fault, or in the heart of 
tornado country, then the risk of flood, earthquake, or crushing winds is one he 
chooses to bear, since those risks could be all but eliminated by living elsewhere. 
(Rakowski 1999: 79)
At first sight, Rakowski’s interpretation of the ethics of consequential responsibility 
seems quite persuasive when applied to these sorts of cases. If a person is aware of the 
risks of living in a dangerous geographical area, but is prepared to take the gamble, surely 
he cannot expect others to indemnify him against disaster. Nevertheless, his 
interpretation has been met with criticism by Anderson.
Anderson argues that whether or not it is right to offer compensation to the victims of 
natural disasters must depend on some assessment of the role people play in the economy, 
where the economy should be regarded as ‘a scheme of cooperative, joint production’ 
(see Anderson 1999a: 321). In the present case, this entails recognition of the intimate 
relationship between those who live and work in dangerous locations and those who 
consume the products. As she puts it:
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In regarding the division of labor as a comprehensive system of joint production, 
workers and consumers regard themselves as collectively commissioning 
everyone else to perform their chosen role in the economy. In performing their 
role in an efficient division of labor, each worker is regarded as an agent for the 
people who consume their products . . .  (Anderson 1999a : 322)
So, what does Anderson’s analysis say about those who choose to live and work near the 
San Andreas fault?
Rakowski argues that such residents should be excluded from federal disaster 
relief because they live there by choice. But they live there because other citizens 
have, through their demand for California products, commissioned them to 
exploit the natural resources in California. To deny federal disaster relief is to 
invoke the rejected principle above [let us be served by occupations so 
inadequately compensated that those in them shall lack the means necessary to 
secure their freedom, given the risks and conditions of their work], (Anderson 
1999a : 323)
I think that this is an interesting line of argument, but I also believe that it is more 
controversial than Anderson admits. For one thing, it is questionable to say the least that 
consumers commission producers to take risks on their behalf. Typically when 
consumers purchase goods (or place an order to purchase goods) they do not sign an 
agreement agreeing to pay for any injuries or losses the producer might have suffered (or
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might suffer) in the course of production. On the contrary, most consumers simply take it 
for granted that producers sell goods and services at a price that includes all the costs they 
are likely to incur in the process of production -  including the cost of insurance.
However, even if there is an implicit understanding that costs should be shared, there 
is an inconsistency in Anderson’s description of the relationship between producers and 
consumers. At one point in her analysis, Anderson contrasts people who engage in 
production in disaster prone areas such as near the San Andreas fault, with rich people 
who decide to build their luxury vacation homes in these same areas (Anderson 1999a: 
323n.82). She claims that producers in these cases should not have to bear the cost of 
insurance, because they are engaged in production and are commissioned to be there by 
people who purchase their products. Those who build their vacation homes in these 
areas, on the other hand, can with justice be compelled to pay a tax to cover the costs of 
disaster relief. This, according to Anderson, is because they ‘haven’t been commissioned 
by others to be there’ (Anderson 1999a: 323n.82). This differential treatment seems 
unmotivated by Anderson’s own ideal of a system of cooperative joint production, in 
which people collectively commission everyone else to perform their role.
To expand on this last point, Anderson sometimes depicts consumers as active 
participants in the economy, in the sense that they commission producers to take risks on 
their behalf. But then she also depicts consumers as inactive participants in the economy. 
When she considers the risks associated with living in disaster prone areas, Anderson 
claims that people who build their vacation homes in these areas have not been
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commissioned by others to be there, and so they must bear the cost of rebuilding their 
flattened vacation homes. Nevertheless, surely if producers in California have been 
commissioned to be there, this is equally true of people who build their vacation homes in 
these areas. They have been commissioned to be there by land owners wishing to sell as 
well as by property agents, construction companies, suppliers of building materials, local 
shops and by people offering to cleah swimming pools in the area. In which case, surely 
it would be more accurate to say that consumers and producers play an equally important 
role in the economy, which in turn implies that if society has any special duties in respect 
of insuring people in hazardous geographic locations, then the duty applies equally to 
consumers as well as producers.
In addition to all this, I think that reasonableness demands at least some policy 
recognition of the quite correct point, insisted on by Rakowski, that living and working in 
these areas is a voluntary choice. This countervailing reason cannot just be ignored. In 
the ends, therefore, the inclusive theory has the implication that responsibility for the 
costs of insurance should be shared between those who live and work in hazardous 
geographical areas and those who do not. This implies that if people voluntarily choose 
to live and work in areas prone to natural disasters, then they should have access to some 
level of subsidy for the higher insurance premiums they face, but must bear some 
proportion of the higher costs themselves in so far as the risks they have taken are 
voluntary risks. Of course, this would not apply to those groups of people who are forced 
onto hazardous land because others have stolen their own land.
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Once again, however, finer adjustments to responsibility are also consistent with 
justice. For example, whilst it might be reasonable to hold some costs in common, it may 
not be in the public interest for people to take just any risks and expect others to fund 
compensation through general taxation without taking into account the amount of risk 
that has been taken. In so far as a compelling case can be made for pooling risks, 
therefore, it is plausible to say that any level of subsidy should be sensitive to the 
following co-responsibility proviso: that both producers and consumers take precautions 
to reduce the risk of injury and destruction of property. It is consistent with this proviso 
to say that some geographical areas are so often ravaged by natural disasters, where the 
cost of relief and reconstruction are so great, and where precautions are so difficult and 
costly, that it is reasonable to expect people to avoid living and working in these areas 
altogether. Those who then decided to flout these prescriptions would certainly have a 
claim to a much smaller percentage of their costs (if any) in the event of disaster than 
those in other areas. Again, the exact amount would depend on voters.
E. Expensive tastes
It has been in the context of finding dimensions of interpersonal comparison that can 
be used to specify what citizens’ claims are when questions of distributive justice arise, 
that some writers have discarded welfare as possible grounds for redistribution. As 
previously outlined in chapter 4, Dworkin thinks that one reason why it is right to force 
individuals to bear the consequences of their own expensive tastes is because they
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typically identify with those tastes. Cravings and obsessions, on the other hand, with 
which people do not identify, are treated as psychological handicaps and are compensable 
on grounds of bad luck. Contrary to Dworkin, however, I think there are other reasons 
that support public subsidies even for expensive tastes that people do identify with. 
Moreover, I do not think these reasons are exhausted by the sorts of cases highlighted by 
Ameson and Cohen in which the taste or preference is itself unchosen. (In these cases 
people are victims of bad luck in the sense that it is part of their constitution that they 
happen to dislike the cheap staples of their society.)
It seems to me that it is possible to make a case for subsidy for expensive tastes on 
the basis that the expense of the taste is not something that lies within a person’s control 
whether or not it is itself unchosen. Even if people typically identify with their tastes and 
preferences, very rarely do people with expensive tastes identify with their tastes because 
they are expensive. This is why Louis is an unusual case. Whilst it seems to destroy the 
point of Louis’ tastes for society to give him free champagne, this is far from obviously 
the case for other types of expensive tastes and preferences. My belief that I should eat 
organically grown foods, my conviction that I have a duty to visit Mecca, my passion for 
saving rare types of buildings, my preference for opera -  all these tastes and preferences 
are developed by me on the basis of my thoughts and feelings about what is important in 
life. The fact that they are expensive to satisfy here and now in my society is not intrinsic 
to why I identify with them and, what is more, the various factors of supply and demand 
which make them expensive lie entirely beyond my control. Even if we assume that I had 
control over the development of these tastes and preferences and that, even now, I would
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not choose to take a free and harmless pill to get rid of them, it does not follow that they 
are uncompensable.
At this point, the reader might well ask: where does the inclusive theory fit into all of 
this? This is because the foregoing points seem to follow from the choice theory, if 
applied consistently. If we take the choice/luck distinction seriously, then the fact that I 
suffer from bad luck in supply and demand warrants some level of redistribution in my 
favour. However, I think that the inclusive theory can add further layers of sophistication 
to the analysis of expensive taste examples. This is because other reasons (besides the 
fact that people with expensive tastes suffer bad luck) might support a level of collective 
responsibility for the cost of satisfying expensive tastes.
Most people think that real freedom of consumption is an important part of life and 
some may even believe that what matters most is happiness and preference satisfaction. 
From here it is a not a great distance to the claim that justice requires that we try to 
suffice, maximin, or even maximise real freedom of consumption and/or welfare. 
Furthermore, in some feasible scenarios, in order to achieve one or other of these 
outcomes it might be necessary for society as a collective body to pay subsidies to people 
with expensive tastes. I suspect that these principles of social responsibility are more 
controversial than others we can think of, but they are far from being counter-intuitive or 
beyond the pale.
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Bringing these points together, the mere mention of the fact that people typically 
identify with their tastes and preferences does not make it bizarre to offer compensation 
or subsidy. Nor does this fact automatically banish diametrically opposed criteria from 
the debate -  criteria which support public subsidies designed to achieve a better 
distribution of welfare and real freedom within society. So, in the end, there are plenty of 
reasons that do support public subsidy even if the criteria of choice-sensitivity and 
preference identification do not.
Assuming, therefore, that it is right to give all of the aforementioned reasons some 
degree of weight, co-responsibility is a way of achieving a balance between the reasons. 
There may be a range of co-responsibility policies, but one obvious policy is that if an 
agent develops expensive tastes and is unable to satisfy his tastes fully as a result, he will 
be entitled to receive some subsidy from society but somewhat less than would enable 
him to satisfy his tastes entirely. This strategy reflects both the reasons that point towards 
individual responsibility and the reasons that point towards collective responsibility. 
According to the inclusive theory, the exact level of co-responsibility is rightly a matter 
for democratic decision-making.
F. Access to university education and lifelong learning
Thus far I have commented very little on the interest in possessing opportunities. 
One sphere where this interest has obvious application is education. Consider first the
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vexed question of tuition fees for university students. One feature of the popular 
justification for asking students to take out loans to cover the cost of tuition fees and 
living expenses is that, on average, graduates earn more than non-graduates. This 
argument is, of course, contingent on circumstances. Higher education is a gamble that 
does not always pay off: not everyone earns more as a result of going to university. 
Nevertheless, the choice theorist will argue that if a person freely decides, in the light of 
all the information, to risk student debt in gambling for increased future earnings, then he 
or she has no right to compensation if the gamble turns out to be a bad one. This is just 
bad option luck. However, one possible way to make a case for pooling the costs of a 
university education across society as a whole is by focusing on the criterion of equal 
opportunity.
The criterion of equal opportunity most obviously comes into play where some 
people are less likely to take the university gamble because they come from poor families. 
Perhaps they are less likely to take the gamble because without financial backing from 
parents they are forced to take on larger debts and, what is more, they have little hope of a 
financial safety-net if the gamble does not pay off. At first glance, these pre-university 
differences are examples of compensable brute luck. The crucial point is that even if we 
view the contingencies that determine people’s economic fortunes once they leave 
university as a matter of ‘option luck’ and, consequently, the responsibility of the 
individual, the contingencies that determine people’s economic fortunes before they enter 
university (that is, the size of the gamble they are faced with) cannot easily been glossed 
over in the same way. There may be more than one appropriate conclusion to draw from
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all of this, but certainly one conclusion is that differences in family wealth are 
unacceptable obstacles to university entry and so we should mitigate some of the costs of 
poorer students.
Another educational sphere where it might be unreasonable to impose full 
consequential responsibility on individuals is adult education (or lifelong learning). To 
see this point, consider two different policies for distributing educational resources and 
opportunities. One policy aims to offer every child, at the public expense, educational 
resources and opportunities so that when they reach the age of 16 they have the chance of 
sitting for formal or vocational qualifications and performing well enough to get a job or 
attend university. Beyond this point, however, there would be no further requirement to 
offer educational resources and opportunities. Although some people make full use of the 
resources and opportunities offered and obtain good results, and others are less willing 
and either do not sit for the qualifications or put in such little effort that they achieve 
extremely poor results, under the proposed policy there is no further distribution of 
educational resources and opportunities, even if the second group of individuals later 
regret their earlier behaviour and would like to have a second chance. In contrast to this, 
a second policy offers people lifelong opportunity for learning. As before, educational 
resources and opportunities are distributed in such a way that every child has a chance of 
gaining good qualifications at the age of 16. Nevertheless, even if some children fail to 
grasp their opportunities whilst at school -  including not sitting for any exams, and sitting 
exams but not putting in any effort -  they still have access to free education and training 
later on in life, should they so desire.
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Reflecting on the choice between these two policies highlights the fact that there are 
two ways of being sensitive to individual responsibility. One issue is whether or not we 
should be concerned to ensure that everyone achieves the same outcome or simply that 
they have equal opportunity. In this case we want to know if individuals have a right to a 
job or a university place, or, on the other hand, a right to the opportunity to acquire 
qualifications that will enable them to secure a job or a university place. A second issue 
is whether people should enjoy equal opportunity just once during the course of their 
lifetime or at recurrent intervals. In the present case we want to know if individuals 
should have the right to additional educational resources and opportunities if they fail to 
make good use of them the first time around. The first issue has to do with the distinction 
between outcome and opportunity. The second issue has to do with the longevity of 
opportunity. Whilst the first policy described just now is responsibility-sensitive in both 
these senses, the second policy is only responsibility-sensitive in the first sense. So which 
policy is best?
To answer this question it is well worth considering a recent debate between two 
leading lights of the British Labour Party (old and new). In July of 1996, Roy Hattersley 
wrote a piece in The Guardian advocating equality of outcome as a goal of social justice. 
In his reply to Hattersley in the August of that year, Gordon Brown dismissed equality of 
outcome as ‘impossibilism’, and argued instead for ‘opportunity for all’. Brown may 
have wanted to ally himself with egalitarian thinking at that time which, due to the work
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of Dworkin and others, had become responsibility-sensitive. Nevertheless, Brown’s idea 
of opportunity for all is responsibility-sensitive only up to a point:
In contrast to Roy Hattersley’s unattainable version of equality of outcomes, I 
propose a maximalist version of equality of opportunity which is both desirable 
and possible. A maximalist equality of opportunity is not the old-style equality 
of opportunity, the one-off, pass-fail educational chance until 16 at school that if 
lost means a lifetime of failure. The equality of opportunity I support is 
recurrent, lifelong and comprehensive. (Brown 1996: 13)
I think that there is something compelling about what Brown says in the foregoing 
passage. Why so? One reason to reject a policy of one-off, pass-fail educational 
opportunity is that children cannot make responsibility-attracting choices: that a child 
cannot be held responsible for the rest of his life for mistakes he made when he could not 
understand the consequences of his actions (see Barry 2005: 136-7). In addition to this, 
however, I think that it is well worth examining what would or would not be a reasonable 
division of responsibility (in terms of who should bear the costs of adult education) from 
a broader perspective; broader, that is, than the narrow issue of whether or not young 
people can be said to ‘choose’ not to make an effort at school.
This broader perspective is necessary in order to reflect common disagreements about 
what are reasonable and just divisions of social responsibility. On the one hand, the 
uneducated adult says that it was not his fault that he did not work as a child. He should
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not be held responsible for the consequences of his childhood errors, he did not make a 
genuine choice. Yet in reply to this the educated high-earning taxpayer says that he 
should not have to pay for the mistakes of others, that he deserves to reap the rewards of 
his own hard work. Why should others ffee-ride on his efforts? In order to judge whether 
the disgruntled taxpayer has sufficient grounds on which to reject a proposal to 
collectivise the costs of lifelong learning, we also need to compare how onerous it is for 
taxpayers to have to pay for other people’s education with just how onerous it is for 
individuals who fail to make good use of their opportunities at 16 to be denied a second 
chance. In short, we need to do some utilitarian thinking on this issue, weighing up the 
benefits and burdens on both sides.
For those on the political right it scarcely needs mentioning that adult education is not 
cheap and that the cost to the taxpayer is far from negligible. But clearly there is also 
much at stake for those who failed at school the first time around. A good set of 
qualifications and/or work-related training offers individuals not only the ability to earn a 
decent wage but also the possibility of self-respect and a degree of real freedom to pick 
and choose what type of employment to accept. There may be a social stigma attached to 
lacking skills and qualifications that causes feelings of shame. The financial burden of 
adult education, when imposed on those who need it most, can also be very great. Indeed, 
it is not just the initial cost of an educational course or training programme that needs to 
be taken into account. The opportunity cost of taking time off work to study can also 
make it very difficult for low-eamers to pay for their own education. People can, of 
course, borrow money for this purpose. But this gamble, like that of a university
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education, might not pay off. And this may cause some individuals not to make the 
effort, which might in turn harm the economy by reducing competition for jobs. The 
upshot of all this is that it might be just from a utilitarian point of view to collectivise the 
costs of adult education where this is justified in terms of the goal of maximising the 
overall amount of self-respect, real freedom, and wealth in society. •
If asking people to pay for their own education is unjustifiable from a utilitarian point 
of view, it is even worse from a prioritarian perspective. Prioritarians believe that 
burdens are more problematic if they fall on those who already worse off and this seems 
to be the case with adult education. Not only is the bare cost of adult education likely to 
be greater when imposed individually rather than collectively, but also the moral 
significance of that cost is greater when imposed individually because it is imposed on 
those who are already the least advantaged in society. And so the criterion of weighted 
utilitarianism (that is to say, prioritarianism) might well support lightening the burden on 
individuals for the cost of adult education so that the least advantaged can benefit from 
education later on in life.
Despite all of these points, however, there may still be reasons on the side of 
taxpayers against holding these costs fully in common. One reason is the proposition that 
for some people not doing well at school the first time around was a choice. Another 
reason is that even if we accept the principle of priority to the least advantaged, this does 
not mean that benefits to the worse off could not be outweighed by sufficiently great 
benefits to everyone else. There may come a level at which subsidy for lifelong learning
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is no longer in the general interest. Consequently, according to the inclusive theory, a 
reasonable policy might be to share responsibility between those individuals who want to 
return to education and society as a collective body.
One obvious policy is that if an individual decides to go back into education later on 
in life, he will be entitled to receive some subsidy from society but somewhat less than 
would enable him to return to school without any cost to himself. Once again, finer 
adjustments could be appropriate as the costs change. So, for example, as the costs of 
subsidy increase and the benefits to society of adult education decrease so the public 
interest argument for subsidy becomes less powerful. Even so, it is consistent with 
justice that the exact level of subsidy depends on the democratic decision-making of each 
society.
Let us take stock of the chapter so far. My aim in introducing the many examples 
discussed above has been to motivate the inclusive theory as a necessary and plausible 
approach to concrete examples of responsibility attribution. I have tried to show that 
justice requires a broad understanding of what is reasonable, rather than a formal 
distinction such as between choice and luck. Whilst formal distinctions can play a part, 
there is much else besides. And the inclusive theory is the only theory to account for all 
the many complexities that we have seen. That being said, in order to make good my 
case for the inclusive theory I need to consider some possible replies on behalf of the 
choice theorist, and this is exactly what I intend to do in the now.
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5.5 REPLIES: TH E CHOICE VIEW AGAIN
One strategy open to the choice theorist might be to insist that the inclusive theory does 
not have a monopoly on co-responsibility outcomes. He can remind the reader -  quite 
correctly -  that, on his view, voluntary choice is a matter of degree, and since choice is a 
matter of degree, responsibility must also be a matter of degree between individual and 
collective responsibility (see, for example, Cohen 1989: 934). Perhaps in the end the 
proportions will be on par with the inclusive theory.
My response to this manoeuvre is to stress that despite what the choice theorist says, 
it is still consistent with his view for responsibility not to be shared at all. On his view, 
the genesis of a person’s misfortune could be entirely down to voluntary choice or 
entirely down to brute luck. And so, responsibility could in principle be assigned entirely 
to the individual or entirely to society as a whole. This means that the outcomes 
delivered by the choice theory could be at variance with the inclusive theory and, more 
importantly, with common intuitions. However, even if the genesis of personal 
misfortune is mixed in every case, my second response is that the choice theorist still 
does not arrive at co-responsibility for the right reasons in those cases. If by chance the 
choice view does frequently deliver some form of co-responsibility outcome, its 
justification for that outcome will inevitably be incomplete because it trades on an 
impoverished theory of the reasons in play; or so I think.
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Of course, at this point the choice theorist could try to attack the inclusiveness of the 
rival theory both in terms of the type and sheer number of reasons brought in. He could 
suggest that the alleged counter examples confirm merely that responsibility (understood 
in terms of the choice/luck distinction) is not the only thing that matters in disputes over 
distributive justice and not that his is the wrong theory of responsibility. In other words, 
the choice theorist could stick to his view that questions of consequential responsibility 
are rightly resolved in terms of the choice/luck distinction by asserting that the various 
reasons introduced above are separate from the question of responsibility properly 
construed. He is not required to refute that these are reasons of justice. He need only 
deny that they are appropriately introduced and dealt with under the heading 
‘responsibility-attribution’. According to this reply, the inclusive theory is not a theory of 
consequential responsibility at all but a tangle of different norms and values that should in 
fact be kept apart.
Some might wonder if this second reply is splitting hairs. If both sides of the debate 
accept that ultimately more than one value should be weighed on the scales of egalitarian 
justice, does it really matter whether responsibility is defined purely in terms of choice 
rather than more inclusively? But I think that it does make a difference how we analyse 
consequential responsibility and, furthermore, that the inclusive theory is the correct 
theory. The inclusive theory allows us to say of someone who does not earn a wage from 
her work as a carer, for example, that she cannot reasonably be held fully responsible for 
being poor because her poverty flows partly from the fact that others free-ride on her 
efforts (she does a socially beneficial job that is unremunerated in the free market). From
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a moral point of view it is not entirely her fault that she is poor. The choice theorist, by 
contrast, is likely to have to say that whilst she is responsible for being poor because she 
chose to be a carer, she is nevertheless entitled to funds which reflect her contribution to 
society. This reading of her responsibility seems to me to be misleading and so I favour 
inclusive responsibility. The merit of the inclusive theory is that it allows us to attribute 
or waive consequential responsibility on the basis of a full normative description of a 
person’s situation.
A third possible reply focuses on the balancing act embodied in the inclusive theory. 
The choice theorist might claim that the inclusive theory is inferior because it relies on 
potentially irresolvable disputes about how the competing factors should be weighed and 
so cannot deliver determinate pronouncements about responsibility. Now, I freely admit 
that a range of outcomes will be consistent with the inclusive theory in any given case. 
But it is worth briefly mentioning that even on the choice view there may be difficulties 
in arriving at determinate outcomes. These difficulties are epistemological: there are 
limits to our knowledge of metaphysical facts. So, at first glance the choice view appears 
to have an advantage in the fact that it is non-judgmental about how people should 
behave and instead relies on non-moral metaphysical facts about choice and luck. Yet 
there is no saying that these metaphysical facts will be any less controversial than the 
moral judgements involved in the inclusive theory.
However, even if the inclusive theory does deliver looser judgements than its rival, a 
further point that needs to be made clear is that this is not necessarily a reason to reject
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the theory as false. In order to motivate this counter argument, I want to pick up on an 
argument recently developed by Dworkin in response to Cohen. In his work on the 
currency of egalitarian justice, Cohen has argued that developing fair assignments of 
consequential responsibility is rightly viewed as a metaphysical enterprise and, moreover, 
that holding individuals responsible for the consequences of their actions is incompatible 
with the philosophical theory of hard determinism. According to Cohen, to the extent 
that hard determinism is true, no person should be held responsible for differential 
advantage (see Cohen 1993: 28; see also Ameson 1989: 86). As he ironically puts it: ‘We 
may indeed be up to our necks in the free will problem, but that is just “tough luck’” 
(Cohen 1989: 934). Dworkin, however, rejects this suggestion. He maintains instead that 
people commonly accept responsibility for outcomes that reflect their personalities and 
they do so without assuming they have full control over the content of their own 
personalities (see, for example, Dworkin 2000: pp. 6, 294). Indeed, according to 
Dworkin:
The distinction between choice and circumstances is not only familiar in first- 
person ethics but is essential to it. We might think ourselves persuaded, 
intellectually, of the philosophical thesis that people have no free will, and that 
we are no more causally responsible for our fate when it is the upshot of our 
choices than when it flows only from a handicap or from society’s distribution of 
wealth. But we cannot lead a life out of that philosophical conviction. We 
cannot plan or judge our lives except by distinguishing what we must take
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responsibility for, because we chose it, and what we cannot take responsibility for 
because it was beyond our control. (Dworkin 2000: 323)
I think there is something importantly right about what Dworkin says about the problem 
of free will. What is right is that our common sense understanding of consequential 
responsibility does not appear to presuppose any contested metaphysical assumptions 
about free will but is, instead, a normative conception. And if this is the case, then it is 
the inclusive theory that has an explanatory advantage over the choice view and not vice 
versa.
I have now considered three theories of consequential responsibility based on the criteria 
of the choice/luck distinction, personality, and reasonableness respectively. In chapters 3 
and 4 I tried to motivate the claim that the first two theories are too crude to bear the 
weight of our common intuitions in respect of the examined cases, and that to explain 
these intuitions we must appeal to a broader range of criteria than choice, luck, and 
second-order preference identification. A number of additional criteria have been 
outlined and defended in chapter 5. Furthermore, I have endeavoured to show that in 
many concrete cases reasonableness has the implication that responsibility should be 
shared between individuals and society as collective body. In addition to this, I have also
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attempted to establish the point that democratic decision-making is indispensable to 
realising determinate policies in this area.
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6 INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE GOOD LIFE
Thus far the discussion has focused on theories of consequential responsibility that focus 
exclusively on justice. I have argued that whether, and to what extent, it is just to hold 
individuals responsible for their own disadvantages depends on whether this division of 
responsibility is reasonable understood in terms of what can be justified to those 
concerned taking into account their interests. At this stage in the argument, however, I 
might face the objection that my analysis has ignored other grounds for imposing (or not 
imposing) consequential responsibility which, though not desiderata of justice, might 
nevertheless be important. One potential point of departure from justice-centred theories 
of responsibility is the idea that responsibility is a part of human flourishing. A second 
potential point of departure is the idea that people have a moral obligation to assume 
responsibility for their own lives. A third potential point of departure is the idea that 
holding individuals responsible for the consequences of their choices can be desirable 
because of the intrinsic moral value of autonomous choice. The aim of this chapter, then, 
is to explore whether justice is an absolute value in relation to these other moral concerns.
6.1 HUMAN FLOURISHING
True, most people care a great deal about justice, and sometimes this means that people 
should be held responsible for the consequences of their actions. But I suspect that most 
of us would feel at least a little bit concerned about holding a person responsible for his
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past mistakes if this meant that he would be unable to live a flourishing life in the future. 
We might feel this moral concern even if we accept that this outcome is just. On the 
other hand, some people associate the need to hold people responsible for their own 
success or failure directly with human flourishing. They find it obvious that people 
should be encouraged to assume greater personal responsibility for what happens to them, 
and be praised for doing so, even where justice does not demand this of them, because 
assuming individual responsibility is part of a good life.
The question we must ask ourselves, therefore, is this: under what circumstances, if 
any, is it right to impose (or to not impose) consequential responsibility in order to pay 
heed to human flourishing? Before addressing this question, however, it is worth pausing 
to clarify what people mean by ‘human flourishing’ and how, more precisely, it can be 
linked to individual responsibility.
I. Individual responsibility as a virtue
There are different ways of defining human flourishing, but one standard way is in 
terms of virtue. Virtue is among the most common moral concerns that people associate 
with consequential responsibility. This has something to do with justice but not 
everything. Virtue can provide an obvious reason of justice not to impose responsibility. 
In the case of a person who risks his life to save others, some might argue that he does not 
deserve to be held responsible for the consequences of his virtuous imprudence. But
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virtue can also provide a reason in favour of individual responsibility quite apart from 
concerns about desert and justice. On a theory of human flourishing that associates the 
good life with the virtuous life, it is relatively simple to see why individual responsibility 
might be viewed as a part of a good life. This is because individual responsibility is 
frequently described as a virtue that it is good for persons to have (and to exercise) 
irrespective of justice.
Consider the example of public dependency, that is, dependency on the state. What 
is, to some people, particularly disturbing about public dependency is not so much the 
fact that this situation is unfair on taxpayers, but what it says about, and does to, the 
moral character of the person who is dependent. On this view, self-reliance is not simply 
a characteristic feature of individual responsibility but also a character trait that some 
people deem to be a virtue. This argument is less concerned with the assessment of 
actions in terms of whether or not unemployment is a voluntary choice and more with the 
character of the agent who allows himself to be dependent on others. The Victorians, for 
example, condemned the Poor Laws for fostering a range of vices (imprudence, 
intemperance, over population) but at the heart of the criticism was a concern for a 
breakdown in the virtue of self-reliance, one of the virtues that make a good person good. 
One develops a virtue such as self-reliance by acting as a self-reliant person does. And 
the Victorians believed that the Poor Laws prevented individuals from acting in this way.
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II. Individual responsibility as what conies naturally
Another way of theorising human flourishing is in terms of what comes naturally. 
There are many instances in ordinary moral discourse where ‘good’ is identified with 
‘what comes naturally’ and individual responsibility understood in terms of self-reliance 
appears to be one of them. According to this interpretation, self-reliance is a natural 
disposition that can be subverted by human intervention, such as through the provision of 
social welfare.
Even as recently as 1979 the election manifesto of the Conservative Party made its 
case for reform of the Welfare State by laying claim to a basic human impulse towards 
self-reliance. ‘We want to work with the grain of human nature, helping people to help 
themselves -  and others. This is the way to restore that self-reliance and self-confidence 
which are the basis of personal responsibility and national success’ (quoted in Goodin 
1998: 336). Perhaps the philosophical principle underpinning this manifesto pledge is 
that human beings characteristically and essentially rely on their own powers to meet their 
needs -  they forage, hunt, produce, or else trade their talents in order to obtain what they 
need to survive, and they decide how, and when, to do these things, and what degree of 
effort will be required and for how long. On this analysis, therefore, to be dependent on 
government even though one is capable of looking after oneself is an experience that both 
corrupts recipients and alienates them from their natural human tendencies.
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6.2 INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY AS A MORAL OBLIGATION
A further way in which individual responsibility might be seen as part of the moral fabric 
of out lives has to do with the idea that assuming responsibility for our own lives is a 
moral obligation of healthy adults. To whom or what are individuals obligated to work to 
support themselves? In some cases it might be appropriate to speak of a person having a 
special obligation to government to try to be self-reliant. Consider, for example, a 
scheme in which those who are unemployed and receiving benefits are required to meet 
with welfare officials to discuss future employment and agree upon a regime of job- 
seeking behaviour.
Even so, it might not be an exaggeration to say that individuals have an intrinsic 
moral obligation to work; which obligation is not dependent on any voluntary agreement 
a person has entered into. Perhaps the most unambiguous example of this line of 
reasoning can be found in the moral theory of Locke. Locke believed that each person 
has a moral obligation to support himself through work wherever possible, which 
obligation is owed not to Kings, or even to fellow citizens, but to God. He argued that 
since our continued existence is due to God, we have an obligation to preserve our lives 
in a way that God intends and God intends healthy adults to work on the land and be self- 
reliant (see Locke 1988: 291).
How do we know this is what God intends? Locke thought that the natural ends or 
purposes intended for humanity are written large in the nature of things and are
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discoverable by human reason. Hence, Locke held that it would contradict the idea of a 
wise Creator to suppose that human beings, who are blessed with the capacity for useful 
labour, are not obligated to make good use of this capacity and preserve themselves 
through their own labour (see Locke 1988: 291). Consequently, Locke believed that for 
those who are not elderly, sick or disabled, the true and proper relief of poverty consists 
in setting the idle to work (see Locke 1993: 452).
6.3 THE INTRINSIC MORAL VALUE OF AUTONOMOUS CHOICE
A third potential point of departure from justice-centred theories of responsibility is a 
general point about the intrinsic moral value that we often associate with the exercise of 
autonomous choice. There are some standard examples of this that I want to explore in 
this section.
As mentioned in chapters 4 and 5, some writers believe that it is right to expect 
individuals to adjust their likes and dislikes in the light of the resources they have 
available to them on grounds of justice. However, an alternative argument for the same 
conclusion is that it is good for a person to exercise his autonomy in this way. Precisely 
this argument can be found in Bruce Landesman’s article, “Egalitarianism”. In the 
article, Landesman considers Rawls’ suggestion that in a just society it is the 
responsibility of the individual to adjust his or her personal ends over time. Landesman 
claims that not only is this outcome just, but also ‘morally sound’. He points out that part
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of this process of adjustment is taking control of personal ends and altering them to fit 
changing circumstances. Furthermore, it is, according to Landesman, ‘a part of a person’s 
good to do this, an aspect of his autonomy and self-determination’ (Landesman 1983: 36). 
Thus, if learning to revise one’s personal ends in the light of circumstances (or else delay 
gratification) is part of a person’s good, then allowing individuals to rely on taxpayers to 
satisfy their expensive tastes would be, as Landesman puts it, ‘morally inappropriate’ 
(Landesman 1983: 36).
The claim that it is part of a person’s good to adapt his personal ends over time is 
further illustrated by obsessions and cravings. Consider again people who fall into a 
lifestyle of drug misuse, among the consequences of which being that they are no longer 
able to control or conquer their cravings for drugs. I concluded my discussion of these 
cases in the last chapter by saying that even if these individuals should pay some of the 
cost of any medical treatment they might need, and at a higher level than other people, it 
is unjust to force them to repay all the costs.
The question remains, however, why it is more appropriate to offer treatment 
programmes for these people rather than offering some form of compensation. Why not 
simply subsidise their cravings like other expensive tastes? To see why this would be an 
inappropriate response, if not an unjust response, we need some other norm or value. I 
think the most natural way to think about these cases is in terms of the ideal of autonomy 
and self-determination. To the extent that we really care about individuals being able to 
control and adjust their personal ends, as opposed to being in the grip of obsessions and
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cravings, it makes far more sense to relieve the underlying problem than to mitigate it. It 
can been viewed as intrinsically good, therefore, for individuals to be able to adjust their 
likes and dislikes in the light of changing circumstances, and for those likes and dislikes 
not to get out of control.
The value of autonomy is not limited to the ability of agents to develop and adjust 
their personal ends. It is possible to develop a similar line of reasoning in various other 
spheres of choice, agency and adaptation. One example is the labour market. Principles 
of supply and demand determine not simply the relative expense of different sorts of 
products, but also the relative value of different sorts of skills. Some skills are more in 
demand than others and at different times. The labour market, then, offers another arena 
in which individuals are faced with the challenge of adapting to changes in the 
circumstances of supply and demand. If a person is unemployed or has been made 
redundant because his skill set is no longer valued, then he may have to change his skills 
in order to find an alternative type of employment. And some might argue that it is good 
for individuals to exercise this human capacity to do so.
Economic gambles are another example of autonomous choice-making that we value. 
Individuals are often faced with choices that have uncertain outcomes: whether or not to 
attend university is one such gamble. In the previous chapter I suggested that justice is 
not served by forcing individuals to bear all the consequences of bad option luck. 
Nonetheless, some might argue that allowing individuals to exercise autonomous choice 
in such matters and holding them responsible for the consequences is an important feature
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of a normal human life and should be valued. In which case, government should not 
intervene to mitigate bad option luck.
There is a general point here about the proper role of the Welfare State. Historically, 
critics of social welfare provision have argued that social assistance can be as bad for 
recipients as it is for those who have to fund it. It has been argued that social welfare 
policies often fail to offer individuals the space to exercise their autonomy. In fact, the 
charge of paternalism has been a major source of criticism against social welfare policy 
ever since the Poor Laws of England were introduced. In his Principles o f Political 
Economy, for example, J. S. Mill warned against the ideal of protection implicit in the 
Poor Laws. Mill rejected the implicit assumption that the privileged and powerful classes 
should think for the poor and take responsibility for their lot in loco parentis (see Mill 
1994: 132).
Many share the same anxiety about the modem Welfare State. According to David 
Willetts, for example, Conservatives believe that the care of the poor should be 
undertaken by them; that how they make their way in life should be influenced by their 
own reflections and not those of the State. ‘The job of the welfare state is to help the 
family but not to take over so many of its functions that we become, in effect, married to 
the state’ (Willetts 1992: 149). For conservatives, then, the paradox of the Welfare State 
is that it provides money to people so they can exercise autonomous choice, but in fact 
achieves the opposite result. When people become dependent on this money, they no
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longer take decisions about how they are looked after and, therefore, they lose a degree of 
control over their lives.
It appears, therefore, that in as much as we value personal autonomy, we have reason 
to hold individuals responsible even for the failures of their own lives. But what, more 
exactly, is the link between the two? Is it possible, for instance, to value autonomous 
choice but at the same time deny that holding individuals responsible for their 
autonomous choices is valuable?
One argument that suggests this may not be possible takes as its starting-point the 
premise that autonomous decision-making typically involves sensitivity to possible 
outcomes and at least some degree of deliberation over those outcomes. It is further 
assumed that autonomous activity is valuable partly because of this deliberation. The 
conclusion of this argument is that it is arbitrary to say, on the one hand, that it is good for 
a person to deliberate over possible outcomes, but, on the other hand, not good for him or 
her to be held responsible for the actual outcome. As George Sher puts it:
Since choices encompass both acts and consequences, any value that attaches to 
the implementation of choice must belong equally to both. If someone did not 
have to live with the predictable consequences of his choices -  if he were able to 
go though the motions of deciding what to do, but was invariably shielded from 
his actions’ easily foreseeable results -  then he would have only a semblance of 
freedom. His “autonomy” would be worth little; and if ours is worth more, it is
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only because we do inhabit a world in which choices have consequences. (Sher 
1987: 40)
Sher considers the foregoing argument in the context of examining an ‘expected- 
consequence’ account of desert. In the end he concludes against this account of desert on 
a number of different grounds including the fact that some results are so disastrous that a 
person cannot plausibly be said to deserve his fate, even if the results were foreseen, and 
the fact that morally virtuous individuals, engaged in acts of self-sacrifice, do not deserve 
bad outcomes (Sher 1987: 45-46). I do not know whether Sher is right about desert, but 
that is not my concern here. At present, my aim is merely to highlight the fact that other 
reasons besides justice can support individual responsibility. And I believe that this is 
exactly what has been shown. If we value autonomous choice, then we should also want 
to live in a world where individuals are held consequentially responsible for their choices.
6.4 VALUE CONFLICT
In this chapter I have tried to motivate a pluralistic view of the value responsibility. 
However, once we adopt a pluralistic view of the value of responsibility, we open up the 
possibility of value conflict. Consider some examples.
In chapter 5 I argued that it might be reasonable (and in that sense just) to support 
even those individuals who choose to engage in non-wage-eaming work. I argued that it
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can be reasonable to subsidise at least some expensive tastes. I also argued that it can be 
reasonable to help the victims of bad option luck. However, if we think that individual 
responsibility is a virtue and that exercising autonomous choice is important, then we 
may regard these results as morally undesirable. Perhaps it is morally desirable for 
individuals to adjust their personal ends; for people to exercise their capacity for work 
and self-reliance and, therefore, to accept whatever jobs are available to them at any given 
time; to hold individuals responsible for the consequences of the risks they freely take 
even when those risks turn out badly.
Value conflict does not end here. In some cases it is justice that supports imposing 
consequential responsibility on individuals even though other values support holding 
responsibility in abeyance. To see how such cases might arise, one only has to reflect on 
the affect that holding individuals responsible for things that they have done in the past 
might have on their capacity to assume responsibility in the future.
The problem of drug use is one obvious example. Suppose someone has fallen into a 
lifestyle of heavy drug use, among the consequences of which being that he can no longer 
afford to satisfy his cravings or control them. Let us suppose that he has caused the 
situation in which he now finds himself. He may not have chosen to ruin his life, but let 
us assume for the sake of this argument that his negligence alone in becoming hooked on 
this way of life warrants this judgement. What should we do? Justice would appear to 
suggest that since he is responsible for the mess in which he finds himself, it would be 
unfair to force taxpayers to pay, for his mistakes. Even if we say on grounds of
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reasonableness that he should not be held entirely responsible for the consequences of his 
actions, it still seems as though he should pay a significant proportion. This has to do 
with giving some weight to choice-sensitivity.
However, suppose we believe that taking control of one’s own personal ends is an 
essential part of what it means to lead a good life. Taking this into account, we may 
decide instead not to abandon the addict to his stupor; we may decide that he should have 
access to specialist care and therapeutic treatment for his addiction. The basic thought is 
that if we wish to see him recover his capacity for responsible agency, in the sense of 
conquering his addiction and taking responsibility for his desires and desire satisfaction, 
at least some taxpayers’ money should be spent on the relevant assistance to get him back 
on track. It looks as though there is a conflict of values. On the one hand, we may want 
him to recover his self-control. But on the other hand, we may also want to uphold the 
demands of fairness and this implies that we should not force taxpayers to pay for his 
treatment.
There are plenty of other familiar examples of this sort. Think of Anderson’s case of 
the uninsured negligent driver lying injured at the side of the road (see Anderson 1999: 
295-6). Do we seriously believe the ambulance should leave the man where he is once it 
has been ascertained that he was responsible for the accident and has no insurance? 
Surely not. Imposing consequential responsibility on him now may result in his being 
unable to act more responsibly in the future. (Anderson would object on the grounds of 
sufficiency of capabilities). However, we must not ignore reasons of choice-sensitivity
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which say he should at least bear some of the consequences/costs. This, then, is a 
responsibility-responsibility dilemma. If we assist everybody regardless of the cause of 
their suffering, then we protect people’s future responsibility and the values of autonomy 
and human flourishing embodied therein, but we also unfairly ignore the fact that some 
people are responsible for the situations in which they find themselves. But if we do not 
offer assistance, then potentially we are upholding fairness at the cost of not protecting 
his future responsibility.
Now some may suggest the following solution to these difficulties. The State could 
make it a legal requirement that people who run certain types of risk are required to buy a 
minimum amount of insurance from approved insurance companies. (Obviously in the 
case of illegal activities such as drug-taking the State would first need to legalise the 
activity and find a way to register, users.) The insurers would then pay out if people find 
themselves in the position of having to give up work and go into drug rehabilitation or 
undergo treatment for injuries suffered as a result of car accidents for which they were 
responsible. Whilst this may limit people’s autonomy in one sense, it ensures that people 
have access to the care they may need at a later date which, in turn, protects their future 
autonomy. In reply to the potential criticism that this is paternalistic, it may be pointed 
out that people often accept rules that require them to do things they know they should do 
precisely because they realise -  in their more reflective moments -  that left to their own 
devices they may fail to do these things through carelessness or weakness of will. There 
is nothing disrespectful about this paternalism because it appeals to people’s own self- 
awareness.
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On the surface, then, there does not appear to be any great difficulty in 
accommodating fairness as well as concerns about people’s future responsibility. Or is 
there? One problem with mandatory insurance is that those who take the biggest risks 
(across a range of activities) might also be the ones who cannot afford to buy the 
mandatory insurance. In practice they might have insufficient money to buy insurance at 
the premiums fixed by the insurance companies due to their own choices about work, 
leisure, and consumption rather than any unfairness in the distribution of income 
opportunities. The upshot is that people who are unable to buy insurance but who 
nevertheless are minded to run the risks and flout the mandatory insurance rules will be 
left uninsured, subject to legal sanction, and without access to medical treatment if 
misfortune strikes. In order to accommodate this problem, insurers could allow such 
people to buy the required insurance coverage at discount prices and raise the premiums 
of people who buy higher coverage to cover any slack in the premiums paid by the poor. 
In this event, however, insurance rules become a form of redistribution of insurance costs 
from the prudent to the imprudent. This result may protect people’s future responsibility 
but it ignores fairness.
Much the same problem emerges if the State takes over the provision of insurance. In 
theory the State could offer insurance across a range of dangerous activities and lifestyles 
thereby requiring people to engage in mutual social insurance: to insure themselves and 
others against different sorts of risks. For example, forcing non-drug-taking taxpayers to 
contribute to an insurance scheme which offers drug rehabilitation to addicts could
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represent a quid pro quo for forcing drug-taking taxpayers to contribute to an insurance 
scheme which offers treatment and rehabilitation for obesity, alcoholism or smoking. 
However, the difficulty again is precisely this: what if it is the same people taking all the 
risks thereby placing an unfair share of the burden on the generally more prudent? In a 
society where there is an ethos of personal responsibility perhaps everyone will put aside 
a fair amount of money for insurance, or else will refrain from engaging in activities 
which have an element of risk that they cannot afford to insure themselves against. But 
this is rarely how things operate in the real world.
In reply to this, some might insist that in so far as the capacities required for prudent 
choice-making are a function of genetic endowment and upbringing, a degree of 
redistribution of insurance costs from the prudent to the imprudent would not be an unfair 
result. I do not ignore this point entirely. Instead, my claim is that i f  some risk-takers do 
fail to set aside enough money to pay for their own insurance and i f  this tendency is their 
own responsibility, then the proposed mutualisation of costs will not be fair because some 
people will make an unfairly low contribution.
What about asking people to pay society back once they have recovered? This may 
be possible in some cases, but we must also bear in mind the possibility that some people 
might never be able to repay the debt. Some addicts, for example, might be able take 
responsibility for their ends in the future and lead a normal life but fail to earn enough to 
repay the cost of their treatment. Others might be so damaged by their past experiences 
that they are unable to work to support themselves financially. To take another example,
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an uninsured driver might, with physiotherapy and special equipment, be able to work 
again and purchase insurance against future accidents but could be left unable to pay the 
cost of this assistance. The point is that sometimes a person might be able to regain his 
capacity for responsibility but is unable to repay the money that society has paid out to 
achieve this end.
I believe reflecting on the foregoing cases and the practical difficulties they involve 
forces us to question why we value individual responsibility and whether justice is the 
most important value. If we also value individual responsibility because we think it is a 
good way of life for people to lead, then sometimes it might be desirable to waive 
personal responsibility now, so as to leave people more able to assume responsibility later 
on. Looking at the role of perspectives in social welfare policy can also help to make 
clearer the tensions between different responsibility-supporting values. Two perspectives 
seem especially relevant.
From a backward-looking perspective we focus on the causes of misfortune, and in 
some cases we note that a person has only himself to blame for what happened. The 
question defining this perspective can be stated as follows: why should society help 
individuals who are responsible for their own downfall? As the Ants say to the 
Grasshopper, ‘since you kept yourself busy by singing all summer, you can do the same 
by dancing all winter’ (Aesop 1996: 11). From a forward-looking perspective, on the 
other hand, we consider what can be done to change people’s behaviour for the better, 
and in some cases we realise that a person can only be helped and encouraged to behave
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more responsibly in the future if we do not withdraw aid. The point is that if the Ants do 
not agree to help the Grasshopper, then he will probably starve to death and the Ants will 
be unable to impress upon him the importance of working hard during the summer. The 
question defining this alternative perspective can be expressed in the following terms: 
what, if anything, can we do to foster a greater sense of individual responsibility among 
individuals who, in the past, have failed to take responsibility?
Trying to give due consideration to both perspectives can highlight tensions within 
our system of values. Whereas the backward-looking perspective is often motivated only 
by considerations of fairness, the forward-looking perspective involves a much wider set 
of ethical concerns, such as the desire to promote human flourishing. At the level of 
public policy the dilemma is this: should the State, on the one hand, give responsibility- 
rejuvenating treatment only to those drug addicts, negligent drivers, and so on, who are 
capable of paying for it either at the point of delivery or at a later stage, or should the 
State, on the other hand, give responsibility-rejuvenating treatment to all those who need 
it, regardless of their ability to pay for it now or later? If we adopt the first policy we 
uphold responsibility as a value of justice, if we uphold the second policy we uphold 
responsibility as a value of human flourishing.
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6.5 UNDOMINATED PLURALISM
In this chapter I have argued that justice is not the only value that supports individual 
responsibility. I have argued that individual responsibility can also be viewed as being 
integral to human flourishing, as a moral obligation, and as something that might be 
necessary in order to secure the moral value of autonomous choice. We have also seen 
value conflict. On the one hand, even if justice does not support holding individuals fully 
responsible for the situations in which they find themselves, there are other reasons that 
can support imposing responsibility. On the other hand, where justice does support 
imposing consequential responsibility on individuals, it can be desirable to waive or defer 
personal responsibility if this can place people in a better position to take responsibility 
later.
It is perhaps worth noting at this stage that there is clear evidence of both this 
pluralism of values and of this conflict between values in the work of Rawls. Consider 
two examples. The first has to do with expensive tastes. On Rawls’ interpretation of the 
division of consequential responsibility, we should assume people are capable of 
adjusting their ends over time such that expensive tastes do not raise a case for assistance. 
This is, on the surface, an argument about reasonableness and justice. But I am not 
convinced that this argument can operate entirely at the level of concerns about justice. 
Instead I agree with Landesman that there is an additional premise at work here about the 
intrinsic goodness of such adjustments as an exercise of autonomous choice (see 
Landesman 1983: 36).
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The second example has to do with health care. Rawls emphasises the aim of 
keeping people as close as possible to the ideal of citizens as normally functioning and 
fully cooperating members of society. This aim is no less directed at those whose 
functioning falls below that ideal due to lifestyle choices than it is to any other citizen. 
So, even where an individual is responsible for his or her own misfortune, the social 
contract argument generates principles of justice which direct the State to restore people 
by medical or psychiatric treatment as required (see Rawls 1996: 185n.l5; and also 2001: 
175). Much less clear is what Rawls thought about how we should distribute the costs of 
securing basic health care for all, that is, whether they should fall equally on society at 
large or, at different levels, to specific individuals and groups of individuals depending on 
their responsibility. But whatever he thought about the role of principles of justice in 
deciding how costs should get distributed, it is difficult to interpret Rawls as claiming that 
hospitals should turn people away if it is ascertained they have no insurance and cannot 
afford to pay their fair share. The argument to which Rawls appeals seems to be that it is 
morally a good thing if society helps everyone back to full functioning quite apart from 
justice.
Faced with this plurality of values, then, social welfare planners must sometimes 
decide which values are to be sacrificed, when and to what extent. So what can we say to 
go further? We need a distinction between two types of pluralism. Let us call a pluralism 
of values ‘dominated’ if the State gives absolute or lexical priority to one value above all 
other values. No doubt some will insist that justice is the dominant value and, therefore,
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that it should take priority in cases of value conflict. The implication of this ordering is 
that responsibility should not be imposed on individuals where it is unjust to do so but 
should be imposed where it is just to do so. On the other hand, let us call a pluralism of 
values ‘undominated’ if the State does not give priority to one value but holds each of the 
values as having equal or nearly equal fundamental importance. I intend to argue that 
justice is part of a system of values that in the case of consequential responsibility 
exhibits undominated pluralism.
According to this view, it can be equally important (or if less important only slightly 
less important) to uphold (or not uphold) individual responsibility for reasons of justice as 
for reasons of human flourishing and autonomous choice. For example, it can be 
desirable to encourage people to be more self-reliant, to delay gratification, and to adjust 
their personal ends in response to fluctuations in supply and demand, even though strictly 
speaking it might not be unjust for them to claim extra resources. It can also be desirable 
not to force people to bear the adverse consequences of their past choices so that they 
might be better able to assume responsibility or lead a more responsible life later on. 
What does this mean? For one thing it means that the State ought to protect the capacity 
for responsible agency of all citizens. This implies that drug addicts should have access 
to specialist treatment regardless of their ability to pay and that negligent drivers should 
be taken to hospital and cared for even if they are uninsured. Whereas according to 
dominanted pluralism valuing choice means either imposing costs or denying aid as 
justice demands, undominated pluralism has the implication that we should help people 
to recover their capacity for responsible agency because of the moral worth of choice.
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In contrast to this, to say that justice is the dominant value in the context of 
responsibility assignment is to accept the following: that government should uphold 
people’s right to income even if doing so is contrary to the ideal of self-reliance, a 
characteristic which, is considered to be a virtue by some; that expensive tastes should be 
subsidised where it is just to do so even if it would be a valuable exercise of people’s 
autonomy to adjust their tastes; that responsibility for bad option luck should be waived 
where it is just to do so irrespective of the claim that autonomy is worth less if individuals 
are not held responsible for the consequences of their voluntary choices. On the other 
hand, saying that justice has dominance means that if an agent does not have a right to 
aid, then government should not offer this aid regardless of whether or not doing so 
would enable him to take responsibility in the future.
Why dominated diversity? One common justification for saying that justice is, or 
should be, the dominant value is that justice (at least as some conceive it) is neutral 
between conceptions of the good, whereas other individual-responsibility-supporting 
values rely on a particular set of beliefs about what kind of life it is good to lead; which 
beliefs might not be universal. This claim about the relative importance of values, then, 
rests on a more general conviction that it is more important to have rules and policies 
which are generally acceptable than it is to have rules and policies which are only the 
preoccupation of a few. Admittedly, if this is the view one takes of justice and its 
absolute priority over other values, then these are the policy conclusions one should draw. 
But the examples do not always support this view.
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Why, then, undominated diversity? In chapter 5 I doubted whether there are any non- 
arbitrary priority rules ordering different criteria of justice at the level of first principle. 
Some might accept this view but insist that such rules are possible when we are talking 
about reasons of justice as opposed to reasons of goodness. This is not, on the face of it, 
a counter-intuitive position to take, but it is controversial, very far from being obviously 
correct. In some cases there may be a great deal of disagreement as to whether justice 
should be the dominant value. For this reason, I adopt a position of undominated 
diversity at the level of first principle, allowing more precise answers to be cashed out at 
the democratic level. It seems to me be an attractive view to say that each society should 
decide the relative importance of these values in any given case. This means that some 
political communities will view justice as being the most important value in some cases 
and not in others, whereas other political communities will interpret the importance of 
justice in precisely the opposite way.
In light of all this, should egalitarians continue to advance principles of justice that 
are responsibility-catering? Nothing I have said so far implies that egalitarians should 
abandon responsibility-sensitivity. What I have tried to show is merely that what we 
mean by ‘responsibility-sensitivity’ and ‘responsibility-catering policy’ depends on the 
particular values in play and justice is certainly not excluded from this list. Even so, I do 
think that egalitarians should be more aware of the fact that justice is not the sole reason 
why individual responsibility matters and may not even be the most important reason.
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This, however, raises one final question: what should we do in cases where there is 
no reason of responsibility to intervene -  where someone is responsible for the situation 
in which he now finds himself and there is no hope of helping him to assume 
responsibility later? Reflecting oh what I have argued so far, I hope the reader will not 
assume I am suggesting that personal responsibility is all that matters. I do not think this. 
A society may have other reasons -  let us call them humanitarian reasons -  to assist 
people whose chances of future responsibility are at best slight. That we should relieve 
suffering and help the stricken is a moral injunction that does not, and need not, rely on 
the assumption that we are thereby placing people in a better position to assume 
responsibility in the future. Sometimes we are not.
However, what if a government decides not to offer humanitarian aid not because it 
cannot afford to do so but because the majority are not in favour of such a policy? Can 
this response ever be morally justified? One view might be that it is rightly a matter for 
each society to decide (through democratic decision-making) what the relative importance 
of humanitarian considerations are, such that it is morally acceptable if a democratically- 
elected government opts not to offer this type of assistance. However, this is not the only 
feasible view of the proper function of the State. It could be argued that it is one of the 
basic moral requirements of the State to preserve life and so any government that fails to 
do so by not offering humanitarian aid does not act legitimately even if it has a 
democratic mandate to behave as it does. This question deserves further examination 
which it will receive in the next chapter.
In this chapter I have explored some of the values that support individual responsibility. I 
do not claim that this list is exhaustive; other values may also be important. Nonetheless, 
we have the limited conclusion that whilst government should not pursue justice to the 
exclusion of other values (virtue and autonomy), it should not strive to promote the good 
in ways that fail to show due regard for justice.
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7 THEORY AND PRACTICE
Previous chapters have addressed the question of individual responsibility from a purely 
theoretical perspective. I have considered largely in the abstract when and how far it is 
fitting to hold individuals responsible for their own disadvantages and misfortunes. The 
present chapter is addressed to the broader issue of how we implement these principles 
and objectives. How far should government cater to responsibility-sensitivity? What are 
the limits of legitimate State authority in this area? What practical and pragmatic issues 
need to be bom in mind? Finally, which policies should we favour?
7.1 THE LIMITS OF STATE AUTHORITY AND THE BASIC FUNCTIONS OF 
GOVERNMENT
When a society, through the institutions of government, takes up the challenge of 
promoting individual responsibility just how far may it pursue this end? Are there certain 
things governments may not do? By way of illustration, consider again the uninsured 
negligent driver lying injured at the side of the road. Let us assume, for the sake of 
argument, that he is rightly held responsible for a significant part of the costs of medical 
treatment. The question is this: how should the State go about ensuring he bears these 
costs? If he cannot pay now, because he has no savings or assets, then the hospital could 
bill him for the costs at a much later date when he is able to pay or set up some suitable 
repayment plan. Yet he might be so severely disabled as a result of the accident that he is
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unable to repay. What should we do then? Do we seriously believe the hospital should 
switch off his respirator once it has been ascertained he has no means to pay? One 
obvious solution might be for government to institute a compulsory insurance scheme, 
whereby money is taken directly from people’s earnings to pay for any medical care they 
might need at a later date. Even so, what about the rights of individuals to decide for 
themselves whether or not to be insured? Is it a legitimate function of government to 
force individuals to take responsibility in this way?
If it was not clear before, then it should be clear by now that when deciding which 
policies to adopt consideration has to be taken of the proper limits of political authority. 
We need to consider not just whether government should hold individuals responsible for 
what happens to them, and to what degree, but also how it implements sensitivity to 
individual responsibility. It may well be in the best interests of individuals to assume 
responsibility by working for a living and by contributing to an insurance scheme. And 
we know from experience that many individuals assume responsibility for their own 
interests spontaneously. But unfortunately we also know from experience that some 
people are unlikely to take responsibility for their lives and livelihoods in a constructive 
way if they are simply left to their own devices. The question is: does the State have the 
right to force them to do so?
Some might try to side-step this question by insisting that in a perfectly fair society 
people could afford to purchase insurance and pay for the life they want to lead and so 
these examples would not arise. Lack of employment and access to income must be a
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causal factor explaining why many people are uninsured. In the United State alone some 
estimate that as many as 43 million people do not have basic health insurance. Surely this 
cannot all be down to personal choice. This reply deserves consideration, but I do think 
there would be a dilemma even in a perfectly fair society. Suppose we live in a society 
where everyone has access to a decent income. What if some individuals prefer not to 
have insurance so they can spend money on other things? The dilemma for government 
is whether to: (a) compel these individuals to take out personal insurance, (b) allow them 
the choice but leave them to bear the consequences, or (c) allow them the choice and 
compel taxpayers to pay for their treatment if they fail to take out insurance even if this 
result is unjust. In fact, the same dilemma occurs when thinking about the prior problem 
of poverty. There are many individuals with the opportunity to work and earn a good 
wage who do not make use of this opportunity. If an adult wants to lead a life of idle 
leisure, and fully appreciates what he might lose by not having a job, the dilemma for 
governments is whether to: (a) compel these individuals to work, (b) allow them the 
choice not to work but leave them with less residual income as a consequence, or (c) 
allow them the choice and offer them income anyway.
In which, if any, of these ways is the State entitled to respond? There are some 
powerful arguments against State intervention of the kind (a) that coerces individuals to 
act prudently through the imposition of sanctions. One argument appeals to the practical 
point that this sort of intervention is often ineffective. This is certainly the crux of 
Samuel Smiles’ message about self-help:
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Laws, wisely administered, will secure men in the enjoyment of the fruits of their 
labour, whether of mind or body, at comparatively small personal sacrifice; but 
no laws, however stringent, can make the idle industrious, the thriftless 
provident, or the drunken sober. Such reforms can only be effected by means of 
individual action, economy, and self-denial, by better habits, rather than by 
greater rights. (Smiles 1859: 13-14)
But even if laws are effective, there are other reasons to object. For example, some luck 
egalitarians believe we can resolve these sorts of dilemmas in the following way: those 
who act imprudently do so typically because they lack the choice-making and choice- 
following abilities of others and justice requires that we try to mitigate the affects of bad 
luck in the distribution of choice-making and choice-following abilities. Therefore, in 
order to do this, government may legitimately force individuals to act more prudently 
through compulsory insurance (see, for example, Ameson 1995: 239). However, in her 
article, “What is the Point of Equality?”, Anderson objects to this sort of reasoning on the 
grounds that it shows a lack of respect:
In adopting mandatory social insurance schemes for the reasons they offer, luck 
egalitarians are effectively telling citizens that they are too stupid to run their 
lives, so Big Brother will have to tell them what to do. It is hard to see how 
citizens could be expected to accept such reasoning and still retain their self- 
respect. (Anderson 1999a: 301)
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Another powerful argument against coercive State intervention can be found in 
Mill’s, Principles o f  Political Economy. Here Mill objects to what he calls ‘authoritative’ 
intervention (see Mill 1994: 325). Authoritative intervention involves controlling what 
people do (or do not do) by means of legal sanction. Those who do not comply with the 
will of the State are liable to fines or other sorts of punishment. Examples of 
authoritative intervention include compulsory pensions and insurance schemes. In terms 
of preventive measures, the State could literally prevent individuals from taking risks 
with their health and safety by banning the production and import of harmful substances 
or by restricting access to hazardous geographical areas. Another example of 
authoritative intervention is forcing individuals to work.
Significantly for the present debate, Mill thought that authoritative interference 
requires a higher degree of justification (or motives of greater urgency) than benign 
interference, for the simple reason that the latter involves no violation of individual 
liberty (see Mill 1994: 326). Thus, Mill famously thought that:
the only purpose for which power can be rightly exercised over any member of a 
civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. (Mill 1972:
78)
Harm, in Mill’s sense, is harm to other people’s vital interest, that is, interests which 
ought to be considered as rights (Mill 1972: 143) -  as when, for example, someone
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physically attacks another person or becomes unable to repay his debts or neglects to keep 
a promise or misappropriates another person’s private property (Mill 1972: 62-63).
What implications does this argument have for the present discussion about whether 
or not the State has a right to impose consequential responsibility on individuals? Much 
depends on how we interpret people’s rights, of course, but at first sight it appears that if 
a person drinks too much, does not work and takes risks with his health but harms only 
himself, then there is no basis for authoritative intervention. For example, Mill pointed 
out that gambling, drunkenness, and idleness can seriously detract from personal 
happiness and are not entirely without effect on the happiness of others, but insisted that 
there is justification for curbing these vices by authoritative means, unless the rights of 
others are violated (see Mill 1972: 149-150). The only exception would be in the case of 
smoking, where there is harm to other people through passive smoking. In this case there 
might be an argument for banning cigarettes in public places; or at least forcing smokers 
to pay for the health care of victims of passive smoking.
There are, then, a number of reasons why the State should not force individuals to 
take responsibility for themselves in ways that we think are prudent. In reply to these 
arguments, however, some might claim that government does have the moral authority to 
interfere authoritatively in people’s lives when it is a matter of life and death. It might be 
argued that the State has a basic responsibility to preserve life. But what is this 
responsibility based on? It might be enlightening to consider at this stage Locke’s views 
on this question. Locke believed that the primary function of political society is to
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preserve the life of all its members (see, for example, Locke 1988: 375, 381-382). Locke 
also believed that political authority is developed through the social contract. On this 
reading, therefore, the responsibility of government to preserve life springs from the prior 
agreement of individual members of society to come together and live under a 
government that has this responsibility.
Like other writers in this tradition, Locke did not rely solely on the idea of an original 
contract to justify the authority of the State, but argued that simply by living within a 
political society, and enjoying what it has to offer, people give their tacit consent to the 
authority of the State (Locke 1960: 347-348). Whether or not Locke’s theory of consent 
can be spelled out so as to handle various well-known difficulties with the idea of tacit 
consent, I think that the general strategy for justifying State interference through the 
consent of the ruled is plausible. If successful, this argument would show that 
government does have the right to interfere in people’s lives by coercing them to take 
insurance for their own health and safety, because it has a basic responsibility to preserve 
life; which responsibility is based on consent.
Perhaps the best way to motivate the argument from consent is to substitute for the 
idea for tacit consent, claims about what we would consent to if, contrary to fact, the State 
did not intervene to save lives and we were simply left to our own devices. Through this 
thought experiment, we are required to think seriously about what the State offers us. 
Arguably, once we consider what life would be like without the State intervening on our
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behalf to protect our lives, it becomes plain that it is in our interests to live in a political 
society where government does just that.
However, this raises a further question: exactly how far does this justification extend? 
Insurance is not the only area where authoritarian interference could potentially help to 
save lives. Another example is where people go hungry because they do not work. Does 
this mean the State has the right to force the idle to work? Historically, some political 
philosophers have supported this right. In his Leviathan, for example, Thomas Hobbes 
argued that it would be legitimate to force the able-bodied poor (see Hobbes 1985: 387). 
Similarly, in his proposals for the reform of the English Poor Laws, Locke proposed a 
number of coercive measures for dealing with the poor. First, he argued that state 
authorities should restrict the number of alehouses, thereby reducing the incidence of 
drunkenness, and removing an obstacle to useful labour (see Locke 1993: 447). Second, 
he suggested that special overseers should be given powers to order the unemployed to 
work for local people, and if they refused to obey any such order, that they may be sent to 
the next port to serve on ships or, if that is not possible, to a house of correction (Locke 
1993: 451). Finally, he claimed that children over the age of fourteen should be obliged 
to attend working schools where they might earn their livelihood, thus freeing their 
mothers to join the work force (Locke 1993: 453). Locke argued that by putting the idle 
to work in this way, government can ensure that, ‘they do not live like drones upon the 
labour of others’ (Locke 1993: 452).
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However, from the claim that the State has the right to intervene authoritatively in 
order to save lives I do not think it follows that the State has the right to force the idle to 
work. When individuals come together within political societies arguably they do so hot 
only with the proviso that the State will preserve life but also with the expectation that the 
State will uphold basic rights and liberties. These basic rights and liberties in turn place 
limits on the extent to which the State may intervene. The foregoing proposals of forcing 
people to take responsibility through work interferes very strongly with people’s rights 
and liberties, and perhaps in a way and to a degree that coercing people to pay for their 
own insurance does not.
A further consideration is that literally forcing people to work is perhaps no longer 
necessary for combating idleness. Nowadays welfare agencies have extremely 
sophisticated ways of encouraging work such that much can be done in terms of getting 
people back into work without relying on the old method of sending them to work houses. 
One sanction welfare agencies can employ is to withdraw aid from individuals who do 
not make an effort to look for work. But there is also a growing body of literature in the 
United States and Great Britain which suggests that imposing financial sanctions on 
individuals, is not as important as a general strategy of ‘help and hassle’. It has been 
observed that effective caseworkers are prepared to animate, buoy up and spur on their 
clients, yet at the same time give them the positive help and encouragement they need to 
succeed. In the first place, an ethos of mutual obligation is thought to be essential: a good 
caseworker not only expects her clients to play an active part, but also works hard on 
behalf of her clients to find decent job opportunities. Secondly, a good caseworker sells
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the option of work to her clients; she urges and persuades clients that work is a good 
thing for them, and is enthusiastic about their prospects. She appeals to their self-interest 
by pointing out that they will be better off by working, but she also appeals to their moral 
sense by suggesting that they have a moral duty to attempt to support themselves and their 
families. Finally, a good case worker builds up the commitment of her clients gradually: 
she begins with the kinds of short-term training programmes that clients are more likely 
to succeed in; and she begins by advocating part-time, limited contract work and only 
builds up to offers of permanent, full-time employment once the client is ready. Once 
that stage is reached she does her best to provide all the training that people require. (See, 
for example, Bane and Ellwood 1994: 131; McLaughlin 1997: 81-82.)
Returning now to the main argument, we have seen that in some cases (but not all) 
the State has the moral authority to intervene authoritatively in people’s lives (to impose 
individual responsibility) in order to preserve life. However, there is another side to the 
argument from preservation of life and it is this: if we truly believe the State has an 
obligation to preserve life, then arguably not only does the State have the right to interfere 
authoritatively in people’s lives to coerce them to act prudently but it also has the right to 
compel society as a whole to pay for the care of anyone whose life is in danger 
irrespective of whether they have taken or can take responsibility. I accept this last point 
fully because it seems to me to be one of the basic moral requirements of a government to 
try to preserve the lives of its citizens and so any government that fails to do so by not 
offering humanitarian aid (say) does not act legitimately even if it has a democratic 
mandate to behave as it does.
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Now if one accepts this principle, then one implication is that anyone whose life is 
threatened by injury should receive the care he or she needs to survive irrespective of 
ability to pay. This holds true in the case of Anderson’s negligent driver. I also think the 
same principle could apply to other life threatening hardships such as extreme poverty 
and hunger. What is more, I do not believe I am alone in drawing these conclusions. As I 
have already written, in his proposals for reform of the Poor Laws, Locke argued that, in 
most instances, the true and proper relief of the poor consists in finding work for them 
(see Locke 1993: 452). However, Locke also believed that: ‘Everyone must have meat, 
drink, clothing, and firing; so much goes out of the stock of the kingdom, whether they 
work or no’ (Locke 1993: 452). For Locke, the obligation of public charity follows 
directly from the basic function of political society to preserve life. Similar conclusions 
about a social minimum can be found in the work of far more recent proponents of the 
social contract. Rawls, for example, described the social contract as a contract between 
fully functioning participants in a well-ordered political society. Rawls draws this ideal 
from what he believes are a set of uncontroversial beliefs and ideas present in mainstream 
political culture today. This ideal forms the background of assumptions against which 
questions of justice, reasonableness and fairness are to be raised and answered. For 
Rawls, then, it is a fundamental task of government to ensure that individuals are able to 
function normally. Thus, Rawls believed that government should make provision for a 
basic level of health care assured for all citizens (see Rawls 1996: lix; 2001: 176).
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Drawing the above points together, I think that the State does have the moral 
authority to coerce individuals into paying their fair share of the medical treatment they 
need wherever possible. But I also think that it would destroy the point of the political 
bond if social welfare institutions did not secure the basic health of all citizens on 
humanitarian irrespective of their ability to pay and even if it is their own fault that they 
are in need of medical attention which they are unable to pay for. In other words, I agree 
with Locke and Rawls that it is a fundamental task of government to preserve life and 
enable individuals to function as participants in society.
7.2 THE PROBLEM OF UNINTENDED HARM
In addition to having to bear in mind the proper limits of state authority and the basic 
functions of the state, a further difficulty the welfare planner must take seriously is the 
practical point that sometimes policies aimed at promoting individual responsibility have 
unintended harmful consequences. Policies can harm those who are able to assume 
responsibility but they can also harm those who are not.
As an example of the first type of unintended harm, consider the policy of workfare 
according to which the State takes over the role of finding work or training for individuals 
and proving welfare benefits on condition they do this work or training. Many writers 
have seen workfare as the right solution to the problem of moral hazard in welfare policy. 
On this view, the problem stems from the fact that access to income is often
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unconditional. They argue the State should offer people not welfare but mandatory work 
or training. Although ‘workfare’ is a relatively new piece of terminology, the basic idea 
is not. In his Essays Relative to the Subject o f the Poor Laws of 1796, for example, 
Jeremy Bentham set out what he called the ‘conditions of relief including the right of 
state authorities to demand work as a condition annexed to the grant of relief (see 
Bentham 1796: 152a. 62). At least for some theorists currently writing about social 
welfare policy, workfare remains the right solution. Perhaps most prominent among 
these writers is Lawrence Mead who maintains that workfare has provided an effective 
tool against the problem of idle dependency in the United States (see Mead 1986: 12; 
1997: 1). Leading conservatives in Germany have also jumped on the workfare 
bandwagon (see Woodhead 2001). What is more, even in countries that have a strong 
commitment to collective responsibility for social welfare such as Sweden, there is a 
tradition of workfare (see Digby 1989: 13). Workfare is viewed by people in many 
countries, then, as a powerful tool in encouraging work: not merely because people who 
habitually fail to search for work will be denied further aid but also because the term 
‘workfare’ makes it clear from the start that each person has a responsibility to help him 
or herself. As Alistair Darling puts it:
When people come through the door -  they will no longer simply be able to ask:
“What can you pay out to me?” They will have to answer the question: “What
can we do to help you into a job?” (Darling 2001: para. 27)
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Now the first thing to notice about these sorts of workfare programmes is that they 
deny real freedom of occupation to participants. This alone may or may not be sufficient 
for individuals to reasonably reject such a policy. However, this is not the only problem. 
Workfare places all the power in the hands of welfare officials and those companies who 
offer the training and job placements. Consequently, workfare programmes have been 
criticised by participants because they offer poor quality of training and low pay. What is 
more, even when people do successfully complete a course of study or training, it is often 
the case that individuals are unable to go on to secure a job in the places where they 
trained or had the experience (see, for example, Dwyer 2000: 146-153). A related 
concern is that participants in the workfare programme are given a bad name even before 
they turn up for work. The Commission on Social Justice, for example, found that 
employers in the United Kingdom were reluctant to employ individuals whom they 
perceived to be unwilling conscripts (Commission on Social Justice 1994: 239).
Turning now to unintended harms to those who are unable to assume responsibility, 
consider the policy of eligibility tests for unemployment benefits. The idea that access to 
unemployment benefits should be restricted to people who are literally unable to work is 
not restricted to the Right. Egalitarians now accept this policy equally. Even egalitarians 
who criticise other egalitarians for putting too much emphasis on personal responsibility 
-  I have in mind Anderson -  accept the principle of eligibility-testing. As Anderson 
writes:
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to administer this system, some limited judgements of individuals’ capacities to 
function in the manner required need to be made. For example, in my article I 
argue that in the normal case, an adult’s access to a decent income will be 
conditional on performing some role in the productive system, whether under 
contract for payment or under obligation to care for dependants. People who are 
capable of performing some such role, and for whom a job is available can 
reasonably be expected to take it as a condition of getting a decent income, and 
will not be entitled to live off the dole forever. For those suspected of abusing 
the worker’s disability system, some determination must therefore be made if 
whether they are actually capable of holding down a job and just malingering, or 
truly disabled or otherwise effectively unemployable. (Anderson 199%: 5)
Under eligibility-rules, the main task of welfare officials in dealing with the 
unemployed would be to judge whether or not a claimant has a valid excuse for being out 
of work. This certainly is one way of catering to individual responsibility but there are 
drawbacks with this type of system. One objection levelled at this kind of system has 
been that in trying to test people’s fitness for work we risk humiliating those individuals 
who are in fact incapable of this particular way of life. To illustrate this objection, 
imagine that I attend my local welfare bureau because I am out of work and in need of 
money. If the principle of the bureau is to restrict unemployment benefits to people who 
are unable to work, it is likely that I shall be asked to attend an interview with a view to 
discussing why I am unemployed. If I want money, I will have to prove to the bureau 
either that I have a serious disability or that I am utterly bereft of talent and will not be
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hired by anyone, not even in a time of high demand for low-skilled labour. However, it 
has been observed -  quite correctly -  by Wolff that such a process of revelation could 
potentially shame people who are disadvantaged in these ways, and could have an adverse 
affect on their self-respect as a consequence (see Wolff 1998: 113-5). Whilst it does not 
seem injudicious to shame those who are ‘playing the system’, by showing that their 
claims are unfounded, it is unworthy to shame those who are genuinely unable to work.
So, the welfare planner is faced with a difficult problem: how to determine who is 
entitled to income, as opposed to just malingering, without shaming those who are in fact 
incapable of work. One alternative might be for officials not to make any prior 
assessment of people’s talent or ability, but simply to cajole people into finding work and 
see what happens. The apparent difficulty with this proposal, however, is that we might 
be setting people up for a fall. If, despite the best efforts of the individual and the welfare 
official, no job has been found, the overall impact on people’s self-respect might be 
worse than if we had simply allowed them to claim that they were unable to work in the 
first place.
The aim of this objection is not to deny that work can contribute to people’s self- 
respect in a number or ways: through the awareness of one’s mastery and skill in doing 
one’s job; confirmed by the fact that others think it worthwhile to employ one’s talents; 
from the realisation that one is paying one’s own way. Rather, it is to highlight the fact 
that for someone without the wherewithal to engage in paid employment, this is just a 
reminder that he or she does not live up to the standards of his or her society.
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A further potential problem is the adverse affect that rules and policies of individual 
responsibility might have on the dependants of those targeted. One source of concern is 
the children of adults who forfeit their right to support. Anyone who favours rules or 
policies that push single unemployed mothers into work must answer the following 
question. Is it better or worse for the child not to have a parent at home looking after him 
or her? As one critic of welfare reform under the Clinton administration put it:
No child is going to be spiritually improved by being collateral damage in a 
bombardment of severities targeted at adults who may or may not deserve more 
severe treatment from the welfare system. (George Will cited in Moynihan 1996:
34)
7.3 PRACTICALITY AND EXPEDIENCY
Further criteria for judging social welfare policies are aptly discussed under the general 
heading ‘practicality and expediency’. One fairly obvious constraint is whether a state 
can ‘find out’ about the situations of its citizens in the ways specified by ideal theory. 
The reason for this condition might seem obvious. If our aim is to find a theory of 
consequential responsibility that can be applied to political decision-making here in the 
real world, there is much less value in a theory that cannot be implemented either because
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it is impossible to find out what it entails in concrete cases or because to find out what it 
entails in concrete cases involves unacceptable costs or intrusions into people’s lives.
Much of this investigation will focus on determining the reasons why individuals find 
themselves in difficulty. This alone poses a number of daunting epistemic problems. 
One problem is that officials might not have sufficient time and resources to conduct the 
necessary investigations to determine the causes. On the other hand, officials might have 
all the relevant information but still be uncertain about the causal link. The disadvantages 
they investigate may have no obvious cause or multiple causes. Employment is a case in 
point. How do we decide if a person is capable of holding down a job? At first glance, 
deciding if someone is able to work appears to be a question of fact that can be settled by 
straightforward naturalistic standards. If I am severely sick or disabled and unable to 
perform even the most rudimentary of tasks, then my inability to hold down a job is 
obvious. Yet for a much larger number of people -  perhaps the majority of people in the 
disabled community -  work might be difficult but not impossible because they face 
partial or minor disabilities, mental health problems, diseases, ailments, and so on.
However, it also makes no sense to exaggerate these problems. We routinely make 
attributions of causal responsibility in other fields of justice even though there is 
imperfect information. In the area of corrective justice, for example, judges often have to 
rely on there being enough evidence .to satisfy them that there was more likely than not a 
causal link between the actions of the tortfeasor and the plaintiff (see Cane 1999: ch. 5). 
The vast majority of tort claims are settled out of court by negotiations that take into
account the strength of the causal evidence (see Cane 1999: ch. 4). Perhaps the same 
pragmatism is applicable in cases of distributive justice.
That being said, officials might have to introduce some simplifications so that the 
process of deciding people’s claims becomes less time consuming and therefore less 
expensive. One way to achieve this might be to categorise behaviour by type: to specify a 
list of acts (or omissions) sufficient for assigning consequential responsibility to 
individuals. In matters of personal health, for example, it might be feasible to identify 
certain kinds of behaviour that generally speaking result in poorer health.
However, even if officials had unlimited funds to spend on the relevant sorts of 
investigations, another problem is that it might be barred from conducting a thorough 
investigation because the information required is of a sensitive nature. It if it is 
unfeasible for government to make a comparison of people’s lives in terms of metric X -  
because, for example, making informed judgements about X requires intrusive 
investigations into people’s private lives and is liable to inaccuracy -  then remedying 
inequalities of X is not rightly a responsibility of government. Welfare appears to be a 
case in point. I have already looked at Rawls’ proposals for a just division of social 
responsibility. But one facet of this argument not yet discussed, is his belief that ‘We 
must also find workable criteria for interpersonal comparisons that can be publicly and, if 
possible, easily applied’ (Rawls 1996: 186). It seems, then, that Rawls may have rejected 
welfare metrics partly because he believed that people’s happiness and preference
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satisfaction are not easily ascertained and do not provide workable criteria for 
interpersonal comparisons.
Indeed, by rejecting the idea of comparing overall welfare in matters of distributive 
justice, Rawls demonstrated once again the intellectual debt he owed to Kant. Kant 
believed that desire satisfaction is not susceptible to legislation because what each person 
wants or desires is infinitely variable and trying to legislate on this basis would inevitably 
lead to intrusion by the State and misunderstandings about what citizens want (see Kant 
1985: 80). Kant believed instead that what we owe to each other should be analysed in 
terms of the agreements we voluntarily enter into. The mere fact that a person wishes or 
desires something from someone else does not raise a case for redistribution (see Kant 
1996: 23-24).
Yet another criterion on which to judge social welfare policy is value for money. In 
so far as government only has a limited amount of resources to devote to social welfare, 
every penny spent on implementing rules and policies is a penny less spent on social 
payments to those in need. So the onus is on efficient uses of public resources. One 
example of this is the fact that promoting individual responsibility is not always the 
cheapest option. It is often argued that if government increased public expenditure on 
free education and training for the low-skilled, free child-care for single unemployed 
mothers, tax-breaks for those on low-wages, subsidies for employers willing to take on 
the long-term jobless, and so on, the result would be that more people enter the work 
place and money is saved that would otherwise be spent on costly unemployment
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benefits. Mead, for example, points to evidence in the United States that shows how 
workfare programmes have saved money for government (see Mead 1997: 24). (These 
strategies might even reduce some of the indirect social costs associated with 
unemployment such as crime and social unrest.) Yet the fact remains that spending more 
money on these sorts of strategies does not guarantee public savings. Consider the policy 
of offering free child-care to single unemployed mothers. Even if the State succeeds in 
encouraging such women back into the work place with the offer of free child-care, it is 
unlikely that women at the bottom end of the income spectrum will earn enough to make 
a net contribution to society through the relatively small amounts they give back in tax or 
that the money saved in unemployment benefits will exceed the cost of child-care 
provision.
One final practical detail that should be borne in mind is the relative wealth of each 
society. A society whose economy is relatively poor and so cannot tolerate high levels of 
taxation, cannot afford social policies similar in cost to those of a society that is relatively 
affluent. Van Parijs, for example, defends a basic income for all but stresses that this 
argument is provisional on the affluence of each society. He prescribes that in an 
‘opulent’ society each person should receive a basic income, even those who are 
unwilling to work. In a society that is not affluent, however, Van Parijs claims that 
access to income should not be unconditional (see Van Parijs 1995: 86).
With this detail in mind, we can now take up the issue of sustainability of 
unconditional basic income. In arguing for real freedom for all Van Parijs supports the
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highest sustainable basic income (see Van Parijs 1995: 38-41). Sustainable income can 
be understood in the following terms. Since income from government is funded through 
the contributions of working taxpayers, the economy requires plenty of labour to fund a 
high level. If the level of unconditional income is too high, however, fewer people will 
have the motivation to work and there will less revenue from general taxation to sustain 
that level. The problem is one of moral hazard.
The idea that we cannot simply rely on people’s innate desire to work for a living but 
must ‘make work pay’ is not new. The problem of moral hazard has been well 
understood and extensively written about ever since the Poor Laws were introduced. 
Mill’s Principles o f Political Economy is perhaps unmatched in this respect (see Mill 
1994: 355). If the amount of income a person receives irrespective of whether or not he 
works is too high, then this will have the consequence that large numbers of people do 
not bother to join the labour market. However, I should make it clear at this stage that 
moral hazard is more of a factor for some policies than for others. Consider, for example, 
Van Parijs proposal of the highest sustainable unconditional basic income. The exact 
level of basic income depends a great deal on moral hazard. If tax revenues are low 
because relatively few people are motivated to work and pay taxes, there will be less 
revenue for government and unconditional income cannot be sustained at a very high 
level. It is for this reason, I think, that Van Parijs suggests that unconditional income is 
most suitable in an opulent society (see Van Parijs 1995: 86).
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7.4 PREVENTION BETTER THAN CURE
A further practical detail I want to highlight is that in social welfare policy, as in other 
areas of life, prevention is often bietter than cure. It is often better for government to aim 
at fostering greater preventive responsibility rather than simply enforcing consequential 
responsibility. Why so? One reason why preventive responsibility is better has to do 
with possible benefits to the individual. In general, it seems better for individuals if they 
avoid disadvantage as opposed to being held responsible after the event at which point it 
might be possible only to mitigate those consequences. Public health and safety is one 
obvious example. Rather than putting all the emphasis on making sure that individuals 
bear a fair share of the costs of the risks they take, it is surely a good idea to find ways of 
promoting less dangerous ways of living to begin with. This helps to ensure that people 
remain healthy and that each person’s life is as successful as it can be.
How can this be achieved? One fairly obvious strategy is to increase the amount of 
information offered to people about the dangers associated with certain lifestyles as well 
as to offer guidance on the practical steps that people can take to reduce the risks and 
substantive opportunities to adopt healthier lifestyles. As Mill put it:
There is another kind of intervention which is not authoritative: when a 
government instead of issuing a command and enforcing it by penalties, adopts 
the course so seldom resorted to by governments, and of which such important
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use might be made, that of giving advice, and promulgating information. (Mill 
1994: 325)
Leaving people to fall into dire straits before holding them responsible is also an 
inefficient strategy from the perspective of the good of society as a whole. The arena of 
work is potentially another area where prevention makes a great deal of sense. Rather 
than ensuring that people bear the appropriate opportunity costs of not working by 
denying them unemployment benefit, it is perhaps also a good idea to find ways of 
encouraging them to take responsibility beforehand by looking for work. It is arguably a 
waste of intellectual capital not to tackle the causes of unemployment, lack of 
qualifications, skills, training, self-belief and so on, rather than simply leaving individuals 
to lead a life of unemployment and extreme poverty. As Gordon Brown has been at pains 
to point out, this waste is not merely to the detriment of the individuals concerned, but 
also to the economy as a whole (see Brown 1996; 1999).
A more mundane reason for incorporating an element of prevention is value for 
money. It might be difficult to prove beyond doubt that policies of preventive 
responsibility represent a more efficient use of public funds than policies of consequential 
responsibility. Much depends on the relative administrative costs of scrutinising claims 
for aid when things turn out badly, and trying to change people’s attitudes and behaviour 
to avoid disadvantage in the first place. But it is at least thinkable that the old adage, 
prevention is better than cure, holds true in this case and that public money is most 
effectively spent on prevention.
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7.5 POLITICAL GOALS
In addition to having to bear in mind issues of practicality and efficiency, the welfare 
planner must try to achieve certain political goals and pursue ends that an elected 
government might want to pursue. One clear illustration would be if our government has 
been elected with a clear mandate to promote the arts or the sciences or sports or all three 
and believes the best way to do so is for the government to use taxpayers money to 
support promising artists, scientists, and sports people. On this view, if we cannot rely on 
the market to support excellence and innovation in these areas, then as a society we 
should subsidise the income of talented individuals to bring them up to the level of 
income they would receive if they opted to employ their more rentable talents. Thus, 
consider Rakowski’s example of the poverty stricken artist struggling in obscurity against 
the aesthetic sense of his age (Rakowski 1991: 109). We could agree with Rakowski that 
the artist has no right to taxpayers’ money on grounds of justice but defend the policy of 
an artistic grant on the grounds that justice is not the only thing that matters. The fact that 
the artist adds to the cultural life of our community is a political goal that could justify the 
imposition of collective responsibility.
In fact one only has to reflect on the way that public funding of the arts, the sciences, 
and sports currently operates to see that sometimes fairness is not at the forefront of 
policy-making. The point is that thousands of people currently receive scholarships and
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bursaries (funded through taxpayers’ money) to develop their talents and to engage in 
worthwhile projects at home and abroad. However, when public institutions extend 
grants to artists, actors, musicians, sports men and women, explorers, scientists, poets and 
writers, generally they do not expect recipients to repay the money or limit their financial 
burden by working with the cheapest materials (say) or producing art that is guaranteed of 
commercial success. There is, then, a need to recognise other reasons for waiving 
individual responsibility besides justice -  a point readily accepted by choice/luck theorists 
(see, for example, Dworkin 2000: 128-129).
7.6 RESPONSIBILITY-PROMOTING POLICIES
Thus far we have the complex result that whichever rules and policies we adopt for 
catering to individual responsibility, these rules and policies should not only uphold 
principles of distributive justice and ideals about the good life but should also not 
overstep the limits of political authority, respect basic moral requirements of the State, 
represent an efficient use of taxpayers’ money, and help to pursue any political goals our 
governments might have at any given time. Ideally we require a set of policies that 
reflects each of these concerns. This balancing act could, in theory, make it difficult to 
arrive at definitive prescriptions about which policies we should favour. Nevertheless, I 
believe that the foregoing arguments do have some substantive policy implications -  
which implications I want to try to bring out in three important areas.
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A. Income and employment
I have argued, on grounds of justice, that people who are unable to work will have a 
right to income for as long as necessary. But I have also argued that it is reasonable even 
for those who are ‘voluntarily’ unemployed or underemployed to receive some level of 
subsidy. (The various possible reasons supporting this were discussed in chapter 5.) In 
addition to this, I have argued that for those individuals who engage in non-wage-eaming 
labour that contributes to society, justice also demands financial recognition of their 
labour. How much income should people receive? I have argued that the exact level of 
income is rightly a democratic decision for each society and does not necessarily have to 
be at the highest sustainable level. However, it is also clear that, as a minimum adequacy 
constraint, whichever level of income the State aims for must be sustainable. So, in a 
society which is not affluent -  where tax revenues depend heavily on the ratio between 
those people who are in work paying taxes and those who are out of work claiming from 
the State -  the level of income cannot be too high. In other words, to be feasible, the 
income level must be set at a level that is sustainable given the affects of moral hazard 
according to which the higher the income the more people are unlikely to want to work to 
earn above that level.
Nevertheless, access to income should not be dependent on prior tax contributions. 
This means that people do not have to pay into the system in order to qualify for benefits. 
Nor should access be dependent on people being in paid employment or training. These
335
conditions reflect the aim of this income: partly to support people who are unable to 
support themselves; partly to offer real freedom of occupation; partly to reflect people’s 
entitlement to an equal share of the earth’s natural resources; partly to recognise the 
contribution of certain types of labour to society. If people did have to pay into the 
system or already be in work or training in order to benefit, then it would destroy the 
point of this scheme as defined by the above reasons: it would disqualify from access to 
income people who have a right to income.
What about the problem of unintended harms? Consider first the plight of children 
bom into poverty. I believe that the foregoing proposals deal adequately with this 
problem. Under these proposals, carers will have a right to income during the period 
when they are at home bringing up their children. So there should not be a problem of 
visiting ‘the sins of the father’ on the child. The problem of shameful revelation, 
however, is perhaps less easy to deal with. One strategy is to say that since everyone has 
a right to some unconditional income simply by virtue of the fact everyone has a claim to 
an equal share of the world’s natural resources, we can side-step the need for talent- 
testing (see, for example, Hinton 2001). Another strategy is to argue that people are in 
fact likely to draw self-respect from living in a society where the affluent have a 
responsibility to provide an unconditional basic minimum for those who are not so 
fortunate (see, for example, Rawls 1971: 181; 1996: 318).
However, no strategy is perfect. One problem with unconditional basic income is 
that the level might turn out to be too low. The idea, for example, that we are all entitled
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to an equal share of the earth’s natural resources is helpful only if it turns out that an 
equal share is large enough to sustain a decent standard of living for all. But it is apparent 
that a great deal of the value of the natural resources that exist in the world today is 
‘added value’, so that an equal share of the earth’s natural resources, distributed across an 
immense population, might not come to much. Moreover, it is eminently possible that 
some people will need more income than others in order to achieve the same standard of 
living. Consider those people with special requirements for additional resources such as 
the disabled or mothers with young children. This means that in a relatively poor society 
where the highest sustainable basic income is relatively low, eligibility tests will be 
needed in order to target additional resources to those in particular need (see Van Parijs 
1995: 75-76). A second problem with unconditional income is that it could turn out to be 
too high. As the level of unconditional basic income increases, so does the complaint that 
it fails to take seriously concerns about choice-insensitivity and free-riding.
In short, I think that there is a genuine problem for social policy planners as to how to 
target benefits at people that have a right to them without, at the same time, humiliating 
recipients. This follows from taking an inclusive normative approach to questions of 
consequential responsibility. This, then, raises the following question: which is the more 
important consideration? In chapter 5 I said I doubted whether there are non-arbitrary 
priority rules between different criteria of justice. I stick by this claim now. Accordingly, 
we would potentially be dealing with equally important concerns of justice. In other 
words, the State could both have an obligation to target income and resources at those 
who have a right to them and a duty to avoid humiliating recipients.
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So what else can we say? We can, of course, say governments must strive to find 
ways of targeting benefits to those in need by means that are least offensive. However, 
where this is not possible, my official view is that it is rightly a matter for each society to 
decide, given its particular sense of what is most important, whether to focus on ensuring 
that resources are targeted at certain groups or to avoid shameful revelation by offering 
high levels of unconditional basic income. Either outcome is consistent with justice 
under my interpretation. Nevertheless, if a government does decide to target benefits, 
perhaps one mollifying thing I can say on this issue is that it is the responsibility of the 
State to guarantee the social bases of self-respect in a variety of different ways. So, even 
though government may have to impose some eligibility tests for access to income, it may 
find other ways of securing the social bases of those who are unable to work, such as 
through equal rights legislation and by increasing public spending on mobility and access 
arrangements.
In addition to all this, in chapter 6 I suggested it could be morally desirable for 
individuals to be able to assume greater self-reliance through work even if this outcome is 
to some degree optional as far as reasonableness is concerned. This is because we want 
to live in a good society not just a fair society and potentially a good society is one in 
which there is self-reliance. So, a further detail worth making plain is that the State has 
an important role to play in offering people the opportunity to take responsibility for their 
own livelihoods by working for a living. Most people would accept, I think, that if we are 
serious about promoting individual responsibility, then we must be prepared to support a
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system that offers everyone adequate opportunities to take responsibility. As David 
Blunkett has recently observed:
Just as we look to individuals to take responsibility for their lives and to take up 
the choices available to them, so we believe that the Government must offer the 
platform for that self-reliance. (Blunkett 2001: 51)
It would, of course, require a great deal of political will to guarantee that every person 
that wants to work has the offer of a full-time job or a place on a vocational training 
scheme or at university. However, even if it is, to some extent, a matter for each society 
to decide how much opportunity it offers, it is arguably incumbent on all governments to 
try to increase opportunities in this area. Governments could provide these sorts of 
opportunities in a variety of ways. It might be achieved through the provision of lifelong 
educational opportunities, free advice and information about jobs and job-seeking, 
subsidised transport and access arrangements for those who are disabled, or subsidised 
child-care for single parents. Pursuant to these measures, steps could also be taken to 
increase take-home pay such as introducing a national minimum wage. Subsidies could 
also be made available to employers who are willing to take on and train people who have 
previously been unemployed. There may even be a limited role for society as an 
employer of last resort for the long-term jobless, a proposal that has the support of Rawls 
(see Rawls 1996: lix). In the United Kingdom, for example, under the New Deal scheme, 
the Labour government has pledged to significantly increase the numbers of lone parents
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in work by offering a package of job-searching assistance, training and after-school care 
in order to help them to come off benefits if they so desire (see Blunkett 2001: 17, 250).
Notwithstanding these points, the State must also be careful in the way it advances 
paid employment as a moral ideal. Even if we believe that the State should try to increase 
opportunities for employment and financial self-reliance, it is equally important that it 
does not patronise citizens. It is one thing to offer people practical help, information and 
guidance about the ways they could improve their lot; quite another to assert that we 
know what is best for other people and have the right to push them in a particular 
direction. In the final reckoning, individuals should be free to decide how to lead their 
lives and what is suitable for them, which may include the decision not to work for a 
living. This is a clear implication of the value we place on autonomous choice.
My point is not that governments act illegitimately if they espouse views about 
human flourishing. Governments can, and often do, express views about how citizens 
might best improve their lot. Rather, what I am suggesting is that governments may not 
intervene authoritatively to coerce or intimidate citizens towards leading a particular way 
of life. This implies, for instance, that single unemployed mothers should not be made to 
feel as though they are doing something wrong by not earning a living in traditional 
labour markets. Thus, welfare officials should not have the power to intimidate single 
unemployed mothers into accepting training placements or jobs. Officials may offer 
guidance about how best to make work pay, but ultimately they should respect the sincere 
convictions of any single unemployed mother who believes that staying at home to look
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after her children is the best outcome for her and her offspring. Anderson reaches much 
the same conclusion in her article, “What is the Point of Equality?” (Anderson 1999: 323- 
324).
i *
B. Health and safety
I have argued that any shortfalls in medical expenses not reasonably funded by 
society at large are the responsibility of the individual. People who are struck down by 
maladies to which they are genetically predisposed, and have no ability to avoid, will 
have a strong claim against the rest of society for the full costs of treatment. In contrast 
to this, those who develop diseases or suffer injuries as a result of their own volition, will 
have a claim to much lesser subsidy. It is, however, a consequence of the inclusive theory 
of responsibility that if an agent has developed a disease or suffered an injury as a result 
of engaging in activities that contribute to society through public safety (say), then he or 
she will have a right to a greater level of subsidy in virtue of that contribution.
How, in practical terms, should government ensure that individuals pay their fair 
share of medical costs? I have argued that the ideal way to enforce consequential 
responsibility is for government to impose costs ex ante. This is because it balances out 
the good and bad luck of people who take the same risks but face different results, and 
ensures that people are not left without medical care. As argued above, it is legitimate for 
government to interfere in people’s lives in this way if the preservation of life is at stake.
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However, I also believe that our social policies should aim, wherever appropriate, at 
fostering preventive responsibility. Not only could this avoid serious injury and potential 
loss of life and limb, but it also reflects the value we place on individuals taking decisions 
about risk and assuming responsibility for their own health and safety. Hence, it is a 
further implication of my argument that the State should try to give people the 
opportunity to avoid risk and, to repeat a point made earlier, perhaps the best way to 
achieve this by means of public service information and guidance.
Finally, I should make it clear that the State also has a responsibility to preserve life, 
irrespective of whether it has already done everything it can to warn people against 
certain dangerous activities and irrespective of people’s ability to pay for medical care 
and emergency assistance. This responsibility is based on the idea that people have some 
rights merely by virtue of living in political societies. I am not suggesting that the State 
does not have an obligation to try to distribute the costs of medical care and emergency 
assistance in accordance with principles of justice. Instead, I am highlighting another, 
perhaps more fundamental role of the State, that is, to save lives. And once we accept the 
fact that the State has a responsibility to save lives, any imposition of individual 
responsibility becomes provisional. This means, for example, that even an uninsured 
negligent driver who ignored the rules of the road and is incapable of paying for his 
treatment should receive assistance. This implication reflects the fact that principles of 
justice are not the only things which matter.
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C. Production and consumption
As outlined above, there are powerful practical reasons why government should not 
adopt welfare as the currency of justice. The problem is not merely that, of the several 
metrics on offer, none has yet to be universally accepted. Finding out about people’s 
happiness, preference satisfaction, enjoyment, overall success, and so on, seems to require 
potentially intrusive investigations into people’s private lives. It also seems that such 
investigations are liable to inaccuracy and exploitation by claimants. Imagine the scene: 
‘Welcome to the ministry of welfare, we have lots of cash to give away, which aspects of 
your life could be more enjoyable and more successful, if only you had more money?’ 
However, we should not discount welfare entirely for the above reasons. Where such 
inequalities are easily and accurately ascertained, I believe the State should intervene 
where justice demands it. In some cases justice is served by offering additional resources 
to people who would otherwise be dissatisfied. In chapter 5, for instance, I argued that it 
is fitting for government to pay some level of subsidy to people who find themselves in 
the unlucky position of having expensive tastes.
Some argue that offering subsidies to people with expensive tastes is morally 
questionable because it is a part of a person’s good to take control of his or her likes and 
dislikes by adjusting them to fit what he or she can afford to pay for. I accept this 
argument and think subsidy should be reduced somewhat to take account of it. Even so, 
there is a further complication. This point about the value of autonomous decision-
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making assumes, perhaps, that individuals are able to make informed selections between 
different tastes and preferences. Hence, it is a further implication of my argument that in 
as much as we value choice in relation to consumption, ideally government should offer 
every individual access to a broad range of different experiences and lifestyles, including 
the expensive and inexpensive. The reason for this is that if somebody has had limited 
opportunities to try what is available, then it is unlikely that he or she will be able to make 
a genuine and informed choice, which it is alleged we value.
How can this be achieved? One obvious mechanism is for government to support 
schemes and projects that introduce individuals to an array of experiences and lifestyles. 
For example, local government could offer money to individuals in local communities to 
set up centres where people have the chance to sample a variety of products and activities, 
and meet people in their local neighbourhoods with differing views about what gives 
value to life. The aim of these initiatives would be to prevent the popular culture in each 
society from stifling the likes and dislikes of a minority, and to enable people to develop 
tastes and preferences in a free and informed way.
7.7 ENDS AND MEANS
It has been one conclusion of my investigation, then, that ideally some taxpayers’ money 
should be spent on giving people who are unemployed the practical support and positive 
encouragement they need to assume greater responsibility for their own livelihoods. I do
344
not claim that valuing this type of individual responsibility logically entails government 
action to promote it, but I do think it offers a practical reason to act. This reason takes the 
following form: if we value A, and believe that doing X, Y and Z will help to foster A, 
then we have a prima facie reason to do X, Y and Z. This can be done in different ways 
such as: by giving the idle access to income from the State in so far as this enables 
officials to exert influence over their attitudes and behaviour and encourage them to 
assume responsibility in the future; free or subsidised education and training; free or 
subsidised travel and child care; tax exemptions; perhaps a limited role for society as an 
employer of last resort.
However, I may face two objections at this point. One focuses on whether it makes 
sense to promote personal responsibility. A sceptic might ask: is not the point of 
individual responsibility that we should be proactive, acting on our own initiative and 
relying solely on our own efforts and resources to make both ends meet? If this is true, 
then surely it is muddled thinking to believe both in the value of individual responsibility 
and that government should intervene to encourage individuals to assume responsibility. 
This is an interesting objection but I do think it has an answer. Perhaps in an ideal world 
individuals would assume responsibility for their own lives spontaneously. But it does 
not follow from this that lesser degrees of individual responsibility are worthless. We 
may value those acts of individual responsibility that flow from personal initiative above 
those acts of individual responsibility that result from government intervention. Even so, 
holding this view about the relative value of acts of individual responsibility is perfectly 
consistent with the claim that all acts of individual responsibility can be valuable.
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A second objection focuses on the rights of taxpayers. The present discussion 
brought us to the suggestion that because we value individual responsibility government 
should pursue efficient means to foster it. However, this raises the following important 
question: do the ends justify the means? In order to answer this question we must make 
an assessment of how much we value individual responsibility. For the ends to justify the 
means it must be shown (1) that we place sufficiently high value upon individual 
responsibility to warrant the costs involved, and (2) that there is no alternative feasible 
policy that would yield the same result at lesser cost. This then requires a response to the 
further question: how can it be shown that the society in question values individual 
responsibility? No doubt there are different ways of showing that we value individual 
responsibility, but presumably the clearest expression is through the decision of voters to 
accept the policy. However, even if this can be shown we must also bear in mind the 
libertarian challenge that people have rights and there are things no government may do 
to them or make them do without violating their rights. In respect of responsibility- 
protection, I have argued that the State is justified in levying taxes on the wealthy in order 
to protect everyone’s capacity for responsible agency, including those who get themselves 
into trouble. But the present case is different. The question is this: what right does the 
State have to force taxpayers to fund responsibility-promotion?
A libertarian might claim that it is morally insupportable for the State to intervene to 
protect responsibility in the ways specified above. How so? Libertarians argue from the 
value of autonomy to very strong rights of non-interference to life, liberty and property.
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The basic thought is that since it is valuable for individuals to select a way of life that best 
suits them and for them to act in accordance with this self-determination, it is morally 
fitting that they should have a protected sphere of property and action. Hence, even if we 
agree both that individual responsibility can lead to self-respect and can itself embody 
autonomy and human flourishing, which are perceived as good things, and that moral 
agents ought to pursue individual responsibility in their own lives and ought to help 
others to pursue it in theirs, it does not follow from this that the State ought to enforce 
this as a collective activity. On the contrary, libertarians may insist that individuals qua 
taxpayers have rights to property and the State violates those rights by forcing them to 
contribute to responsibility-protection. On this view, getting people off drugs (say) is 
rightly a matter for private individuals and charities to pursue, perhaps with some special 
responsibility falling on family members. This is one example of a standard libertarian 
argument against welfare-supporting intervention by the State. It rests on the claim that 
individual citizens have an inviolable right to live in society and retain their income and 
wealth without being forced to take a part in the welfare of others.
I grant the relevance of this objection but deny its power. In my view the correct 
response to this objection is quite simply that accepting the value of autonomy does not 
entail libertarian rights and the minimal state. An equally valid view is that we should 
promote personal responsibility because we value autonomy. Putting the same argument 
another way, if part of the justification for very strong rights to non-interference is that we 
value autonomy, then it is morally appropriate to leave a proportion of people’s income 
and wealth outside of the protected sphere in order to fund autonomy-protecting policies.
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Otherwise libertarianism is bound to lead to some people’s misadventures going 
untreated, which, in turn, will have an adverse affect on their future autonomy. On this 
view, it is acceptable to impose taxes on people who are capable of exercising individual 
responsibility in order to ensure the same capacity for all. None of this is intended to 
demonstrate that autonomy cannot be used to justify at least some very strong rights to 
non-interference. Rather, the point is that using autonomy to justify the very strong rights 
of taxpayers to reap all of the rewards of their labours is questionable in situations where 
the result is detrimental to autonomy.
In this chapter I have tried to develop a set of rules and policies that best advance our 
concerns for individual responsibility whilst taking into account a range of other 
considerations which impact on social welfare planning. I cannot, of course, with the 
foregoing remarks, claim to have addressed all of the moral concerns and practical 
difficulties relevant to the subject matter. But I am confident that enough has been said to 
underline the sorts of areas that any adequate account must address as well as some 
specific difficulties peculiar to responsibility-sensitivity. At the very least, I hope I have 
been able to flesh out the policy implications of my argument in a plausible way.
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8 CONCLUSION
The thesis has explored the deeper meaning of individual responsibility and has compared 
the relative merits of different interpretations of consequential responsibility in dealing 
with a range of questions of social justice and welfare. It has also explored the different 
values which support sensitivity to individual responsibility and has examined which 
social policies might best advance our concerns. In this chapter I want to briefly 
summarise my main arguments and indicate some of the reasons why I think they are 
important, perhaps startling even.
The idea of individual responsibility has come to the fore in recent years partly as a 
result of developments in normative egalitarian theory. It has been suggested that 
insisting on strict equality is unfair since it is insensitive to inequalities for which 
individuals are rightly held responsible. In spelling out this idea, some writers (including 
Cohen and Ameson) have focused on the idea that individuals should bear the 
consequences of their voluntary choices. However, as I have tried to show in the 
investigation, this formulation of the argument is too crude to bear the weight of our 
intuitions in specific cases. Partly in response to these counter examples, Dworkin and 
Rakowski have suggested that even if it is misleading to say that people ‘choose’ paths 
that lead to misfortune, it is at least true that they do not typically repudiate the aspects of 
their personalities that prompt their behaviour. And so it is fitting to hold them 
individually responsible. However, closer scrutiny of specific cases reveals that justice is 
more subtle in its implications than even these egalitarians seem to recognise.
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Even when individuals have made a choice or, if not a choice, endorsed their personal 
ends, it is not obvious that justice is served by leaving them to bear the consequences of 
this. Individuals with expensive tastes can have a case for subsidy; there is an argument 
that people who are unemployed, low paid or non-wage-eaming should have access to 
income from government; it is possible to defend people’s right to subsidised education 
and training later on in life; it is very far from just that fire-fighters and other public 
servants should take risks on other people’s behalves but not be insured against the 
injuries they might suffer as a result. So, even if there is an initial case for holding 
someone responsible for a situation in which he finds himself -  either because he has 
chosen to behave in a certain way or because he identifies with the relevant features of his 
personality which steer and motivate him -  we might still be justified in not holding him 
responsible. I have argued that the more important egalitarian aim should be to find a set 
of rules and policies for dividing consequential responsibility which can be justified to 
those concerned on the balance of reasons in play.
Of course, the idea that reasonableness is crucial to political judgements of 
consequential responsibility is not unanticipated by the current literature. Both Rawls and 
Dworkin, for example, believe that considerable progress can be made in defining a just 
division of consequential responsibility by looking at the sorts of principles which would 
be selected by moral agents placed under conditions of freedom and equality. However, 
some of the last mentioned results -  the fact that, for example, at least some individuals 
with expensive tastes have a right to subsidy, and those who are unemployed, low paid or
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non-wage-eaming should receive an income from government for the contribution they 
make to society -  are not anticipated by Rawls and Dworkin.
Perhaps the most disconcerting thing about the approach defended here is that it relies 
on intricate evaluations of what can or cannot be justified to those concerned, including 
comparisons of the distribution of benefits and burdens under alternative divisions of 
responsibility using various criteria of distribution; subtle assessments of what does and 
what does not maximise advantage, and far from prosaic evaluations of special duties 
society has towards individuals. I accept this point and, with it, the charge that the 
inclusive lacks the elegance or formal simplicity of existing accounts. However, it seems 
to me that even if the truth is somewhat messier than we would like it to be, that does not 
mean we should not pursue it to the fullest possible extent.
In short, I have tried to advance knowledge of individual responsibility by clarifying 
the criteria according to which individuals are rightly held responsible for disadvantages 
and misfortunes. And, even if my analysis of justice filters out some assignments of 
individual responsibility that other egalitarians suggest are fair, it is at least in a tradition 
of thought that other egalitarians can accept. By focusing on rules and principles that 
cannot reasonably be rejected, the approach defended here accords with the basic 
egalitarian premise that government must show equal concern for the lives of all citizens.
Nevertheless, another possibly surprising thing about individual responsibility is that 
it is supported by other values besides justice. I say ‘possibly’ surprising because the fact
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that we care about individual responsibility for motives other than justice will not be 
surprising to some. There is a wealth of philosophical material on social welfare policy 
that is not exercised by the insular*'.question: equality of what? And many writers are 
concerned with a much broader range of issues such as: the question of what kind of life 
it is good to lead, what type of society we wish to live in, and how best to achieve our 
concerns.
We have seen that different traditions highlight different aspects of the ideal of 
individual responsibility. The Kantian tradition emphasises the importance of finding a 
division of consequential responsibility that can be justified to all: in some cases we can 
say that holding individuals responsible for the consequences of their actions satisfies this 
constraint. Another tradition highlights the value of certain ways of life and that part of 
what makes a good person good is. their living in conformity with human nature: it is 
argued that humans are essentially self-reliant beings. Finally, there is a tradition that 
stresses the fact that we are beings who are capable of deciding for ourselves what is the 
best kind of life to lead: so even if a majority has a shared sense of the kind of life it is 
good to lead, except where people’s lives are at stake, it is illegitimate to compel 
individuals to lead that life against their will.
In response to the various normative values and traditions that seem to support 
individual responsibility, I have developed a set of policy prescriptions in the areas of 
production and consumption, income and employment, and health and safety. In 
defending these prescriptions I have also taken into account a number of practical and
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economic criteria for judging the best policies. On the one hand, I have argued that faced 
with detailed questions of consequential responsibility -  where practitioners have to 
implement principles of distributive justice, achieve political goals, show sensitivity to 
people’s rights and the basic aims of political society but at the same time respond to the 
special circumstances of each society, the particular facts of specific cases and the 
practical demands of efficiency and cost -  a nuanced approach is needed, in which 
policies are adjusted as and when the balance shifts too far in the direction of either too 
much or too little individual responsibility. On the other hand, I have also argued that 
ideally social welfare policy should aim at fostering greater preventive responsibility 
among individuals, rather than merely enforcing consequential responsibility, either by 
imposing costs or denying aid.
Notwithstanding all this, I am aware that my conclusions are limited. Firstly, I have 
only explored the issue of negative responsibility (that is, responsibility for misfortunes 
and disadvantages) often ignoring arguments about individual responsibility couched in 
terms of the rights of ‘winners’ to reap the rewards of their endeavours. In many 
instances individuals will want to be able to increase their earnings by working harder and 
gaining more qualifications. Others will want to increase their income by taking financial 
gambles that pay-off such as buying company shares or investing in rental properties. 
This raises a question as to whether or not such individuals have a right to retain these 
rewards. When and how far is it right to tax those who are successful? Secondly, 
although I have considered at length different criteria of consequential responsibility, I
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have only briefly touched upon other kinds of responsibility used in ethics and 
jurisprudence.
In reply to the first point, I accept that my investigation has been limited to cases of 
personal disadvantage. I have claimed very little about whether, and to what extent, 
individuals have a right to retain their advantage. I also accept that a complete account of 
these issues would have to address important questions of personal advantage such as the 
taxation of the rich and successful. Governments cannot set about the business of 
relieving disadvantage without paying attention to how much, and from whom, it has a 
right to collect taxes in order to pay for relief. Even so, it seems to me that most, if not 
all, of the criteria discussed in chapters 5 and 6 could easily apply to these other 
questions. The distinction between choice and luck, for example, is intended to apply as 
much to those who are the benefactors of good luck as to the victims of bad luck.
In response to the second point, it would, of course, imbue our theories of justice with 
a holistic elegance if roughly the same criteria of responsibility were applicable across the 
board. Accordingly, some writers -  I specifically have in mind Arthur Rispstein’s wide- 
ranging book, Equality, Responsibility, and the Law (esp. 267) -  have tried to develop 
unified accounts of responsibility for distributive, corrective, and retributive justice. 
However, my own view is that we should keep an open mind as to whether principles of 
responsibility suitable for distributive justice and social welfare are equally applicable in 
other areas, and vice versa. It might be that the aims and concerns of holding people 
consequentially responsible for the disadvantages and misfortunes of their own lives are
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very different from those aims and concerns associated simply with blaming people for 
moral wrongdoing, or with holding people liable for legal sanction in the case of rights 
violations.
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